

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 1

14 November 1921

No. 1. Conference committee.  
Chief, League of Nations Section  
For Limitation of Armaments.

To Secretary-General (of Japanese Delegation).

Subject: Observations On The U.S. Secretary of State's  
Proposal of November 12.

According to the statement made by the Secretary of State, the U.S. Government intends to submit another formal proposal on the limitation of naval strength. An accurate discussion on the U.S. Proposal may therefore not be possible until after the above proposal has been made. But since the general effect of the U.S. proposal can be perceived from the Secretary of State's statement, we submit the following observations.

First: Proposal to reconsider the matter of replenishment ten years later.

The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to bind the respective signatory powers permanently in naval strength for the U.S., British Empire and Japan.

However, such factors as fast changing international relations, differences between nations as regards ups and downs in their national destiny, the progress of science

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However, such factors as fast changing international relations, differences between nations as regards ups and downs in their national destiny, the progress of science



leading to a boundless development of armaments, etc., render it difficult to recognize as reasonable the Secretary of State's proposal of fixing permanently the ratio of naval strength among the U.S., Great Britain and Japan at 5:5:3 and to indicate the standard of naval strength by tonnage.

Therefore, while we should willingly accept the Secretary of State's proposal, it should be in order for us to propose that ten years later, should a necessity arise to make alterations due to changes in circumstances, another conference should be held in Washington for free exchanges of opinion with a view to establishing a reasonable and practical agreement.

Moreover, the following matters are worth being considered as reference in respect of this question.

1. The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to establish the principle of maintaining status quo on armaments.

However, such severe opposition was voiced by the U.S. and other powers against the so-called "status-quo" principle in connection with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant that the fate of the said article was, in effect, virtually the same as though it had been rescinded.

2. The fact that the United States, whose armaments did not even become an issue when the question of arms limitation was discussed at the first Hague Peace Conference held some twenty years ago, is today sponsoring a disarmament conference is one instance showing how greatly the international situation

may change.

3. Being confident that Japan is destined to develop Greatly in the future, we do not consider it advisable to adhere to an agreement which would permanently restrain us on the problem of armament on which the basis of national strength should be sound. Furthermore, for us to openly agree to maintain the ratio of 5 to 3 against the U.S. and Britain would be a grave problem affecting Japan's prestige. We deem it necessary therefore to take every precaution so that the agreement may not become absolute and immutable.

Second. Proposal to have the agreement on armament limitation take the form of a treaty.

The execution of armament limitation, unlike in the case of to its expansion, does not require the approval of the Diet under the municipal law of any country. It is not impossible to carry it out by the sole authority of the Government. Consequently it is not necessarily impossible to adopt the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes or of an agreement which does not require ratification, rather than the form of a formal treaty.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Japanese Government gladly accepted the invitation to the Conference and are now considering the proposal made by the Secretary of State with good will because first, arms limitation is the demand of world opinion and second, we were moved by the sincerity of the



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American Government in taking the initiative to carry out arms limitation. It, therefore, becomes important, before Japan's attitude on this question is determined, to know whether or not the public opinion in America will support the Secretary of State's proposal. From which it follows that Japan should insist upon the arms limitation being effected in the form of a treaty, and hence requiring ratification by the U.S. Senate. If, instead, it is effected merely as an agreement between governments, it cannot be guaranteed that arguments regarding its invalidity will not arise in consequence of change of governments, as was the case some time ago in the case of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement. It must be said that Japan cannot possibly rely upon the choice of so indefinite a method for determining a question having such an important bearing on the nation's independence and destiny as that of national defense.

Remarks:

Although there have been numerous instances in the Past when treaties having important bearing upon the question of national defense, such as alliances, were concluded without the approval by the Diet, the principal reason for following such procedure was the necessity of maintaining secrecy. However, things differ today and questions on national defense should be discussed and determined in the light of public

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opinion. Whereupon we consider ~~it~~ unnecessary to adhere to such precedents.

Third. Proposal to designate a definite date for the enforcement of arms limitation agreement.

The Secretary of State proposed that the U.S. possess 18 capital ships, the British Empire 22 and Japan 10 capital ships "within three months after the making of the agreement", but what is meant by "the making of the agreement" is not clear.

1. In case the form of an agreement which does not require ratification is adopted, the time indicated would be when the respective delegates sign the agreement at Washington. The reason why such a form of agreement should be opposed has already been set forth above. Therefore this interpretation should not be adopted.

2. In case it takes the form of a treaty, ~~it~~ should mean, as a matter of pure logic, the time when all the signatory powers have completed ratification, that is when the ratification by the last nation has been finished. In this case, should the respective powers wait for the other nation to ratify it, it must be borne in mind that the time of conclusion of the treaty would only be gratuitously prolonged. Again, should the ratification by any single power be unduly delayed owing to debating in Diet etc., the other two powers would be forced to stand in an unstable position.

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As a measure of expediency, therefore, the proposal may be made that it would be most practical to have the three months period begin to run from the time when the delegates of the U.S., Britain and Japan sign the treaty at Washington. It is conceivable that, in view of the American desire to carry out limitation of armaments at an early date, that such a proposal may be made.

In such a case we would propose that a signatory power which fails to ratify within three months after the signing should be deemed to have refused ratification (that the agreement will not be formed if even one nation rejects ratification goes without saying); and also, in view of the special circumstances of our country, to change the period from three months to five months.

In brief, this problem is the first important question which will be encountered in connection with the execution of the limitation agreement.

We consider it necessary to suggest determining this point clearly beforehand.



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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Observations on the U.S. Secretary of State's Proposal of Nov. 12" is an excerpt from the documents which is still in my custody at present by the order of my chief at the Washington Conference in 1921.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

7

米國國務卿十一月十二日ノ提案ニ對スル意見

國務卿ノ演說ニ依レバ米國政府ハ海軍力ノ制限ニ關シ更ニ正式ノ提案ヲ爲スヘキ趣ナルヲ以テ米國案ニ對スル精確ナル論究ハ右正式提案ノ後ニ非サレハ之ヲ行ヒ得サルヘキモ國務卿ノ演說ニ依リテモ尙且米國案ノ大體ヲ推知シ得サルニアラサルヲ以テ右ニ關スル意見ヲ左ニ具申セントス

第一、補充ニ關スル事項ハ十年後再議ニ附スヘキ旨提議スルコト

國務卿ノ提案ハ日英米三國ノ海軍力ニ付永遠ニ各締約國ヲ拘束セントスルモノナリト雖モ國際關係力變轉窮リナキコト、各國ノ國運ニ消長ノ別アルコト、科學ノ進歩力限りナク軍器ヲ發達セシムルコト等ノ理由ハ日英米三國海軍力ノ比例ヲ永遠ニ五・五・三・ニ一定シ且噸數ヲ以テ海軍力ヲ示ス基準トナサントスル國務卿ノ提案ノ必スシモ妥當ナラサルヲ認メシム

故ニ國務卿ノ提案ニ對シテハ欣然之ニ應諾ノ意ヲ表スヘキモ十年後ニ至リ事態ノ變化ニ依リ之ニ對シ何等力變更ヲ加フルノ必要ヲ生スル場合ニハ再ヒ華府ニ會議シテ腹藏ナキ意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ以テ其後ニ對スル合理的且實際的協



大正十年十一月十四日

第一號

合議係

軍備制限國際連盟關係部主任

事務總長

件名

米國國務卿十一月十二日ノ提案ニ對スル意見

起草者

主任

第三軍備制限ノ協定ニハ條約ノ形式ヲ採ルヘキ旨提議スルコト

軍備制限ノ實行ハ其擴張ト異リ各國ノ國法上議會ノ承認ヲ要セス單ニ政府ノ  
 權限ヲ以テ之ヲ實行シ得サルニモ非ス從テ特ニ嚴然タル條約ノ形式ニ依  
 ラズシテ外交文書ノ交換又ハ批准ヲ要セサル協定ノ如キ形式ニ依ルコト必ス  
 シモ不可能ニ非スト雖モ抑モ帝國政府力今回ノ會議招請ニ對シ欣然參列ヲ應  
 諾シ且國務卿ノ提案ニ對シ厚意の考慮ヲ拂ハントスル所以ハ一ハ軍備ノ制限  
 カ世界ノ公論ナルコト他ハ米國政府ニ於テ自ラ進ンデ制限ヲ斷行セントスル  
 誠意アルニ動力サレタルカ爲ナレハ米國ノ輿論力國務卿ノ提案ヲ確認スルモ  
 ノナルヤ否ヤヲ確知スルハ帝國カ本國ニ對スル態度ヲ決定スル上ニ重大緊  
 切ノ關係ヲ有スル前提條件ナラサルヘカラス從テ之ヲ條約ノ形式トナシ米國  
 上院ノ批准ヲ經ヘキモノトナスハ帝國ニ於テ最モ重要視スヘキ要件ナラスト  
 セス若シ然ラスシテ單ニ政府間ニ於ケル申合セトナストキハ政府ノ變更等ニ  
 依リ他日或ハ彼ノ石井「ランシング」協定無効論ノ如キモノ生スルナキヲ保  
 セス而シテ一國ノ獨立ト運命トニ絶大ノ關係ヲ有スル國防問題ヲ決定セント  
 スルニ當リ斯カル不確實ナル方法ヲ採ハントスルハ帝國政府ノ到底安ンシテ



定ヲ確立スルコトト致度旨我方ヨリ提議スルコト可然ト思考ス

尙本同盟ニ付キ參考トスルニ足ルヘキ事項次ノ如シ

一、口務卿ノ提案ハ軍備ニ付キ現狀維持ノ原則ヲ確立セントスルモノナリ

然ルニ所謂「スタチュー、クオ」ノ原則ニ對シテハ國際連盟規約第十條ニ

關シテモ激烈ナル反對論米國及各口ニ起リ遂ニ同條ヲシテ事實削除ニ等シ

キ運命ニ合セシメタリ

二、二十餘年前ノ第一回海牙平和會議ニ於テ軍備制限問題カ討論セラレタル際

ニハ米國ノ軍備ノ如キハ實ハ同盟トセラレサリシニ拘ラス今日米國カ軍備

制限會議ノ首唱者トナレルカ如キハ國際ノ形勢カ如何ニ大ナル變化ヲ來ス

モノナルカラ示ス一例タルヘシ

三、帝國ノ同盟ハ將來益々進展シテ窺リナキモノト信ス從テ口力ニ基礎ヲ置ク

ヘキ軍備ノ問題ニ付キ永遠ニ拘束ヲ受クルカ如キ協定ニ參加スルハ實際ニ

適セサルモノト認ム加之英米ト五對三ノ比例ヲ保ツヘキコトヲ公然約束ス

ルカ如キハ一國ノ權威ニ關スル重大ナル問題ナレハ成ルヘク之ヲ絕對不棄ノ

モノナラシメサル爲十分慎重ナル考慮ヲ要スヘキモノト認ム

二、條約ノ形式ニ依ル場合ニ於テハ純理上各締約國ノ全部カ批准ヲ行ヒタル時即チ最後ニ批准ヲ行ヒタル國ノ批准カ行ハレタル時ヲ意味スヘキモノナルヘシ此場合若シ各締約國ニ於テ互ニ他國ノ批准ヲ待チテ批准セントスルカ如キコトアルトキハ條約成立ノ時期ハ徒ニ遅延ヲ免レサルモノト心得ベシ又或一口ニ於ケル批准カ議會ニ於ケル討議等ニ依リ意外ニ手間取ル場合ニハ他ノ二口ハ之ニ依リ勢ヒ不安定ナル位置ニ立タサルヘカラサルヘシ茲ニ於テカ便宜ノ措置トシテ口英米三口ノ全權委員カ華府ニ於テ條約ニ記名關印シタル時ヲ以テ三ヶ月ノ期間起算點トナス方實際的ナリトノ議起ラサルヲ保セス米口側ニ於テ急速軍備ノ制限ヲ實行セントスル希望アルニ願ミ或ハ斯カル主張ヲ見ルニ至ルコト有リ得ヘシトモ察セラル此場合我方ニ於テハ若シ記名關印後三ヶ月以内ニ批准ヲ行ハサル口アルトキハ之ヲ以テ批准ヲ拒否シタルモノト認ムルコト（一口ニテモ批准ヲ拒否スル口アルトキ協定カ成立セサルハ勿論ナリ）及我國特別ノ事情ニ願ミ三ヶ月ヲ五ヶ月ニ改メ度キコトヲ提議スヘシ



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 軍備制限ノ實行ハ其擴張ト異リ各國ノ口法上議會ノ承認ヲ要セス單ニ政府ノ  
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之ニ信認シ得サル所ナリト言ハサルヘカラス

附言

從來同盟條約ノ如ク國防上重大ナル關係ヲ有スル條約カ議會ノ承認ヲ經ス  
シテ締結セラレタル事例極メ多シト雖モ主トシテ秘密ヲ必要トスルカ爲  
ニ出テタル便宜ノ方策ニ外ナラス然ルニ今日ハ舊時ト異リ寧ラ輿論ニ依リ  
國防ノ問題カ討議決定セラルヘキ時代ナレハ徒ニ此等ノ先例ニ拘泥スルノ  
要ナキモノト認ム

第三、軍備制限協定實施ノ時期ヲ明確ナラシムヘキ旨提議スルコト

曰翁卿ハ「協定ノ作成後三ヶ月以内ニ」米國ハ主力艦十八隻英國ハ同二十二  
隻日本ハ同十隻ト爲スヘキ旨提議シタルモ「協定ノ作成」*making of the*

*agreement*

トハ果シテ如何ナル時期ヲ意味スルモノナルカ不問ナリ

一批准ヲ要セサル協定ノ形式ニ依ル場合ニハ華府ニ於テ各口全權委員カ協定  
ニ記名調印シタル時ヲ指スコトトナルヘシ

斯カル形式ノ協定ニ反對スヘキハ已ニ述べタル所ノ如ク從テ此解釋ハ採用  
スヘカラス

要之本問題ハ制限協定ノ實行上最初ニ達着スヘキ最も重要ナル問題ナレハ  
豫メ明確ニ之ヲ決定シ置クヘキ旨提議スルノ要アリト認ム



文書の出所竝に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した日本語に依つて書かれ八葉からなる「米田國務卿十一月十二日ノ提案ニ對スル意見」と題する文書（附屬書第一）は私が一九二一年華府會議の際上官より保管を命ぜられ現に私が所持して居るものの寫に相違ないことを證明する

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲された

同日 同所

立會人

奥山八郎

Mr. Balfour's address bearing on  
abolition of Anglo-Japanese Alliance made  
at the 4th Plenary Session of Washington  
Disarmament Conference, December 10, 1921.

- Official Conference Report (Government  
Printing Office, Washington), pp. 170  
and 172.

Mr. Balfour (speaking in English): Mr. Chairman and Gentle-  
men of the Conference:

You have heard an exposition by Senator Lodge of the Contents  
of this Treaty, admirable in its clarity, perfect in its literary  
form, and you have just heard the way in which this Treaty strikes  
a great Frenchman in its world relations; you have heard his  
views, in an eloquent speech by one of the greatest masters of  
eloquence now living. (Applause.)

So far as I am concerned, I would most gladly leave the matter  
in their hands, for I have nothing to add to what they have said  
upon the general aspects of the Treaty. If I rise to occupy your  
attention for one or two moments it is not to deal with the Treaty  
in its entirety, but merely to say something about one clause in  
that Treaty in which only my friends from Japan and the British  
Empire Delegation can regard themselves as immediately interested.



although I think it touches, in truth and in reality, the interests of the whole world.

You will have noticed that Article IV provides that when this Treaty receives its ratification at the hands of the Signatory Powers, at that moment the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain comes to an end. Now, I am perfectly well aware that the Treaty between Great Britain and Japan has been the cause of much sear-chings of heart, of some suspicions, of a good deal of animadver-sion in important sections of opinion in the United States, and I think that from the historical point of view that attitude may at first cause surprise, for certainly nothing was further from the thoughts of the original framers of the Treaty between Japan and Great Britain than that it could touch in the remotest way, either for good or for evil, the interests of the United States. The United States seemed as remote from any subject touched in the original agreement, as Chile or Peru.

Now what has caused the change in what I think was the origina view taken in the United States by all sections of opinion? To what is it that the change of opinion is due? I think it is due to the fact that a state of international tension did arise in the Pacific area-and I hope I may incidentally say that it is now for-ever set at rest (applause)-but at all events it did arise in the area of the Pacific Ocean, and critics in the United States began to say to themselves, "Why is there this Treaty between Japan and

Great Britain? What further interest does it serve?" They called to mind the fact that it originally came into being on account of the aggressive attitude taken in Far Eastern affairs by Russia and Germany, and they asked themselves, "Is there any further danger from Russia? Is there any further peril to be feared from Germany?" And when they answered that question, as of course they were obliged to answer it, in the negative; when they perceived that the practical objects for which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was brought into being no longer existed, that history had wiped them out, they said to themselves, "Why, then, is this Treaty continued? May it not in certain conceivable eventualities prove hampering and injurious in case strained relations should become yet more strained?"

I understand that point of view; but there is another point of view which I want you to understand, and with which even those who disagree with it will sympathize. There is no audience that I would rather appeal to than an American audience on the point I am just going to mention. This Treaty, remember, was not a Treaty that had to be renewed; it was a Treaty that ran until it was formally denounced by one of the two parties to it. It is true that the objects for which the Treaty had been created no longer required international attention. But, after all, that Treaty (or its predecessors) had been in existence within a few days of twenty years. It had served a great purpose in two great wars. It had stood the strain of common sacrifices, common



anxieties, common efforts, common triumphs.

When two nations have been united in that fiery ordeal, they can not at the end of it take off their hats one to the other and politely part as two strangers part who travel together for a few hours in a railway train. Something more, something closer, unites them than the mere words of the Treaty; and, as it were, gratuitously and without a cause to tear up the written contract, although it serves no longer any valid or effective purpose, may lead to misunderstandings in one nation just as much as the maintenance of that Treaty has led to misunderstandings in another. Great Britain therefore found herself between the possibilities of two misunderstandings; a misunderstanding if she retained the Treaty, a misunderstanding if she denounced the Treaty; and we have long come to the conclusion that the only possible way out of this impasse, the only possible way of removing those suspicions and difficulties which are some of the greatest obstacles to that condition of serene peace which is the only tolerable condition, after all, for civilized people was that we should annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outworn and unnecessary agreement and replace it by something new, something effective, which should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific.

(Applause.)

DRF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.2

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Mr. Balfour's Address bearing on abolition of Anglo-Japanese Alliance made at the 4th Plenary Session of Washington Disarmament Conference Dec. 10, 1921" (Annex 2) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Report of Washington Naval Disarmament Conference which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ Fnamoto Jui  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /S/ Okuyama Hachiro  
(seal)

5



Def. Doc. 1904-5

文書の真所並に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依る書は四葉からなる  
「Mr. Balfour's address bearing on abolition of Anglo-  
Japanese Alliance made at the 4th Plenary Session  
of Washington Disarmament Conference,

December 10, 1921」と題する文書(附屬書第二)は現に  
私の所持する華海海軍軍縮會議の報告書の板  
本に相違ないことも證明する

昭和二十二年七月二十日 於東京

原本 重治 (破)

右署名捺印は自合の面前に於て爲されに  
同日於同所

立會人 奥山 二郎 (奥山)

No. 1

Def. Doc. # 1904-2

No. 2

一九二一年十二月十日ワシントン軍縮會議の第四回總會に於て行はれたる日英同盟廢棄案に關するバルフォア氏の演説

會議正式報告(ワシントン政府印刷所)

PP-701-72

バルフォア氏(英語演説)會議議長及紳士諸君  
諸君はロンドン院議員による明析にして正確な文辭形  
式により完全に本條約内容の説明がなされたものと聽  
取したなお諸君はその甚密の關係に於て偉大なる一ツラ  
ス人の本條約に關する見解を現在に於ける最も有力な  
雄辯を統一して聽取するに値する

私の関する限り私は本問題に關する最も切實な彼等の意中  
に妥協を欲するものである。この理由は彼等が同條約の  
總体について無きものに私は何等追加すべきものも持た  
ぬからである。併し私がさう諸君の注意を喚起せんとす  
る点があるがそれをもつて敢へて同條約全文を取扱はんとす  
るものでなく唯、同條約中の一條項についてある事をいは  
んと認するのみである

それは日本より来る私の友人及英國代表者は彼等  
自身こそ直接利害關係者であるとの如く考へるので  
あるが実はそれは金世界の利害に關聯するものである  
と思惟される



1904-21

#

Def. Doc.

No. 3

諸君は同條約の署名國にも批准されば本條に規定されたる通りこの瞬間に於いて日英間の條約は終末に歸するものである今私は日英條約の多分に腹中の擇り合ひとなつた多分の疑惑を起し合衆國に於ける各方面の批判の重要な部分の原動力となし居ることを充分承知しつゝ、歴史的觀望よりすれば米國人のかく如き能くは驚愕に値するものである日英間の該條約立案の者。本条の思想からは吾等何れにせよ合衆國の利害。如きは最も遠隔の道に於いて接觸するものと考へたに思ふ。かつたところから合衆國は本条の條約に關しては如何なる態度からとも無關係にらしむに恰も千裡一或はべしに於ける關係の如く遠く見られてゐたと思はれる合衆國內各方面に於ける意見は本条はかく如きものなりしならん該條約に対する見解の變化を來させるものには余計にありやといへば太平洋地域に於いて起れる國際關係の緊張狀態の事實に負ふべきであると思へらるゝそれは今や永久に靜謐であることを私は希望すると附け加へて言はうと欲するものである(拍手)然しとにかくそれは太平洋の地域に於いて起る合衆國內に於ける批判が彼等自身より先づ語り始められ何故に該條約が日英間に存在するか「これ以上如何なる利益を齎すであらうか」との疑問が起るに至つたのである。彼等によれば元來ルンバ及びドイツにより極東問題に於

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110.4

いふ取らぬ侵略的態になつてゐる事實を相起すこと  
あらうが然し今や此の危険ありや又ドイツも憂  
慮するこれ以上の危禍あり得るか。この質問に対して  
彼等の答は、何論否定的ならざるを得ない。彼等は日英  
同盟締結の實際上の目的が最早も存在しない事態を知  
つたとき、歴史はそれらを取り去つた。然らば何故にこの條約  
が繼續されなければならぬかと自問するであらうある偶  
發事件の勃發に際しこの條約が障礙を爲し國際同  
係を更に緊張せしむる懼れなりや否や。私はこの見解  
と了解するものであるが更に諸君の了解を求むる他の處  
がある

これに付しては意見の異にする人々にも同情されあらう  
私が説明せんとするものは他の者に対してより寧ろ時に  
アフリカ人の聴衆に訴へんとするものである

該條約は更改せらるべき條約ではなく正式に廢棄せら  
るゝことは有効に存続すべき性質のものであることを知  
る國は尙ほ少なぬ

兩條約締結の目的は既に世界から注意が拂はれなくな  
つたことは事實である

ともあらばあれ該條約(或は其の先驅者等)は~~半~~年余に  
亘り存在した

それは二大戦争における大目的に寄與したそれは共同の機  
體共同の眞實忠誠共同の努力共同の勝利に貢献した

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No. 5

二つの国民が互いに鉄道の試練に於いて結合するに至る  
のはその終局に於いて恰もたまたま汽車中で初めて知り  
合ひしやう数時間の旅行を共にした二人の旅行者が別れに  
際し互いに帽子を取って別れるといふが如き態にならねば  
難いといふのではないが 兩國の間に條約の文言以上のあ  
るものより緊密なものであるものが存在する よしその條約がも  
はや何事かの意義はなく或は目的に対して有効なる寄与  
するものなくとも條約文書を理由もなくして引裂くが如き  
ことはその條約を継続するに他國の誤解を誘致す  
ると同様にまた他國の誤解を招くものである 今英  
國は二つの誤解を受ける可能性がある 即ち條約を継  
続するも誤解を招きまた條約を廢棄するとして誤  
解を免れ難き立場にあることを見出した 然しこの行  
き詰りを打開し得る唯一の途は文明國民に欠くべから  
ざる靜穩なる平和の事柄に際し寧ろ疑或及困  
難を隔去することになるとの結論に達しこれに於てこの古  
き使ひ果した不必要な條約を廢棄してより良き新し  
き有効なるもの而してそれは太平洋の大地域に關係する  
凡そ國々を包含することゝこれを以て代るすること、  
しなくてはならぬ





The Joint Resolution and  
Mr. Gibson's address made at the  
3rd Plenary Session of the Three  
Power Naval Conference at Geneva.  
August 4th, 1927

- Official Conference Report,  
PP. 42 - 46

The Hon. Hugh Gibson: As I indicated in my opening remarks, the Conference has just reached a point where we have been reluctantly forced to admit that we cannot continue our work with any hope of a successful conclusion. Since the proposals which have been laid before us by Mr. Bridgeman represent a final decision of the British Empire delegation. I have already informed Mr. Bridgeman that we shall be forced frankly to admit that our efforts at present to find a basis for negotiation acceptable to all three Powers have not been successful.

I should like to take this occasion for stating somewhat fully the American views on the subject, not by way of argument with my colleagues but because the solution of this problem can be found only if all conflicting views are clearly stated and left for mature consideration.

First of all let us consider why we came here. The President of the United States, on February 10th, extended to the Powers

signatories to the Washington Treaty an invitation to meet in Geneva to agree upon the extension to auxiliary craft of the principles of that Treaty. The British Empire and Japan accepted this invitation. The President's initiative in calling the Conference was in conformity with the repeatedly expressed desire of our Congress, as specifically set forth in an Act of February 11th, 1925, that armaments should be effectively reduced and limited in the interests of the peace of the world and for the relief of all nations from the burdens of inordinate and unnecessary expenditure. The President's invitation left no room for doubt as to the purpose he had in mind, and the proposals to be made by the American delegation could have been forecast with considerable accuracy. It was known from the President's message that we would propose limitation of auxiliary craft by categories that we were in favour of limiting them according to the principle of the Washington Treaty. It was not difficult to forecast even the tonnage levels which we would suggest, as it was obvious that no fresh complications in the world situation had called for a material increase over the figures suggested by us at Washington in 1922, namely, 450,000 tons for both classes of auxiliary surface vessels.

In strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the President's invitation, the American delegation on the opening day of the Conference laid on the table clear, simple and



comprehensive proposals for a genuine limitation of naval armaments. We were confident that proposals of this general character would be acceptable to the Powers represented here. It was not unreasonable to feel that, even if the specific figures suggested by us as a basis of discussion were not acceptable, a reasonable limitation might be achieved on the basis of the present state of the strongest navies in the different categories; that is to say, the British Empire in cruisers and the United States in destroyers and submarines, with the result that, by agreeing upon such figures, we should be relieved of the dangers of competitive building. The Japanese delegation subsequently indicated its willingness to negotiate on the basis of the minimum tonnage figures suggested by the American delegation. It should be recalled that the minimum figures of the American proposals involved a considerable reduction in the destroyer and submarine tonnage now possessed by the United States.

From the first, however, we encountered a serious difficulty in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably larger number of cruisers than it now possesses. Instead of the 48 cruisers now in service, the British Empire delegation has set forth in the report of the Technical Committee a need for 15 8-inch gun cruisers and 55 cruisers of a smaller type, a total of 70. The claim for these figures was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American

delegation has never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitation on the basis of mutual concessions. If the sole purpose of our negotiation be that of setting forth the view of each Power as to its requirements without regard to the navies of others, it is difficult to see how we can arrive at a treaty for the real limitation of navies. Further, we have not yet been able to understand why, in a time of profound peace and at the moment that we are seeking to reduce the burdens of naval expenditure, the British Government considers a considerable programme of naval expansion as an absolute and even a vital necessity.

In an effort to meet the views of the British Empire delegation, we have indicated our willingness to make very substantial modifications in our original proposals respecting cruisers. We have agreed to discuss a tonnage in the cruiser class far in excess of what we had hoped might be fixed as a limitation for the future. This was done in an effort to help meet the British claim for numbers of vessels. Further, we have agreed to discuss the number of 10,000-ton cruisers and to accept a secondary class of cruisers, provided that the secondary type of cruisers should not be of a maximum individual displacement which will preclude the mounting of 8-inch guns, a calibre of gun which was agreed upon by the signatories of the Washington Treaty.



Unfortunately, these efforts to meet the British position, together with other American proposals to which I shall refer later, were not considered sufficient. Any further concessions on our part would have involved a complete surrender of the right to build ships responsive to our needs, and we were obliged to take the ground that, if agreement were to be reached, there must be some measure of reciprocity in concession. We frankly recognize that the naval needs of various Powers differ, and we have never contested the argument which had been put forward that the naval requirements of the British Empire could best be met by numbers of vessels. One of the virtues of the system of limitation of naval strength by total tonnage in classes is that each country is left free to use its tonnage allotment according to its special needs. We have felt, however, that the making of a treaty to which we could honestly subscribe as representing a limitation of armaments was dependent upon meeting these requirements within total tonnages which constituted a limitation and not an expansion. With a large number of naval bases scattered along its lines of communication, we can quite well understand the desire of the British Empire for a certain number of cruisers of the smaller type. At the same time, we feel that it should be recognized that our own geographical position and our lack of bases resulting in part from the restrictions of the Washington Treaty require a larger type of cruiser affording a longer cruising radius. We felt further that the repeated

expression of our willingness to reduce the total cruiser tonnage to the lowest limits acceptable to the British delegation was sufficient evidence that we have no thought of engaging in a programme of construction which can be any cause for apprehension.

The British delegation, in its proposals, sought to secure agreement to limit very strictly the number of the larger type of cruisers with 8-inch guns and to limit all other construction to small ~~fixed~~ ~~cruisers~~ ~~armed~~ with 6-inch guns, a type of ship of relatively small use to us because of its lack of cruising and operating radius and protection. The immediate and obvious result of acquiescing in these British proposals would have been that the British Empire would have been able to build exactly what it desired and that we, on the other hand, would be restrained from building what we consider we might need and yet the tonnage levels insisted on by the British Empire would result in a substantial increase even over present strength.

It may be well here to touch upon the view which has been expressed that we have rendered agreement difficult by our alleged insistence upon freedom to build a large number of 10,000-ton cruisers armed with 8-inch guns. These the British delegation terms offensive vessels as distinguished from the 6,000-ton cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, which they call defensive cruiser. No such distinction was recognized at the time of the Washington Treaty. The 10,000-ton cruiser with 8-inch gun



armament was fixed by the Washington Treaty, and this decision was supported by the British delegates at that Conference and adopted as non-controversy. Furthermore, the United States did not commence the construction of cruisers of this size. Five cruisers of this type have now been practically completed by the British Empire and six more are in process of construction, while four vessels of 9,750 tons are now in commission. The United States has two 10,000-ton cruisers which are about 15 per cent completed and six for which the contract has been recently set. We have none that will be afloat for approximately two years. In the Act authorizing the construction of these cruisers, it was provided that, in the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armament, the President was empowered in his discretion to suspend in whole or in part any construction authorized by the Act.

The British Empire delegation had drawn a sharp distinction between the offensive and aggressive character of 8-inch-gun cruisers and the essentially defensive character of the 6-inch-gun cruisers which they feel would adequately serve for our purposes. The American delegation cannot but feel that every warship possesses essential offensive characteristics and that no ship is built for the sole purpose of defending itself against attack. We cannot follow the reasoning which attributes to 6-inch-gun cruisers a purely defensive role. We are told that they will police trade routes and protect British commerce on the sea.

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But, in order to afford effective defense to British commerce upon the seas, these cruisers must in time of war effectively deny the sea to others. When we come down to essentials, the claim on the part of any nation for the right to maintain in time of peace a cruiser strength sufficient to afford complete security to its commerce in case of war renders impossible any effective naval limitation by international agreement.

When we are asked to limit strictly the number of cruisers on which 8-inch guns may be mounted and eventually to abandon that gun altogether in favour of the 6-inch gun, we are compelled to consider the effect of such a limitation upon our situation in view of the fact that the British Government had at its disposal approximately 888,000 tons of fast merchant ships, capable of being readily converted into cruisers and armed with many 6-inch guns, as contemplated by the Washington Treaty. We, on the other hand, have only 188,000 tons of such ships. As was so ably brought out by Lord Jellicoe, converted merchant ships played a great part in the late war.

There is another matter which has given us cause for reflection. At the time of the adoption of the Washington Treaty, as I have mentioned before, the delegates of the British Empire looked upon a total tonnage for surface auxiliary craft of 450,000 tons as an acceptable and reasonable figure. But now we are faced with a programme calling for 817,000 tons of auxiliary surface craft, a tonnage far in excess of that contemplated at the time of



the Washington Conference. What has brought about this change on the part of the British Government? What new factor in world affairs has appeared upon the horizon which has caused them apprehension? One of the mightiest fleets on the high seas, that of Germany, has disappeared. So far as we know, no other great maritime nation has embarked on any programme which could conceivably be considered a menace to the British Empire. Other than the Powers here represented, there are in the entire world but five navies possessing modern cruisers of effective combat value; the strongest of these has approximately 72,000 tons, and the total effective cruiser tonnage of all five combined is now less than 200,000.

The British contention has been that their proposals make for economy, while ours call for a large outlay. We cannot admit the justice of such a claim. We have proposed a low limitation on total tonnage, which means a very large saving. Economy can only be realized by reduction of total tonnage. The fact is that within the total tonnage limitation, the larger the unit size of vessels the greater is the economy, both in initial construction and in operation and maintenance. Both high total tonnage and small units are necessarily expensive. I should like once more to stress that the American proposals would obviously permit of drastic economies, and that a proposition largely to increase the tonnage of auxiliary craft beyond that which any country now possesses would impose, we believe, an unnecessary burden.

The latest proposals of the British Empire delegation do not indicate any substantial reductions in the tonnage demands or modifications in the position taken by the British representatives on the Technical Committee during the early days of the Conference. The proposals of the British Empire delegation which have recently been submitted to us contained the points of difficulty which we have encountered from the outset, and, in addition, a new difficulty is that a combined tonnage limitation for all auxiliary craft, including submarines, is suggested. This total, fixed at 590,000 tons, is to be augmented by an additional 25 percent of so-called over-age ships. But the age-limit for replacement within the tonnage limitation of 590,000 tons has been so reduced that we have, in effect, a proposal for a total tonnage limitation of effective auxiliary vessels of over 737,000 tons. If we deduct from that figure the highest submarine and destroyer tonnage heretofore suggested by the British Empire delegation, namely, 90,000 tons of submarines and approximately 221,000 tons of destroyers, there would remain a tonnage limitation for cruisers of at least 426,000 tons. This is over 75,000 tons in excess of the British cruiser strength upon completion of vessels now under construction. This figure could be materially increased under the combined tonnage system proposed by the British through the utilization of a part of the destroyer and submarine tonnage for cruiser construction.

It is obvious that, in a treaty fixing total tonnage



limitations, any such figures would not be a present limitation and that even without a treaty it is unlikely that any of the Powers would reach any such maximum tonnages before 1931, when in any event we are to meet again to consider the question of naval armaments. Thus for the immediate future the only real effect of the British proposals is to restrict types of cruisers, not building programmes, and to obligate the United States, in case it should desire to build within the total tonnage limitations proposed, to construct many 6000-ton 6-inch-gun cruisers a type which we have clearly indicated, is not adapted to our needs.

I cannot but feel that the British Government has an unnecessary apprehension as to the use which might be made by the United States of reasonable freedom of action in the cruiser class within strict tonnage limitations. It is to be remembered that if the total tonnage for cruisers should be fixed as low as 300,000 for the United States and the British Empire, a certain part of this will be consumed in the construction of the maximum-size cruisers of a number to be agreed upon. A further considerable part is already taken up as far as the United States is concerned by the existence of ten 6-inch-gun ships of the Omaha class aggregating approximately 70,000 tons. The only practical question arising therefore is whether, in addition to building an agreed number of maximum-size cruisers, none of which have yet been completed by the United States, our future construction of secondary cruisers with 8-inch guns within this

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narrow limit could be on such a scale as to give concern to the British Empire.

In an effort to meet any possible concern of the British Government on this score, an apprehension which, I hasten to add, we consider unwarranted by anything in our past or present policy, we had already suggested the possibility of inserting in the Treaty a political clause providing in effect that if the building programme of any one of the signatory Powers within the tonnage limitation agreed upon for cruisers should give concern to any other contracting Power, a meeting of the signatories could be called at any time after 1931 and, if a satisfactory agreement was not reached, the Treaty might be shortly terminated. It is difficult to see why this would not adequately meet any possible apprehension, as it would not be possible for a Power to make any substantial progress on a building programme within the short time prior to the termination of the Treaty. Furthermore, I may add that we are so confident that nothing in our own policy could give ground for such concern that we felt no hesitation in suggesting such a clause.

The American delegation was greatly impressed by a statement recently made by the British Foreign Secretary to the effect that war between the British Empire and the United States was already outlawed in the hearts of both nations. We give our thorough endorsement to this view, and the sincerity of this endorsement has been proved by the fact that our Government has not indicated mis-



givings or concern because the British Empire has build up a cruiser force entirely disproportionate to our own. We find it difficult, however, to reconcile the British conviction that war is already outlawed between us with their present unwillingness to recognize our right to build a limited number of the type of ships we would desire or with their willingness to risk the success of this Conference because they fear the problematical possession by us during the life of this Treaty of small number of 8-inch-gun cruisers, and this in spite of the fact that any apprehension which might be occasioned by such problematical construction is amply covered by the political clause which offers a release from the obligation of the Treaty.

Before concluding, I should like to take occasion in the name of the American delegation to express once more our appreciation to the Japanese delegation for the proposals they have brought forward and supported as regards low tonnage limitation. We feel that the firm desire of their country to effect limitation of armament at or below existing tonnage levels will have a profound influence.

We regret exceedingly that we have as yet not been able to harmonize the conflicting views on naval limitation. We believe that on broad principles, looking ahead to its influence on disarmament among the nations of the world and the interest of peace, an agreement between the principal naval powers is of surpassing importance. We believe that we can all afford to make

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a very strict limitation which will largely decrease our armaments, in the near future and consequently decrease the burden of taxation and the fear of war. We cannot believe that, if the three great naval Powers are all willing to make this limitation and reduction, there is any resultant danger to their respective Governments, their trade routes or their possessions. We believe we should deal with this subject on a broader and higher ground than our need of meeting all conceivable eventualities.

From generation to generation during the last 100 years, it has become more evident that these three nations intend to and will live in a state of peace, and we should approach this subject of naval limitation on the basis that war between them is unthinkable. The interruption of our work should not be interpreted as indicating a permanent inability to agree upon effective methods of naval limitation, and it is our hope that a thorough study of the whole problem of naval armaments may lead to the finding of some method of reconciling the views of our respective Governments and that a satisfactory agreement may be shortly concluded for a greater limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

In conclusion, I should like to express on behalf of the American delegation our warm personal esteem for our associates of the British Empire delegation and of the Japanese delegation. It has been a privilege to work with them on this problem, and we trust that, even though we have not succeeded in reaching agreement at this time, our work may mark a step forward toward



eventual agreement acceptable to us all. We are, all of us, united in the sincere desire to promote good understanding and friendship between our three countries, and I am confident that the inability to agree will not discourage us in our efforts to achieve substantial limitation in naval armaments.

Before proceeding to present the joint Declaration, I am desired to state on behalf of the three delegations that we have been very glad to welcome to French and Italian representatives at our this occasion to express, on behalf of the American delegation - I feel I may say on behalf of the other delegations - our warm thanks to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the generous measure of assistance he has accorded us: and to express our thanks as well to the very helpful secretarial staff under the able direction of Mr. Howard Huston, who has contributed so materially to our comfort and to the prompt and efficient handling of the large volume of secretarial work entailed by the Conference. I am confident that my colleagues will desire that our Secretary-General be requested to convey an expression of our appreciation to Sir Eric Drumond.

I will now read the joint Declaration:

In pursuance of the suggestion of the President of the United States, the Plenipotentiary Delegates of the President of the United States, of His Britannic Majesty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, met at Geneva on June 20th to consider the limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

Meetings have been held from that date until August 4th, during which period the delegates and their advisers have considered in detail various methods of effecting this object. On many important, questions, provisional agreements have been reached, certain of which are embodied in the annexed Report of the Technical Committee of the Conference. These points of agreement relate particularly to the limitation of destroyers and submarines, and it was only when the Conference took up the question of the limitation of the cruiser class that difficulties were encountered. These difficulties proved to be of character to render it desirable to adjourn the present negotiations until the respective Governments have had an opportunity to give further consideration to the problem and to the various methods which have been suggested for its solution.

The American delegation presented the view that, within total tonnage limitations, which they initially suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessel which they might consider best suited to their respective national needs, with freedom subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit.

The British delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground



that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired, first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton 8-inch cruisers, and secondly the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 8,000 tons, carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstance and its special needs.

The Japanese delegates presented the view that low total-tonnage levels should be fixed which would effect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the 8-inch-gun cruisers, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further 8-inch-gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorized in existing programmes.

Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made, the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible

total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restrictions as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty.

Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.

Further, the delegates agree to recommend to their respective Governments the desirability of arranging between the Signatories of the Washington Treaty that the Conference to be called pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the Treaty should be held earlier than August 1931, the date contemplated under the terms of that instrument, in order that any decisions reached by such a Conference may come into force before the capital ship construction programme commences, namely, in November of that year.

In making these recommendations and in submitting the statement of the points of agreement, as well as of the points on which agreement has not yet been achieved, the delegates desire to place on record a statement of their conviction that the obstacles that have been encountered should not be accepted as terminating the effort to bring about a further limitation of naval armament. On the contrary, they trust that the measure of agreement which has been reached, as well as the work which has been done in clarifying their respective positions, will make it possible, after consultation between the Governments, to find a basis for reconciling



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divergent views and lead to the early conclusion of an agreement for the limitation of auxiliary naval vessels which will permit of substantial economy and, while safeguarding national security, promote the feeling of mutual confidence and good understanding.

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Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 16 pages and entitled "The Joint Resolution and Mr. Gibson's Address made at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, Aug. 4, 1927" (Annex 3) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Report of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, 1927 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/s/ Enomoto, Jui  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /s/ Okuyama, Hachiro  
(seal)

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No 1

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文書の出所並に公正に関する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依つて書かれ十六葉からなる「The Joint Resolution and Mr. Gibson's address made at the 3rd plenary session of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, August 4th 1927」と題する文書（附屬書第三）は現に私の所持する一九二七年壽府三國海軍會議の公式報告書の抜萃に相違ないことを證明する

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治 (印)

本署名捺印は自分の面前に爲され

同日 於 同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (印)

May Dec 1904-3

No 2

一九二七年八月四日「ジエニール」に於ける三國海軍會議  
第三回總會に於ける共同決議と「ギブソン」氏の演説

——正式會議報告——

(四二頁ヨリ四六頁迄)

「ヒエー・ギブソン」氏—私が冒頭に指摘しました様に會議  
は首尾良く解決の希望を持って我々の仕事を繼續  
する事は出来ないと認めない譯には行かない段階に  
立ち至つたのであります。

「ブリッヂマン」氏にも我々の前に提出された諸案は英帝  
國代表團の最後の決定を表すものであるからであります。  
私は既に「ブリッヂマン」氏に対し三ヶ國全部が承諾出来る  
交渉の基礎を見せんとする我々の現在迄の努力は成  
功で無かつた事を卒直に認めなくてはならないと申し上  
げました。此の機會に本問題に対する米國の見解を  
出来るだけ具体的に述べて見たいと思ひます。議論に  
よつて無く本問題の解決は対立する諸見解が明  
瞭に述べられ且つ熟考が加へられてのみ可能であるから  
です。先づ初めにどう言ふ譯で此処に集つたのか考へ  
て見ませう。二月十日米國大統領は華府條約署名  
諸國に招請状を出し「ジエニール」に會合して同條約の  
原則を補助體に迄擴張する事を協定するためで  
した。英帝國と日本は此招請を受け入れました。大統領  
が率先本會議の招集を發議したのは一九二五年二月



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No 2

一九三七年八月四日「ジュネーブ」に於ける三國海軍會議  
第三回總會に於ける共同決議と「ギブソン」氏の演説

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する事は出来ないと認めない譯には行かない段階に  
立ち至つたのであります。

「フリッドマン」氏にも我々の前に提出された諸案は英帝  
國代表團の最終的決定を表すものであるからであります。  
私は既に「フリッドマン」氏に対し三ヶ國全部が承諾出来る  
交渉の基礎を発見せんとする我々の現在迄の努力は成  
功で無かつた事を卒直に認めなくてはならないと申し上  
げました。此の機會に本問題に対する米國の見解を  
出来るだけ具体的に述べて見たいと思ひます。議論に  
よつて無く本問題の解決は対立する諸見解が明  
瞭に述べられ且つ熟考が加へられてのみ可能であるから  
です。先づ初めにどう言ふ譯で此処に集つたのか考へ  
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原則を補助體に之擴張する事を協定するためでし  
た。英帝國と日本は此招請を受け入れました。大統領  
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No 1

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昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

櫻 本 重 治 (印)

本署名捺印は自らの面前に於て爲され

同日 於 同所

立會人 奥 山 八 郎 (印)



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十一日の法令にも特に明示されてゐる通り、我議會の重なるの明白なる希望に應じて行はれたのであります。即ち軍備は吾界の平和の爲に有効に削減され制限され且つ金と國を過大にして不必要な支出の重荷から救ふべきであります。大統領の招請は彼が心中に抱いて居た目的に就いては全く疑ふ餘地は無かつたものとす。従つて米代表團によつてなされる提案も相當の正確を以て豫測出来た筈であります。大統領のメッセージを見ても明らかなく我々は艦種別により補助艦艇の制限を提案するであらうし且つ華府條約の原則に従つて制限する事を支持する位の事は解つてゐたものであります。我々が提議するだらうと思はれる噸数の水準を豫測するに難くは無かつたものと云ふのは我々が華府に一九二二年提議した数字（即ち兩水上補助艦艇に四五〇〇噸）に實質的増加を要求する様な新たな複雑した事情が吾界に生じて居ない事は明白だからであります。

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大統領の招請状と其の精神に忠実に従ひ米代表團は會議の開會當日諸君の前に海軍軍備に対する眞の制限に関する明瞭簡單且つ包括的な提案を致しました。此の様な一般的性格を持った提案は本會議に出席の各國により承諾される事を確信して居たものであります。協議の基礎として我々の提起した特定の数字が承諾されない場合でも特定の艦種については最強海軍國の現状

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に根據を置き合理的な制限が得られると感ずるには無理では無かつたのであります。言ひ換へれば英帝國は巡洋艦に於て又米國は駆逐艦や潜水艦に於て而して結果は其の様な數字を協定する事により建艦競争の危険から免れるのであります。日本代表團は後程米國代表團にも提議された最低噸數々字に基き交渉を進める意思ある事を示しました。米國程案の最低數字と云ふは現在米國が保有する駆逐艦及び潜水艦の噸數に於て相當の削減を意味する事を記憶されたのであります。

当初も然し英政府が現在保有するより相當多くの巡洋艦を必要とすると言ふ主張は我々にとり重大な困難に直面したてであります。現在就役中の四十八隻の代りに英代表團は専門各員。報告の中に八吋砲巡洋艦十五隻及びそれより小型の巡洋艦五十五隻、計七十隻を發表して居ります。之等の數字の主張は帝國にとり絶対に必要海軍力であると言ふ主張されたりしてあります。

米國代表團は今迄如何にも絶対的な海軍の要求と云ふ概念と相互讓歩を基礎とする軍備制限を決定する條約の交渉と云ふものを調和させる事は出来ません。我々の交渉の唯一の目的が他國の海軍を重視して自國の海軍の要求のみを發表するものからして海軍の真の軍縮條約等實現するかどうかは六ヶ敷い。

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あります。更に又英政府が今日の様に真に平和な時に而  
も海軍支出の負担を削減せんと試みおる時に何故相  
当な海軍擴張案を以て絶對的且死論に關する必要  
と迄考ふるが我々には今に至る迄理解出来ぬのであります。  
英帝國代表團の意見と合致せざるため巡洋艦に關する  
我々の原案に対し非難に大なる修正を加へる意向である  
事を示しました。將來の制限として決定される事を希  
望してゐたより遙かに大なる噸数を巡洋艦級に就いて  
協議する事に同意しました。それは英國側の主張たる  
艦艇の数を満足させ様と努力したかうであります。

更に我々は一万噸巡洋艦の数は就いても協議する事  
に同意し且つ華府條約締結國により協定されたところ  
の八吋砲の搭載を許さない程度の最大排水量のものを  
ない限りは第三級の巡洋艦と認めることに同意しました。  
不幸にして英國の立場を満足させ様との努力も後述す  
る他の米國提案も共に充分なものは認められなかつたの  
であります。之以上の譲歩は我々の必要に應じて建艦する  
權利を完全に抛棄する事になるを何等かの協定を作  
るせば交渉妥協の方途が講ぜられなければならぬと  
の立場を取らざるを得なくなつたのであります。

我々は平直に各國の海軍要求はそれ／＼異なる事を認  
めます。且つ英帝國の海軍要求が艦艇の數によつて最大  
なものと云ふ議論に対し我々は決して争はなかつ  
たが、艦種別による總噸数の海軍力制限の制

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度の長所の一つは各國が自由に割当てられた噸数を以て各々の特殊な要求に応じて建艦が出来る事である。然る軍縮代表として誠実に意見を得る條約を作る事は拡張に拘らずして制限を齎す總噸数の内に於て要求を充てる事にあると感して居りました。

その補給線の所々に散在する多数の海軍基地を持つ英國が小型巡洋艦を一定数欲しい理由は充分解ります。同時に我々の地理的地位及び其の一部の原因は華府條約の制限によるものであるが甚だしく乏しく航続半径の長大な巡洋艦が必要である事を認識するところであると我々は感ずるを有します。更だ英國代表は巡洋艦の總噸数を英國代表團が承諾し得る最低限度迄引き下げる用意がある事を重々表示した。英國が懸念を呼ぶ原因となるが如き建艦計畫を開始する考へは無い充分なる證據があると感ずる所ではありません。

英國代表團はその提案に於て八吋砲を持つ大型巡洋艦の数量を非常に嚴格に制限する事を協定する事を求め而して他の金べの建造は六吋砲搭載の小型巡洋艦即ち航続力、行動半径及び防禦力より見て我々には比較的用途の大型の艦に制限を及ぼすのであります。之等の英國案には屈服せざるやと明白に現はれる結果は英國自身は望み通りのものを建造し而して我々は他方に於て必要と感つたものを建造する事を禁ぜらるゝにも拘らず英帝國の主張する噸数水準は現勢力以上に定ま實に増大する結果となるを有する。我々八吋砲を搭載する二の噸巡洋艦を大量建造する自由に就いて



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主張した事に協定する事が困難になると申し立てられた見解  
に対し此處で少し觸れるべきでありませう。此事の艦を英國代表団は  
彼等が称する六千噸六吋砲と區別して攻撃専用艦艇と呼んで居  
ります。華府條約當時その稱を區別は認められてゐたので  
あります。一萬噸六吋砲搭載の巡洋艦は華府條約により決定され  
此の決議は當時の會議に於て英國代表團により支持せられ  
且つ異議無きとして採決されたのであります。更に米國は此級  
の巡洋艦の建造を開始したものであります。此型の巡洋艦  
五隻が英國側では既に完成し更に六隻が目下建造中であり  
又五の噸の艦艇四隻が就役中であり、米國は約十五パー  
セント完成した一萬噸級巡洋艦三隻を所有し又最近契約  
が許可されたもの六隻あります。今後約三年間は就役するものは  
一隻もありません。此事の巡洋艦の建造を認め下法令には海軍軍  
縮の爲の國際的會議が用いられる際は大統領は法令により認め  
られ建造の全部又は一部を中止する権限を委せられる事が  
規定されてゐるのであります。

英帝國代表團はは巡洋艦の攻撃的且つ侵略的性格と六吋砲  
巡洋艦の本来的防禦的性格との間に明確な區別を印し我々の  
目的にも相應に役立つと思つてゐるのであります。米代表團は如  
何なる艦艇を雖も必要なる攻撃専用の特質を持ち又攻撃に好  
し事に自らを守るためののみ定められてゐる艦艇は無いと考へて  
あります。六吋砲巡洋艦に純然たる防禦的役割を与へると言ふ  
推理を我々は解し得ないと海上貿易路を警察し英國の  
通商を保護すると教へられました。

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No 8

然し海上に於て英國に遑遑と有効に行動し得る者には此等巡洋艦は戦時に於ては有効に海上を他国に對しては拒否せねばなりません問題の骨子に於ては平時に於て自國の通商に對して完全なる保護を与ふるために充分なる巡洋艦の勢力を維持する權利を主張する如何なる國と雖も戦争となれば國際約束による有効な海軍軍縮は之れを不承不取にしてしまふのであります。

は砲を搭載する巡洋艦の數を嚴密に制限する様になはれてその内に六吋砲が用ゐられ、六吋砲の方は全く廢止されれば英國政府は華府條約を企てられ、如く多數の六吋砲を以て武装を以て容易に巡洋艦に亦更に出る速力の早い商船を約六、〇〇〇噸自由に出る事實を思ふとその様な軍縮の効果を我々の事情に鑑みて考へるを得ないであります。

それと反して我々はその様な艦は六、〇〇〇噸しか有して居らないのであります。アエリコー卿により示された如くの戦争に於て改定商船は偉大な役割を演じました。

今一つ我々の同様にすべき理由があります。既に述べましたが華府條約採決の時英帝國は在達は水上補助艦艇總噸數四、五〇〇噸を以て承諾し得る合理的な數字と見做したのであります。然るに現在我々は水上補助艦艇六、四七〇噸を要求する計畫に當面し華府會議當時の二期された噸數を遙に超過するものであります。英政府側、此変化は如何に齟齬をきたしたのであるか。彼等に懸念を起させるのに如何なる新しい事柄が世界事情が水平線の上に現はれたので



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せうが、洋上最速の艦隊の一つ即ち獨逸艦隊は消失したて  
あります。我々の知る限り、於ては母國に於て月威威感され  
る程、建艦計畫を周知して海運國はないのであります。  
此會議に於ては、表裏に於ける國々の外有効なる戦艦價  
値を有する近代の巡洋艦を保有する海軍は全世界中五  
ヶ國にないものであります。

その内最大のもの約二、三の噸で且つ有効巡洋艦噸數を全  
全野合する二、三の噸まであります。英國領の主張によれば其  
の提案は經濟を目標とするが故には大規模な支出を必要とする  
といふのであるが、これに反して認めざるを得ない我々は噸數  
に於ける制限を提議し、これは非難や長きに卸れざる味をも  
つてあるが、經濟を目標とするは噸數の減少によつてのみ實現さ  
れるのであります。噸數制限内に於ては噸數の單位置が大分  
おほいなるだけ経済的であると云ふのであります。

その當初の建造に於ては又建設費及び維持費に於ても同様で  
あります。今一々米國の提案を二つ明白に長大な經濟的輕減を  
許さるゝが、現在如何なる國も保有しない程の補助艦噸數  
を増大せざることを提議する者は不必要な重負を押し  
つけるものであらうと我々は信ずる事も重なる強辯とい  
ひであります。

No 9

最近の米代表國の提案は噸數要求に對する實際的削減  
を指摘せず、又會議開始の時東京の各員は又代表によつて  
取られ長立場に修正を拒んで居ります。最近我々に提出する

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NO 10

英帝國及他國の提議の中にも有利より直面する困難な  
点と合はせ、更に新に國難は潜水艦を含む全補助  
艦艇に対する總噸數制限が提議され、事です。此總計  
五九〇〇〇噸と決定されるべきが俗に艦艇超過艦と呼ばれ  
るものにより更に千五百噸増加されるのであります。然し五九〇〇〇噸の  
制限内に於ける代艦の年額(期限)はあまりにも縮められ、  
實際には三三〇〇〇噸以上の有効補助艦に対する總噸數制限  
の提議となるのであります。

この數字から英國及他國の提議する最高、潜水艦駆逐  
艦噸數即ち潜水艦に於ては二六〇〇〇噸駆逐艦に於て約  
二二、〇〇〇トンと差引くと巡洋艦には二六、〇〇〇トン  
の制限が残るのがあります。之は目下建造中のものを完成せば  
英國の巡洋艦數が千五百噸超過するのがあります。  
更に此數字は英國提議する綜合噸數の下に於て駆逐  
艦及び潜水艦の噸數の一部を巡洋艦標準に利用する事  
により實際的に増大するのがあります。

總噸數制限を決定する協定に於てその標準數字は目下  
制限はなうを基準は明白であらう、又それと協定なくして一九三  
二年以前に於ける國々もその標準大噸數に達する事はあり得るもので  
あり、一九三二年には兩國會合して海軍軍備の問題を考慮す  
る様になり、また目下の將來に於て英提議する其の  
効果は單に巡洋艦の型を制限するが、此建艦計畫の  
制限が、英國が提議する總噸數制限内に於て



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No 11

建艦を希望する場合も多数の六十噸六吋砲巡洋艦を建造する様に義務を負はねばならぬものであり、その事なる既に明瞭に指摘にしておりますが我々の要求に適合しないのであります。

米國が嚴密な噸數制限内に於て巡洋艦級建造の合理的な行動の自由により、の様にと利用するがに對し英政府は不必要な懸念を抱いてゐると私は感ぜざるを得ないのであります。もし米國及び英國の巡洋艦總噸數が三〇〇〇噸程に低く決定されたとしたら右の數字の内一部は協定された數量の最大型巡洋艦の建造に使用されませう。米國に關する限り更に相手の部令が總計噸數約七〇〇噸なる六吋砲十の「ア」級の存在により定められてゐます故に實際問題として起るのは米國は度々未だ完成して居りません人が協定された數量の最大型の巡洋艦を建造するに於て六吋砲搭載ホーニ型巡洋艦の將來に於ける建造が此狭い制限内に於て行はれん時々の規模が果して英帝國を懸念させる程のものとなり得るかどうかであります。

此の問題に關し英政府を懸念させざるが故に對し解答を乞へるべく、その懸念にも斷つて同意しますが我々の過去及び現在の如何なる方針に照してても理由なしと云ふべきで、我々は條約の中にも看取國の何れが巡洋艦協定噸數制限内に於てその建艦計畫が他の加同盟國に懸念を乞へる場合、五三年以後署名國の會合を召集する政治條項を設けるが點に既に提議してあります。又、この決定は

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意見の一致を得なかつた場合は條約も短期のものであつても  
良いのであります。國が條約の期限が切れる短日月の開  
期箇内にその意圖計畧に相違を違持と示すことは不可能  
なもので斯くすることにより起り得る懸念に対して充分解  
決出来ない理由はないと云ふのであります更に附け加へても  
良いと思ひますが我々は我々の方針に対してあまりにも確信を  
持つて居りましたのでその様な懸念は起るまいと云ふ様な  
條項を提議するに躊躇したものであります。  
英帝國と米國との間の戦争は既に兩國民の心の中では  
超越してゐると云ふ

以下次頁へ續く

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意味の言葉は、英国外務卿により最近発表され、米代表団は非常に深い感銘を受けたりを致し、我々は此見解に対し、全篇の賛意を表するものあり、我々の賛成は如何に誠意あるかは、英國が我々と全均衡を取らない巡洋艦勢力を造つて我が政府の懸念や心配をふたつた事により證明出来るのであり、我々我々の間に戦争等あり得ない、英國は確信を持って下さる。希望する型の艦艇の制限を水に数量にり建造する権利を認めようとする事及び我々此條約の有効期間中、少数の、対砲巡洋艦の建造を保有を恐れ本會議の成功を賭する氣持を有する事。我々には解らないのであり、我々も、福を覺得るに建造により脅かされるから知らない懸念は條約履行義務から解放される事を許さる政治保項により充分保証されてゐるのであり、

終に臨み此席上より米代表團の右に於て日本代表團に対し彼等の齊一に提案及低い噸數制限に対する協調に対し、今一度感謝の意を表し、軍備制限實現の現在或はそれ以下、噸數水準に引下げる彼等の本國の堅い希望は深い影響を及ぼすものを感じ、我々も、海軍軍縮に對する村立諸意見を未だ調和出来ない事は極大残念である、在野各國の間に於ける軍縮

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No 14

に對する影響及び世界平和の度に及ぼす大體下は  
主要海軍國間に於ける協定は極めて重要下はと  
信し、近き将来に我々の軍備を大きく削減する  
非常に嚴格な制限を實行する事は誰にも可能  
下らざる結果として納税の重荷と戦争の脅威を減少  
し得るものと言ふもつてゐる。我々も三大海軍國の  
全部此様な制限縮小を實行する意思を保持す  
るなら各國政府との通商ルート及び領土に對し  
危険が生ずるとは考へられなかつた。我々も  
あらゆる事を得る萬一の事に備へる必要から我  
々は一層高い立場から本問題を取扱  
ふべきであると我々は信するものであります。一時代より次  
の時代へと遷去百年間土等の三ヶ國は平和の裡に暮  
らす事を冀望し又希望する事は段々明白となつて來た。今  
此の三國間は戦争を考へられなかつた基礎の上  
に海軍軍縮の問題を研究すべき下らざる事  
我々の仕事の中絶は海軍を縮小有効的な方法に頼  
りて協定する事は永遠に不能である事を指摘する  
と解釋せられるべきでない。我々の海軍を縮小の全問題  
の徹底的研究は夫々の政府の見解を調和する。何  
等の方法を見出す事。我々は希望するものとす  
る。我々は補助艦艇のより大なる制限に向つて満  
足する協定の近い内に締結される事を望む。



Day Dec #1904-3

No 15

のてをします

終りに米國代表團を代表して英國及び日本兩  
代表團の仲間の皆様に対し、我々の心からなる個人的  
尊敬を表し、たいと思ひます。皆様と一緒に此問題  
に就いて仕事する事は光榮でありました。而して今  
日は協定を結ぶ事に成功しなかつたと雖、我々  
の仕事は後日誰かが承諾出来る協定の定現に  
同く一歩前進を印したものと我々は信するを敢  
て言ふ。我々は皆三ヶ國間に良好理解と友誼を増  
進するに心から願望を請う居る上、更に於て一致  
し、居るを敢て言ふ。我々が来たのは海軍を備  
に実質的制限を成功するに努力にほき我々を挫  
折せしむるものゝないことを確信するを敢て言ふ。  
共同宣言文を提す、す。前に三代表團を代表して申  
し上げた、希臘國と伊太利兩國代表を迎へて、此  
ひとしき事を敢て言ふ。又此席上より米國代表團を  
代表して、他の代表團にも代つて言つて、差付  
へないと思ひます。——國際聯盟の事務總長に  
對し、彼が我々に与へ下した多大の援助に対し、心から  
謝禮を申し言ふ。

又會議中の膨大な事務仕事を迅速且、能率的  
に処理し、我々の願望に對し、物質的に盡した下、た、ア  
ト、ス、代とその立派な指導下にあり、非常に良

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く、<sup>ト</sup>代に事務関係、皆様に感謝の意を  
表します。  
「エクス・トラ・モラ」<sup>ト</sup> 御に村に於ける感謝の意を傳  
へるに於ける事務局長に御願ひする事に就き  
私の仲間の皆様に御希望の事と信じます。共同  
宣言文を讀みます。  
米國大統領の賛議に従ひ米國合衆國大統領  
の全權委員、英帝國君主の全權委員及び  
日本天皇の全權委員は六月二十日「三三」に於  
て神戶艦艇制限を協議するに會合し、  
會議は各自立派の代表を同代表團として顧問に  
此目的實現の方法を極く詳細に互に研究し、  
多くの重要な問題に就き、假令の意見の一致を見  
出したものの内、幾つかは會議の序に要旨報告の中  
に含み、居る之等の意見の一致は主として駆逐  
艦及び潜水艦の制限に關するものと會議困難  
に直面したる巡洋艦級の制限の問題を取り上  
げた時、初めてなるとある。此等論は各國政府  
が問題を更に研究する機会を予へ、此等の  
解決の名提議、米大統領の方法に就きても一層考  
慮を拂ふ機会があるに現在交渉を中止する  
事が好ましくないと認めらるゝものとす。判明に。



Doc 741904-3

米代表團は米國及英國の巡洋艦の噸数を三、〇〇〇より三、〇〇〇噸迄日本は二、〇〇〇より一、〇〇〇噸と提案した。總噸数制限内に於て各國は自由に事前條約の制限に従ふべき國情の必要はなく、最も適當と認むる巡洋艦の數と型を決定する自由を有し且つ適當と認むるが如く武装するものとすべしとの見解を合致した。

英國代表團は許さざる是れ、艦艇最大備砲は必然的に標準となつてゐる理由をもつて、總噸の艦艇最大の制限を二、〇〇〇噸と提議した。總噸數による制限には反對は第二に舊條約は二、〇〇〇噸の巡洋艦の嚴密な制限を二に最大は二、〇〇〇噸を搭載する是れ人排水量六千噸の巡洋艦と云ふ次位の型を設ける事を決めた英國代表團は此型の設定のみによつて總噸數の中程度の數字内で英國は容易に特殊な事情と必要を満す事を可能ならしめ不可成なる艦艇の一定數を獲得し得ると主張した。

NO 17

日本代表團は補助艦艇の實際の制限を決定するに總噸數水準を決定すべきであるとの見解を發表した。八千噸巡洋艦の問題に就ては

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主義上如何な制限に同意せしめられた日本政  
府も日本に対し水上補助艦艇三五〇〇噸の決  
定せられ、現存する艦艇計畫中既に命令  
済みとなりたるものを除き一九三六年迄は巡洋  
艦を建造せずとる表明もなすに困難を感ぜ  
られた。

以上の如き一致した見解を調和すべき種々の  
方法に研究し、実質的進歩を見、見解の相違  
を減少するに至る。英米代表團の六ヶ所を  
搭載する艦の定数量の主張も米米代表  
團の希望する如く華府條約に決定した  
武装制限に従いその制限内に於いて武装する  
自由を特に最近可能な噸數制限とを調和  
し相互に於て承諾し得る案を見せしなかつた。  
此困難に對面し各代表は夫々率直なる意見の  
發表により本會議を休会する事。賢明と考へ  
本問題に對し該國政府の今後熟考に供し  
該國政府内に於ける協議の早期解決に至  
る事を希望す。更に各代表は會議決定  
事項が主力艦建造計畫開始前即ち一九三  
二年十一月以前に発効するもの華府條約に指定  
された期日一九三二年八月以前に同條約第二條  
第三項に従ひ同條約署名諸國間に會議開始



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...  
催つ望し、事あるを該国政府に報告する事  
に同意したと云ふ。勸告をなすに當り且つ又協定  
せる事項を提するに際し、同様にまた協定に  
違ふ事項に就いては、且面せる障礙は今後  
の海軍を備制限に對する努力を終熄せしむる  
ものと考ふべからざる事を確信する事を記録  
する様、各代表は希望すと云ふ事、今同一致を  
見たる協定事項の程度と夫々の立場を申  
明するに盡した努力は各政府間の協議に  
格する意見の相違を調和するたの意  
を發見し、相違の經濟節約を許し、國家安  
全を防護し、相互信頼と良好関係を増進  
するたの補助海軍艦艇制限協定の早期締  
結に導く事を可能ならしむるに盡した可らう

(終)

Naval Disarmament Secretariat

Confidential. Telegram No. 63.

Transmission date:

1400 hours 27 March 1930

From: Vice-Minister for Navy

To : Senior Delegate Sakonji

Telegram (Code, highly confidential,  
Personal)

1. Request you relay message to  
Minister.

At 1700 hours 15 March, received from Hamaguchi, supervisor of affairs. plenipotentiary telegram No. 208 asking for instructions.

Situation very Sudden and unexpected. Circumstances leading to situation not clear to us. Not even data upon which to base judgment in drafting instructions available. Extremely perplexed; hence the various telegrams sent to you.

We know that at the conference held-between senior delegates of the three powers on 17 February, negotiations ended in a rupture, though not of a serious nature; after which private talks were held between Matsudaira and Read with the understanding that those talks should not bind the home governments in no way.

However, the Navy is uninformed even on the progress of the negotiation, much less on the substance. Moreover, the figures

- 1 -





Ref. Doc. No. 1904 Annex 4.

according to plenipotentiary telegram No. 206 we had understood to be the U.S. Proposal, but reports received later make us think it is the U.S. British, Japanese compromise plan. However, according to data available here we cannot judge it to be so. In the period from 17 February to 22 March, 16 out of 77 plenipotentiary telegrams were not relayed to the Navy, and 17 telegrams were handed to the Vice Minister through the Prime Minister.) However, after that, information was received from you; and on 22 March separate telegram (A-part one) in response to your request for instructions was sent from Hori, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, to Chief of America and Europe Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

But no answer has been received as yet, (26th), nor even any expression of opinion thereon. On the other hand, our policy for dealing with the current situation and the future as well, was decided after repeated deliberations from various angles. It was submitted to the Ministry's supreme council including Admiral Okada and Vice Admiral Nomura this morning (26th), and approval thereof obtained. And vis-a-vis also the aforementioned draft instructions already sent to the Foreign Office, it was considered advisable to take steps necessary to show that the said draft represented the agreed opinion of the Ministry rather than the personal opinion of the Chief of the Naval Affairs

Def. Doc. No. 1904 Annex 4

Bureau, and also to explain its authenticity and nature. This afternoon, therefore, Hamaguchi, Supervisor of affairs, was visited, and the separate messages A (part One), B (part Two) were delivered in documental form, and explanations given.

Upon the request and advice of Mr. Hamaguchi, Foreign Minister Shidehara was visited once again, and the same procedure was followed with him as with the Supervisor of Affairs.

(However, separate message B (part Two) was only restricted to Explanations.) The Supervisor of Affairs and the Foreign Minister both understood the Navy's viewpoint, and I was able to express my ideas freely as usual. Both Supervisor and Minister also freely expressed opinions.

Separate message A (Part One) (Same instructions)  
B (Part Two) (Policies for the future)

End.



CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Naval Disarmament Secretariat Confidential Telegram No. 63" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of July, 1937

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

44

Def. Doc. 1904-4

No. 1

大書の出所並に成立に関する證明書(三號)  
自分吉井道教は復員廳第ニ復員局、職ニ居ル者ナル疑、茲ニ  
添附セラレタル日本語ニ依リテ書カレニ頁ヨリ成ル軍縮官房  
機密第六三番電ト題スル書類、日本政府(復員廳第ニ  
復員局)、保管ニ係ル公文書、沿革、正確ニシテ真實  
ナル寫ニナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月五日 於東京

吉井道教 (印)

右署名捺印、自今、面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於月所

立會人奥山八郎 (印)



Def Sec. 1904-4

No. 2

軍縮官務機密第六三番電

昭和五年三月二十七日午後二時。分發電

發海軍次官

宛左近司首席隨員

電宋(暗号、特秘、親展)

本電大臣ニ御傳ヘラレ

三月十五日午後五時小官濱口事務管理ヨリ全權電第二。  
八号請訓電、手交ヲ受タルカ事、餘リニ唐突ニテ何分  
前後、関係情況等明瞭ナラス同訓案ヲ作製ニ對スル判  
断、資料サヘフ當方トミテハ頗ル富惑ニ各種、照電ヲ  
モ發セシ次第ナリ

即十二月十七日三國首席全權、會談ニテ輕キ意味合ニテ  
物別ニ妥ナリニ其、渡松平、リド、問ニ何等本國收  
府ヲ拘束セサル意味ニテ私的會談、行ハレツアルコト、  
承知シ居タルモ其、内容ハ紛論交渉、進行程度等  
一切當方海軍側トミテハ承知シ居ラザリシ次第ナリ尚又  
全權電第二。六号ニ依ル數字ハ未提案ト了解シ居  
リタルト、ロ其後日英米ニ妥協案タルガ如キ話モ下ルモ當  
方ニ於テ得ラル資料ヨリハ斯ク判断シ能ハルコトナリ(二  
月十七日以降二月二十日迄、間全權電七十七通、中十六通ハ  
海軍ニ廻付セラシ又中十七通ハ總理ヲ經テ次官ニ交  
付セラシタリ)然ルト、ロ其、後貴方ヨリスル情報ヲ得三月  
二十日別電(其甲)同訓案ヲ作製セシ海軍務局長ヨ  
リ外務省改米局長ニ送付セシガ今二十六日ニ至ルニテ右ニ関

No 3

(三)



MEMORANDUM OF STATEMENT

Opinion expressed by the Vice Minister of Navy from a technical standpoint, at the Cabinet Session held on 1 April 1930 to draft a response to the request for instructions; the said opinion having been approved in advance by the Temporary Supervisor of the Affairs of the Navy Minister.

-----

Considering the draft of the reply to be given to the request for instructions from a technical standpoint, we find that while acceptance of the purport of the American proposal will enable us to realize almost completely our demand for 70% in the aggregate tonnage of auxiliary vessels, which is one of the three items we are insisting upon, it will still leave us far short of our desires as regards the other two items. That is to say that should the existing ratio of 5:3 in cruisers mounting 20 centimeter guns as between the United States and Japan become binding upon the relations between the two countries, not only would our defense plans for the future be seriously affected, but today when such striking developments are being made in shipbuilding, ordnance and other fields of technology that it is impossible to foresee what the future will bring, Japan, possessing nothing better than the obsolete FURUTAKA class built under the 1921 program, would be forced to stand idly for the next six years and watch our ratio go down while America goes ahead building numerous 10,000 cruisers mounting 20 centimeter guns.

Until 1935, to be sure, the 12 ships we have already completed will be slightly more than 70% of the 15 ships that America will have by that time.

In the interim, however, she will commence construction of three more ships are bound to be completed at some future date. So even if we were to make a reservation of some kind regarding our shipbuilding subsequent to 1935, there is the possibility, in view of validity of treaties being long-lasting, that should our reservation be not recognized at the next conference, there is every apprehension of our being unable to maintain the 70% ratio for certain even if the period of validity of the treaty should be clearly stipulated. Even if we were to tolerate such a situation for the period of the treaty as a temporary phenomenon, we cannot bear to thrust this grave responsibility upon the naval authorities in the years to come.

We feel the more apprehensive when we think of the moral blow that will be felt by our navy, which is now in high spirits in the confidence that it can cope with America by supplementing its inferior ratio in capital-ships with its present superiority in 20 centimeter gun cruisers, when it realizes that the relative positions will be reversed in consequence of the treaty.

Coming next to the question of submarines, should a reduction in our present strength in that category by so much as one-third be forced upon us, it would constitute a serious blow to our plan of national defense based on submarines. If we were to accept the proposal for our retention of 52,700 tons with the replacement age fixed at 13 years, the result would be, in effect, tantamount to a recognition of the complete abolition of submarines. For until 1936 we would not be able to build a single new



DEF. DOC. #1904 Annex 5

submarine for replacement; and in the interim our shipbuilding capacity would deteriorate most seriously. We are even apprehensive that this may be but the first step toward a complete abolition of submarines at the next conference.

I therefore hope that due consideration may be given to the points I have already set forth during your deliberations on the draft instructions.

One word I wish to add here is that should the draft instruction be approved here in its present form, I would ask you to take the following into consideration.

The only way in which we can ease the numerous difficulties that will be encountered in the execution of our national defense plans as a result of the conclusion of a treaty on armament limitation will be through strengthening of substance and improvement of technique. With regard to the former, it is essential to take suitable measures for the maintenance and improvement of our strength in existing ships, strengthening of air power and encouragement of organs for air research and experiment, development of defense installations, strengthening of special surface craft, maintenance of shipbuilding and industrial power, and prevention of unemployment. With regard to improvement of technique, it will be necessary to take into consideration such measures as the improvement of various training activities and improvement of living conditions in the service. To that end I would ask your special consideration of such items as the various ordinary expenditures, training expenditures, and expenses for repair and improvement of ships, all of which have hitherto been slighted in favor of expenditure for shipbuilding.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of t  
Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau,  
hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese,  
consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Memorandum of Statement"  
is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in  
the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of  
Demobilization Bureau)

certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed  
hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKAYAMA, Hachiro  
(seal)

4



Ref. Doc. 1904  
Annex 5

文書、左所並ニ成立之因ニ證明書 (三張)

自分三井道敷ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長  
職ニ居ル者ナル処 茲ニ添附セラルル日本語ニ  
依テ書キレテ貰ヒ成ル陳述覽ト題スル書類ハ  
日本政府(復員廳第二復員局)保管ニ係  
ル公文書、披尋、正確ニシテ真實ナル寫シナルコト  
ヲ證明ス

昭和二十一年七月五日 於東京

三井 道敷 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分、面前ニ於テ為サレタリ

同日 於同所

立會人 奥山 八郎 (印)

No. 1

## 陳述覽

同訓案上程閣議(昭和五年四月一日)ノ席上ニ  
於テ海軍次官ヨリ専門的見地ニ立テ陳  
述スル意見ニシテ豫メ臨時海軍大臣ヲ務  
管理ノ諒解ヲ得置キタルモノナリ

海軍専門的ノ立場ヨリ此ノ同訓案ヲ見ルニ今次ノ  
米國提案ノ主旨ヲ應諾スルコトニ依リ我々主張スル三  
項目ノ内ノ一タル補助艦總括的七割ノ件ハ略ホ完全  
ニ貫徹スルコトヲ得タルモ尚他ノ二項目ニ関シテハ所望ノ  
域ニ達スルコト甚ク遠キモノニシテ即チ我等ノ最モ重要  
視スルニテ糧砲搭載巡洋艦ニ於ケル日米ノ比率ハ六  
割ニ當リ之ヲ以テ彼我ノ關係ヲ束縛スルモノトセハ將來我  
々國防計畫ニニ少ナカラサル影響ヲ受クルモノトナルノミ  
ナラス現時造船進兵其他各方面ノ技術的進歩顯  
著ニシテ未來ノ豫測ヲ許ササルノ時ニテリ米國が獨リテ  
糧砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦多數ノ新造ヲ敢テスルニ對シ  
我々國ハ一九二二年計畫ニ係ル古鷹級ノ旧艦ヲ擁シテ  
向テ六ヶ年間ニ亘リ袖手傍觀ヲ餘儀ナリセシメテ相  
對比率ノ低下スルニ委セサルベカラズ

尤モ一九二五年迄ハ即成艦ニ於テハ我々國ノ有スル十二隻  
ハ米國ノ有スベキ十五隻ニ對シテ七割ヲ幾分ヲ超過スル  
コトナルヲ其ノ期間ニ米國ハ更ニ三隻ノ建造ニ着手シ  
而モ或ル時機ニハ確實ニ之ヲ完成スベキモノニシテ假令  
一九二六年以後ニ於ケル我々が建造艦ニ關シテ留保スルコト  
アリトモ次期ノ會議ニ於テ列國カ之ヲ承認サル場合想像を假令



Def. Doc. 1904-5

條約實施期間、明記せられたる三條約、永續性ニ鑑み確實  
ニ維持維持不可能トナリ虞アリ所謂協定期間トシ  
一時的現象トシテ尚之ヲ忍び得べトスルモ此重大ナル責  
任ヲ後年、海軍當局ニ残スニハ頗ル苦痛トスルコトナリ  
殊ニ現時我が優勢、二十浬砲搭載巡洋艦ヲ以テ主  
力六割ノ劣ヲ補ヒ以テ米國ニ對抗し得べトナリ士氣大  
ニ揚ガシル我々海軍部内ハ此、協定爲ニ忽チ優勢ヲ失  
所ヲ失スルヲ見ル場合ニ於ケル精神的打撃ニ至リテ、更  
ニ憂慮ニ堪ヘサルモノナリ

次ニ他ノ一項目タル潜水艦ニ関シテ考フルニ我が所要、  
現有量ヲ其ノ三分ノ一モ低下スルコトヲ強ヒルハ潜水艦  
依リ國防計畫、ニ大打撃ヲ與フルモノニシテ又帝國  
保有量ヲ主萬二千七百噸トシ代換艦齡ヲ十三年トシ  
テ受諾スル如キコトナラバ實項ニ於テ潜水艦、全廢ヲ  
認ムルコトト同様ニシテ即チ一九三六年迄我々一隻モ新造  
代換ヲ爲シ得サルコトナリ、其、同造艦機能、全ク萎  
靡衰頹ニ頹スヘク且次期會議ニ於ケル潜水艦廢  
止ノ素地ヲ醸成セントスルノ前提ニ非ズヤト危惧セザ  
ルヲ得ズ

同訓案、審議ニテリ以上陳述シタル諸矣ニ関シテ今  
モ考慮ヲ加ヘラシムコトヲ所願ス

尚茲ニ一言附ケ加ヘタキハ若シ此、同訓案ガ此、盡  
ノ席ニ於テ決定セラルルガ如キ場合トモナラバ次、即考慮  
ヲ煩ヒタキ一事ナリ

No. 3

Def. Doc. / 904-5

軍備制限協定、成立に伴ひ国防計画實施一起、得て  
困難ナル諸事ヲ緩和スル、対策トシテハ内容、充實ナ  
術力、向ニトニ俟ツ、外ナシ内容、充實ニ関シテハ現存  
艦船、勢力、向ニ及維持航空兵力、整備実験研究  
機関、獎勵及充實防備施設、改善特殊水上艦艇、  
整備製艦技術及工作力、維持失業防止等ニ就キ  
適當ナル措置ヲ講ズル、要ナルベク又術力、向ニニ関シテ  
ハ教育諸般、施設、改善各種演習、勵行勤務  
生活、改善等ヲ考慮スルヲ要スベシ之が爲ニハ從來艦艇  
建造費、爲ニ圧迫セラシ勝ナリシ各種經常費、演習  
費、艦艇改裝費、艦艇修理費等ニ付キ考料ヲ加フル  
等、コトニ関シ充分、配慮ヲ願ヒタシ

No. 4



DEF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.6



APPENDIX I of First Report of the First Committee.

31 January 1930.

- Official Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930. Printed & published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, P.P. 317 - 319.

FRENCH TRANSACTIONAL PROPOSAL.

The limitation of Naval material deals with floating material. It consists of the following:-

1. Measures for limitation.
  2. Measures for Public Information.
  3. Regulations for replacement.
1. Measures for limitation.

A.--The limitation of Floating material relates to the total (global) tonnage, that is to say, to the total of the individual displacement of all vessels susceptible of being used as fighting units, with the exception of those vessels which are specified as not being subject to limitation.

The maximum total tonnage (global) which no High Contracting Power shall exceed during the period of application of the Convention is fixed at . . . . . tons.

Table I shows for each H.C.P. the total (global) tonnage which, taking into consideration the limit laid down in the preceding paragraph, and the present state of security, this

D.F. DOC. #1904 Annex No.6

H.C.P. undertakes not to exceed during the period of application of the Convention.

B.--The individual standard displacement for vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed. . . . . tons.

C.--The calibre of the guns of vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed. . . . . mms.

## 2. Measures of Public Information.

The limitations specified in paragraph 1 are supplemented by the following measures of public information:-

A.--Table II shows, by tonnage per class, the way in which each H.C.P. intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I. For each class, this tonnage corresponds to the figure which should not be exceeded, during the period of application of the Convention, by the total of the individual displacements of all the vessels at any one moment on active service, and which by their characteristics belong to the class in question. The classes mentioned above are specified as follows:-

Class A.--Vessels the individual standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons, or with guns of more than 8-inch (203 mms.) calibre.



Class B.--Light surface vessels with guns exceeding 6-inch  
(155 mms.) calibre.

Class C.--Light surface vessels with guns not exceeding 6-inch  
(155 mms.) calibre.

Class D.--Submarines.

Class E.--Aircraft Carriers.

Class F.--Special vessels (minelayers, training ship, aircraft  
transports, etc.).

B.--Within the limits of the total (global) tonnage shown in  
Table I, and in the absence of more strict conditions resulting  
from special conventions to which it is or may become a party,  
each of the H.C.P.s may alter this distribution, subject to the  
two following conditions:-

(1) The tonnages by class shown in Table II shall in no  
case be the object of an increase or subtraction of an amount  
exceeding the figures given in the annexed Table;

(2) The amount of tonnage of one class which is to be trans-  
ferred to another class shall be notified to the other H.C.P.s at  
least one year before the laying down of the ship or ships for the  
construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned.

C.--Each of the H.C.P.s shall notify within the month  
following the laying down of any vessel that is being built for  
its own account, the type and displacement of this vessel. This  
information shall be supplemented at the time that the vessel is  
launched by publication of the main characteristics of the armament

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of the vessel.

D.--Even should they not have been declared to be on active service, vessels still under construction shall be regarded as being on such service after the lapse of a period, dating from their laying down, of . . . . . years in the case of Class A, of . . . . . years in the case of Class B, etc.



TABLE I.--LIMITATION OF

---

H. C. P.

---

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

---

TABLE II.--DISTRIBUTION

---

H. C. P.

(Vessels, the individual  
standard displacement of  
which exceeds 10,000 tons  
or armed with guns exceed-  
ing 8 in. (203 mm.)  
calibre.)

---

Light Surface Vessels  
with Guns Exceeding  
6 in. (155 mm.).

---

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

---

left half (5)

TABLE I.--LIMITATION OF

H. C. P.

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

TABLE II.--DISTRIBUTION

H. C. P.

(Vessels, the individual  
standard displacement of  
which exceeds 10,000 tons  
or armed with guns exceed-  
ing 8 in. (203 mm.)  
calibre.

Light Surface Vessels  
with Guns Exceeding  
6 in. (155 mm.).

United States of America

British Empire

France

Italy

Japan

left half (5)



TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

---

Total (global) Tonnage

---

---

OF TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

---

Light Surface Vessels  
with Guns not exceed-  
ing 6 in. (155 mm.)

Submarine

Aircraft  
Carriers.

Special Vessels  
(Mine-Layers, Train-  
ing-Vessels, Seaplane  
Carriers, etc.)

---

---

right half (6)

DEF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.6

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "French Transactional Proposal" (Annex 6) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/s/ Enomoto Fujii  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /s/ Okuyama Hachiro  
(seal)

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Doc 1704-6

文書の出所並に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依り書かれ三葉が  
なる「French Transactional Proposal」  
と題する文書（附屬書第6）は現に私の所持  
する一九三〇年ロンドン海軍會議の公式  
文書集の抜萃に相違ないことを證明する

昭和三十三年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治 (印)

本署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲され

同日 於同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (印)

No 1

第一委員會第一報告書附屬書、  
一九三〇年二月三十日

佛國之協定

海軍兵力の制限は艦船に付て行ふものと  
は次の項目の各項目を含む

1. 制限に關する方式
2. 公表に關する方式
3. 代換に關する規定

A... 艦船の制限は總トノ数即チ制限の對  
照とならぬ様な特殊の艦船を除き戰時  
單位として使用される可能性ある凡の艦船  
個々の排水量の總數を基準とする條約通  
用期間中超過するを衡する最大總トノ數  
トニ定む

第一表は夫々の締約國に對し前項におい  
定めたる制限及安全の現狀を考慮に入  
れ條約適用期間中超過することなからべし  
と言ふ總トノ數を示す

B... 條約發効後起工される各艦船の基  
準排水量は...トノを超過すべからず

C... 條約發効後起工される各艦船の備  
砲口径は...リメターを超過すべからず

Doc 1904-6

NO 2



Ref Doc 1904-6

No. 3

乙 公 表 二 國 事 六 六

定章に於ては、制限は次の如く設けられたるべきである。

A ..... 表且り各締約國の艦艇に於ては、この條の適用期間中第一に表に示す制限を遵守し、數の範圍内に於て既分として示す各艦艇は、此の多數は、如何なる國に於ても、其後中、右の艦艇水量の總計、或は又、右の各艦艇は、當該艦艇に屬するに依り、條約適用期間中、右の表に示す數に超過するものとする。

上記の艦艇は、次の通りである。

艦艇 A ..... 重量排水量一萬五千噸以上のもの又は  
口徑八センチ（二・五二一メートル）以上の艦  
艇を有する艦

艦艇 B ..... 口徑六センチ（一・五二四メートル）以上の  
艦艇を有する輕水上艦

艦艇 C ..... 口徑六センチ（一・五二四メートル）以下の  
艦艇を有する輕水上艦

艦艇 D ..... 潜水艦

艦艇 E ..... 航空母艦

艦艇 F ..... 特殊艦艇（機雷敷設艦、掃雷艦、  
飛空艇、輸送艦、その他）

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日表人により示された例と、数割以内には、  
指別協定によるより嚴重なる條件なき場合締  
約意圖は、次、司條件に従ふこと、命令を要する、  
かしきる

(1) 表正に示された毎種別と、表に附表に、  
與へ、水、計費の超過總量、下、工事、  
増加目的、の、  
かしきる

(2) 他、艦種に移した、一、種、の、總、  
定、移動、の、艦、船、起、上、  
第一、他、國、に、通、  
かしきる

締約各國、  
の、起、上、  
を、通、  
の、起、上、  
補、  
かしきる

の、起、上、  
事、  
場、  
を、  
の、  
かしきる



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No 5

日本  
イタリ  
フランス  
英帝國  
合衆國  
(締約國)  
表一 總トノ数の制限  
(總トノ数)

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表II 總噸數の配分

潜水艦 航空母艦 特務艦船  
(機雷敷設艦 飛空艇母艦 輸送艦 補給艦 其他)

潜水艦 航空母艦

口徑六吋(155毫米)  
以下の砲を有する  
潜水艦

口徑六吋(155毫米)  
以下の砲を有する  
潜水艦

個艦排水量一萬噸以上  
排水量一萬噸以上  
又は排水量一萬噸以上  
(203毫米)以上の砲を有する艦

(締約國)  
合衆國 英國 日本  
大日本帝國 日本



STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE  
CONFERENCE, HELD AT ST. JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON, S.W.1,  
ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 30TH, 1930, AT 10 A.M.

- Documents of the London Naval Conference,  
1930 Printed and published by His Majesty's  
Stationery Office, P.P. 151-154.

Mr. Gibson: Mr. Chairman; the reference to a Committee for study and report of the important subject of methods of naval limitation may tend to create an erroneous impression as to the scope of the task that we are asking this Committee to undertake. It is gratifying, however, to be able to say that the scope of this enquiry has been very materially reduced by previous discussions, and that the task of the Committee is reduced to a purely practical problem bearing on the work of this Conference. Perhaps the most expeditious way of making this clear is briefly to restate the various steps in the previous discussions by which we have narrowed the question at issue.

The general problem of methods of naval limitation was first taken up by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1926; sub-committee A of that body sat for some months and carried on exhaustive--and sometimes exhausting--discussions, with a view to finding a single and ideal method by which naval limitation could be achieved. It soon became apparent, however, that the various Powers entertained divergent views as to what constituted this ideal method. Roughly, there were two schools of thought: that of limitation by categories and that of limitation by total tonnage. Limitation by categories fixes the tonnage which each country may use for each type of vessel, and

thereby fixes the total tonnage. Limitation by the global method fixes the total tonnage for each navy and allows each country to apportion that tonnage among the various types of ships as it sees fit.

The discussions in the first session of the Preparatory Commission revealed the divergence of views of the various Powers as to the merits of limitation by categories as opposed to the system of total tonnage limitation. I think it is important to stress the fact that these discussions were not immediately concerned with the reaching of an agreement, but were carried on merely with a view to determining the merits of these methods, and there was, therefore, no reason for attempting to conciliate the divergent needs of the various naval Powers at that time. (Indeed, the general work of the Preparatory Commission, as indicated by its name, has been to draw up a plan of work rather than any exact limitation.)

When, however, the Preparatory Commission met at its Second Session in 1927, this divergence of views had crystallised into a complete deadlock between the two opposing schools of thought, and it became important to devise some means of bridging the gap. In an endeavour to accomplish this the French Delegate, M. Paul-Boncour, brought forward a compromise proposal. This proposal was based upon the author's understanding of the inability of any Power, supporting one of these schools of thought, to accept for its own navy the system advocated by the other school, and has had a most important bearing upon the subsequent course of events. In a modified form it is one of the most important elements in our discussions to-day. The proposal was placed before the Preparatory Commission on



April 11, 1927. In its essence, it provided for the allocation of a total tonnage for the navy of each of the Naval Powers. This tonnage was then to be sub-divided into four categories--capital ships, aircraft-carriers, surface vessels of 10,000 tons and submarines. The provision was added that each of the High Contracting Parties, while keeping within the limits of the total tonnage, could alter the employment of that tonnage as apportioned among the various categories, subject to one year's notice before laying down the portion of tonnage transferred from one category to another. In the course of subsequent discussions, the four categories were increased to five by the division of auxiliary surface vessels into two categories, from 10,000 to 1,850, and from 1,850 to 600 tons. Moreover, a limited right of transfer between the last three categories was recognized in principle, any tonnage added to one of the categories being deducted from one or both of the other categories, with the result that the total tonnage should never be exceeded. Although there was no definite agreement at this stage as to the percentage of transfer, it was generally understood that the deviation would be small.

The proposal put forward by M. Paul-Boncour was conceived in the desire to facilitate agreement among the Naval Powers. This conciliatory spirit found ready response, and was the first step toward recognition by each school of thought that agreement must be found through consideration of the special needs of different types of navies.

This session of the Preparatory Commission was followed by the Three-Power Naval Conference in Geneva, but as the three Powers party to that Conference were all in favour of limitation by categories, the compromise

proposal found no application and was only brought to the fore again after the adjournment of the Three-Power Conference.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the British and French Governments during the early part of 1928, agreement was reached as to the terms of a proposal which divided warships, for the purposes of limitation, into four classes--capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons, armed with guns of more than six inch up to eight inch calibre, and oceangoing submarines of over 600 tons. With regard to the last two classes, it was agreed that the Disarmament Conference, eventually to be called, would fix a maximum tonnage applicable to all Powers which no Power would be allowed to exceed during the period covered by the treaty; and within this maximum limit each Power should indicate at the final Conference for each of these categories, what tonnage it proposed to reach, and would undertake not to exceed during the period covered by the treaty.

This compromise proposal was submitted to the American, Italian, and Japanese Governments. In setting forth the reasons for its inability to accept this plan, the American Government expressed its determination not to close the door on any possibility of obtaining a mutually satisfactory basis of limitation, and declared its willingness to take into consideration the special needs of other naval Powers for the particular classes of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defence, and suggested that this might be accomplished by permitting any of the Powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes, within the total tonnage, this percentage to be agreed upon, and any increase in one class to be deducted from the



tonnage used in another class or classes; in other words, the American Government suggested a re-examination of the proposal by M. Paul-Boncour.

Shortly after the opening of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission in April, 1929, the American Government, in expressing its willingness to undertake negotiations for a formula to determine equivalent naval strength, taking into account other factors besides tonnage, further stated that, for the immediate purpose of discussion, it was prepared to take as a basis the French compromise proposal of 1927, which constituted a middle ground between the thesis of global tonnage limitation and limitation by categories. At the same time, the American Government indicated that it did this, because it considered the technical aspects of naval reduction to be secondary to the spirit in which the problem is approached.

This statement of the development of the past discussions, in regard to the methods of limitation, has been made with a view to showing that such has already been accomplished, and that, when we refer to a committee the study of the methods of limitation, we are, as a practical matter, asking them to consider the various methods already devised and discussed, with a view to determining how the gap between them can be bridged, as a matter of practical application for the purposes of the treaty we are now seeking to conclude.

The American Government has consistently held the view that the method of limitation by categories is better calculated than any other method, thus far devised, to reduce international competition in the building of armaments and the feeling of mistrust, suspicion and insecurity

inevitably attendant upon such competition. If the system of global tonnage limitation were applied to all navies, no nation would know exactly what its neighbour was contemplating, now would it know exactly what steps it would have to take to meet the situation; all would be faced with an unknown factor, calculated to introduce an element of tenseness into the situation instead of one of complete certainty and security. It is the fear of the unknown that engenders distrust. As an example of what this means, let us assume that the three largest existing navies-- British, Japanese and American--were to adopt the system of global tonnage for those categories not now covered by the Washington Treaty. We would each have available several hundred thousand tons which might be applied in such a way as definitely to create suspicion and possibly endanger international security through the use of an undue proportion of that tonnage, for construction in some special type of ship, which would upset all the calculations of the other navies and provide all the elements of the competition which would exist in the absence of any agreement.

In brief, our conviction is that a strict system of limitation by categories affords a clear understanding as to the intentions of each naval power and affords a maximum of reassurance to all the parties to an agreement, so that they can regard each other's programmes without misgiving or alarm.

While we feel that the system of limitation by categories affords a maximum of benefits, still we recognise that smaller navies have inevitably a tendency towards specialisation, and we are not disposed to press our



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methods for the purpose of preventing such specialization. Further, specialisation can be taken care of under the category method. Nevertheless, we are not disposed to impose our theories upon other people who do not agree with them, and it is this which has led us to accept the compromise proposal for discussion.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 7

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Stenographic Notes of the 2nd Plenary Session of the Conference, held at St. James's Palace, London, S.W.1, on Thursday, Jan. 30th, 1930, at 10 A.M." is an official document which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, hachiro (seal)

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一九三〇年一月三〇日午前一〇時聖ジエイムス宮殿  
ロンドン S. W. I. で開催カレタ第三本會議ノ速記録

王宣文書局印刷刊行一九三〇年倫敦海軍會議文書

一五二頁乃至一五四頁

ギブソン氏

「議長殿、軍縮方法ニ關スル重要問題ヲ研究、報告スル委員會ニ關シテハ此ノ委員會ノ擔當スベキ任務ノ範圍ニ就キ誤マツタ印象ヲ與ヘル可能性ガアル、然レ此所ニ於テ以前ノ協議ニ依リ此ノ調査ノ範圍ガ非常ニ縮少ササレタコト又此ノ委員會ノ任務ガ當會議ニ關係アル純然タル實際的問題ニ減少サレタコトヲ報告出來得レコトハ甚ダ嬉シイ次第デアル、此ノ事實ヲ明白ニスル最モ手ツ取リ早イ方法ハ當問題ノ範圍ヲ縮メタ處ノ以前ノ協議ノ試験階ヲ簡單ニ送ベルコトカモシレナイ、軍縮ノ方法ノ一般問題ハ一九二六年ノ「ジュニエーヴアル」軍縮會議準備委員會ニ依テ始テ取上ゲラレタ、同委員會ノ△小委員會ハ數ヶ月ニ亘テ軍

結ヲ達成シ得ル單一ノ又理想の方途ヲ發見スル目的ノ下ニ該博ナ……  
 時ニハ消耗的ナ……・協議ヲ續ケタ、然シ各列國ガ理想的方法ニ就  
 中各々別個ノ見解ヲ有シテキルコトガ明カニナツタ、概念的ニニツノ思  
 潮ガ認めテレタ。即チ艦種別制限方式ト總屯數制限方式、艦種別制限方  
 式ヨ各國ヲシテソノ艦種別ニ許容屯數ヲ定メルコトニ依テ總屯數ヲ制定  
 スル總屯數制限方式ハ各國海軍ニ許容屯數ヲ定メテ各自海軍ニ隨意ニ其  
 ノ枠内ニ於テ之ヲ艦種別ニ割當テルコトヲ許ス、  
 準備委員會ノ第一回ノ會議ニ於ケル議論ハ各列強ノ艦種別制限方式ト總  
 屯數制限方式ノ眞價ニ就イテノ異ナツタ意見ノ存在ヲ明カニシタ、  
 此處ニ於テ強調スベキハ上記協定ガ何ラ條約締結ト直接關連シテキカ  
 ツタコトデアツテソレハ單ニ方式ノ眞價ヲ決定スル爲ニナサレ又其レ故  
 ニ當時ノ列強間ノ不一致ノ要求ノ妥協スル努力スル必要ガナカツタノデ  
 アル。(寧口、準備委員會ノ一般任務ハ、名稱ノ示ス如ク、嚴格ニ制限コ  
 ヲリモ寧口予定計畫ヲ作成スルコトデアツタ。一)



然シテ準備委員會ガ一九二七年第二回ニ集合シタ際、右ノ相異ニスル意見  
 二ツノ對立スル思潮ト結晶シテ完全ナル行詰リ狀態ヲ呈シテ居タ。何等カ  
 カノ方法デ此ノ間隙ヲ埋レコトガ重要トナツテ來タ。之ヲ達成スル爲ニ佛  
 代表「ポールボンクール」氏ハ妥協案ヲ提出シタ。此ノ提案ハ作者ノ左ノ  
 見解ニ基ツクモノデアッタ。

即テ如何ナル國モ若シ何レカノ思潮ヲ支持スルモノデアッタナラ他派ノ主  
 張スル方式ヲ自分ノ海軍ニハ採用シ得ナイト言フコト、此ノ提案ハ爾後ノ  
 經緯ニ重要ナ影響ヲ及スモノデアッタ。修正サレタ形ニ於テ今日ノ協議ノ  
 最モ重要ナル項目ノ一ツヲ形成シテキル、上記提案ハ一九二七年四月一  
 日準備委員會ニ提出サレタ。本質ニ於テハ各海軍國ニ總屯數割當ヲ爲シタ。  
 右總屯數ハ尙四種類ニ小區分サレタ。……戰艦、航空母艦、一万屯級  
 海上艦及潜水艦、之ニ左ノ條件ガ附ケラレタ、條約參加國ハ總屯數ノ枠内  
 ニ於テ各種類別ニ割當ラレタ屯數ノ使途ヲ變更スルコトヲ得、但シ右變更  
 ノ一年前ニ予告ヲ爲スコト、爾後協議ノ經過ニ於テ四ツノ種類別ハ補助海  
 上艦種ノ一万屯一、八五〇屯ト一、八五〇屯一六〇〇屯ノ二種類ハ再

區分ニ依ツテ五ツトナツタ。又原則トシテ最後ノ三種類内ニ於ケル一定ノ融  
 融通ハ認めラレテキテ一ツノ種類ニ用イラレタ屯散ヲ他ノ一ツ若シクハ二  
 ツノ種類ヨリ引キ總屯散ヲ超過シナイ様ニスルコトナツテ居リ、當時融通  
 割合ニ於テハ明確ナ協約ハ成立シテキナカツタカ、其レガ少量デアルト云  
 フコトハ大体了解サレテキタ。  
 「ボール、ボンクール」氏ノ提案ハ海軍國同ノ協定ヲ容易ニスル目的ヨリ主  
 ジタノデアツタ、此ノ妥協約精神ハ直ニ應答サレ、各思想ノ妥協ハ各々相  
 異スル海軍ノ特別ノ要求ニ對シ考慮ヲ拂フコトニ依リ初メテ達成シ得ルト  
 言フ認識ヘノ第一歩トナツタ。  
 此ノ準備委員會ニ續イテ「ジュニエーヴアル」ノ三國海軍會議ガ開催セラレタ  
 而シテ同會議參加ノ三國共ニ種類別制限法ニ贊成シテキタ爲、妥協案ハ採  
 用サレズ三國會議休會後ニ於テ始メテ又持出サレタ。  
 一九二八年初期ニ於ケル英國及佛國代表ノ會議ノ結果艦船ヲ左ノ四種類ニ  
 區別スル提案ノ項目ニ就キ了解ガ成立シタ



即チ制限ノ目的ヲ以テ海軍艦船ヲ主力艦、航空母艦、一万屯又ハ夫レ以下ノ六吋乃至八吋砲ヲ一級スル水上艦船、及六〇〇屯ヲ超ユル航洋性、潜水艦ニ區別シ最後ノ二艦種ニ就テハ、結局召集サレルトコロノ軍縮會議ニテ總テノ國ニ適用セラルベキ最高限屯數ヲ定メ條約有效期間中各國共之レヲ超過スベカラザルコトヲナツテ居タ。又各國ハ右最高限屯數ノ枠内ニ於テ各艦種毎ニ何屯建造スベキヤノ予定ヲ最後ノ會議ニ於テ示シ條約有效期間中夫レヲ超過セザル義務ヲ有スルコトニナツテ居タ。

此ノ妥協案ハ衆、伊、日政府ニ手交サレタ。米日政府ハ此ノ案ヲ採用シ得ザル理由トシテ相互ニ満足ヲ與ヘレ制限方式ノ重要ノ發展ノ機會ヲ閉鎖セザル決意ヲ披瀝シ、他ノ海軍國ガ自國防衛上最速ト思考スル特殊ノ艦種ヲ要求スル特殊ノ必要ヲ考慮スル用意アル旨ヲ宣言シ、此ノ目的ヲ達成スル爲ニハ各國ニ對シ總屯數ノ枠内ニテ各艦種ノ屯數ノ割合ヲ變更スルコトヲ許スコトトシテ而シテ此ノ割合ハ參加國ノ協定ニ依ルベキ一艦種ニ對スル増加ハ他ノ一艦種又ハ他艦種ニ當テラレタル屯數ヲ減ズルコトニ依リ埋合スコト、換言スレバ米日政府ハ「ボール、ボンタール」氏ノ提案ノ再調査

ヲ提言シタノデアル。

一九二九年四月ノ準備委員會第六回會議ノ直後米國政府ハ均等海軍力ヲ屯數以外ノ要素ヲ考慮シテ決定スル方式ノ協議ヲ喜ンデ行フ用意アル旨ヲ宣言スルト同時ニ日下ノ協議ノ基礎トシテ總屯數制限法ト是種別制限法トノ中庸ヲ行ク一九二七年ノ佛妥協案ヲ用ウルノ用意アル旨ヲ述べタ。同時ニ米國政府ハ之ヲ爲ス理由ハ海軍縮少ノ技術的面ヲ第二意義的トシ、問題ノ核必ニ觸ルル精神ヲ重要視スルコトニモアルコトヲ示シタ。

此ノ制限方式ニ關スル過去ノ討議ノ經過ニ就テノ陳述ハ左ノ目的ヲ爲サレタ即チ既ニ相當ニ完成サレテキルコトト又制限方式ヲ調査スル委員會ニ就テ述ベルトキニハ我々ハ現實ノ問題トシテ委員會ヲシテ既ニ考察サレ研究サレタ幾ツカノ方式ヲ考慮ノ中ニ容レ如何ニシテ現在締結セントシテキル條約ノ爲ニ彼等ノ間ニ存スル間隙ヲ現實ノ適用問題トシテ之レヲ填充シ得ルカラ決定シテシテ實ウコトニアル。

米國政府ハ常ニ是種別制限方式ガコレ迄作成サレタ如何ナル方式ヨリモ國際間ノ建艦競争及其レニ當ニ伴フ疑念猜疑ト不安ヲ減少スル最モ適當デアルト



ノ意見デアツタ。若シ總屯數制限法ガ各海軍ニ適用サレタナラバ何ノ國モ隣國ガ何ヲ考ヘテキルカ正確ニ解ラズ又如何ナル手段ヲ取ツテ將來ノ情勢ニ備ヘルベキカモ明確ニ解カラナイ。各國トモ未知ノ要素ニ直面スル而シテ之ハ十分ナル確實性ト安全感ノ代リニ情勢ヲ緊張スルコトナル不信ヲ生ムモノハ未知ノ恐怖デアル。一例ヲ舉ゲレバ現存三大海軍英、日、米、……ガ假ニ羣府條約ニ含マレテキナイ艦種ニ就テ總屯數制度ヲ採用シタトシテ見ユウ。三國共ニ自由ニ數十万吨ヲ使用シ得ルトスレバ夫レハ明カニ疑念ヲ生ズル又ハ不相當ナル屯數ノ割當ヲ特殊艦種ニ用フルコトニ依リ各海軍ノ計算ヲ狂ハセ、條約ノ存在セヌ時ニ起ル様ナ競争ヲ惹起スルニ至ル。

要スルニ我等ノ信念ハ嚴格ナル艦種別制限方式ハ各海軍國ノ意圖ヲ明確ニシ條約各參加國ニ最大ノ安心ヲ與ヘ互ノ建設計畫ヲ心配又ハ恐怖ナシニ見レコトガ出來ルト言フコトデアル。

又我々ハ艦種別制限方式ガ最大ノ利點ヲ有スト感ズルモノデハアルガ然シ我々ハ小海軍ガ必然的ニ特殊化ノ傾向ヲ取ルコトヲ認メ我等ノ方式ヲ強イテ此ノ特殊化ヲ防止スルニ押附ケル意圖ハナイ、又特殊化ハ艦種別方式ニ於

テモ可能デアル。然シ我々ハ我々ニ同意シナイモノニ我々ノ見解ヲ押附ケル  
コトヲ好マナイ  
之ガ我々ヲシテ妥協案ヲ討議ノ題目トスルコトヲ承諾セシタノデアアル



文書の出所竝に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依つて書かれ六葉からなる「stenographic notes of the Third Plenary Session of the Conference, held at St. James's Palace, London, S.W. 1, on Thursday, January 30th, 1930, at 10. A. M.

(一九三〇

年一月三十日木曜日セント・ジェームス宮殿に於て開催せられたる第三回總會速記録」と題する文書(附屬書第七)は現に私が所持して居る會議議事録の寫であることを證明する

9

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於 東京 榎 本 重 治

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲された

同同日日 於 同 所

立 會 人 吳 山 八 郎

RESOLUTION PERTAINING TO "CRITERIA FOR THE

LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS (Adopted

at 14th Meeting of the General Commission,  
20th April, 1932).

AGENDA OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION

Article 1, II a) b)

RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

Conf.D./G.C./24.

April 19th, 1932.

In view of the proposals submitted by various delegations concerning the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The General Commission declares that, in determining those criteria, the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations shall be applied, and that, in consequence, armaments must be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

It will be necessary, further, to take account of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State.

The General Commission decides that the application of those criteria and the methods by which the reduction and limitation of armaments must be effected, shall be immediately examined from a practical standpoint.



DEF. DOC. #1904 Annex 8

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution Pertaining to criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments (adopted at 14th meeting of the General Commission, 20th April, 1932)" is an official document handed to me when I attended Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present. Certified at Tokyo, on this 30 th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Junji (soal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (soal)

RESOLUTION PERTAINING TO CRITERIA FOR THE

LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS (Adopted

at 14th Meeting of the General Commission,

20th April, 1932).

AGENDA OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION

Article 1, II a) b)

RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE,

Conf.D./C.G./24.

April 10th, 1932.

In view of the proposals submitted by various delegations concerning the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments,

The General Commission declares that, in determining those criteria, the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations shall be applied, and that, in consequence, armaments must be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

It will be necessary, further, to take account of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State.

The General Commission decides that the application of those criteria and the methods by which the reduction and limitation of armaments must be effected, shall be immediately examined from a practical standpoint.



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Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30 th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

軍縮の基準に關する決議案（一九三二年四月二十日）

第十四回一般委員會採擇）

一般委員會議事第一條第二項 a) b)

起草委員會決議案

一般委員會は軍縮の基準に關し各國の提案を考慮して左の通り宣言する  
軍縮の基準に關しては連盟規約第八條の規定を適用し従つて各國は其の  
安全保障に必要な最低限度まで國際協定に従い軍備を縮少する。而し  
て各國の地理的位置及特種狀況を考慮に入れる必要がある。  
軍縮に對する基準及方式適用の研究は實際的方面より直ちに行ふ必要が  
ある。

（終）



文 文書の出所竝に公正に關する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依つて書かれ一葉からなる「Resolution  
pertaining to criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments (adopted at 14th  
meeting of the General Commission, 20th April, 1932).」

(「軍縮基準に關する決議(一九三二年四月二十日一般委員會第十四回  
會議に於て採擇)」)と題する文書(附屬書第八)は私が一九三二年ジ  
ュネーブ一般軍縮會議に専門委員として出席した際配布を受け現に私が  
所持して居る會議議事録の事であることを證明する

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

復 本 頁、 治

Ref. Doc. No. 1904 - 8  
Annex . 8

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲された

同日 於 同所

立會人 吳 山 八 郎

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 9

Resolution adopted by the General Commission  
Conference for the Reduction and Limita-  
tion of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd, 1932.

- Official Conference  
Document Number, Conf.  
D.C.G. 26 (1)

Without prejudice to other proposals which fall to be discussed under  
later heads of the Agenda, the Conference declares its approval of the  
principle of qualitative disarmament-- i.e., the selection of certain  
classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should  
be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalised by means of  
a general Convention.



Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932." (Annex 9)" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: YAMAGUCHI, Hachiro (seal)

No. 1

Adj. Doc. - 190.4 - 9

文書の出所並に公正に関する證明

本證明書に添附した英語によりて書かれ、葉からなる

"Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for

the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd 1932"

と題する文書(附屬書第九)は私が一九三二年、シネー、

一般軍縮會議に専門委員として出席した際、配布を

受け現に私が所持して居る會議事録の寫であること

とを證明す。

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲された

同日 於 同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (印)



Doc-190.4-9

文書の出所並に公正に関する證明

本證明書に添附した英語によつて言かれ一葉からなる  
"Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for  
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd 1932."  
と題する文書(附屬書第九)は私が一九三二年のハーグ  
一般軍縮會議に専門委員として出席した際配布を  
受け現に私が所持して居る會議記事録の爲であること  
を證明する

昭和十二年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲され

同日 於 同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (印)

No. 1

Dep. Sec. - 1904-9

no. 2

一九三二年軍備縮限會議一般委員會に依り  
採擇せられたる決議 一九三二年四月二十二日

一 會議公文書番号

秘 D. C. G. 二六(一)

後日の會議議題の下に討議せらるべき他の提案に關係  
なく本會議は左記質的軍縮主義を可決する旨を宣言  
す。

武器の一定の等級又は種類の選擇之が保有又は使用は  
總ての國家に絶對禁止するか又は一般協定の方法に依  
り國際管理すべき。



Resolution adopted by the General Commission  
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limita-  
tion of Armaments, 1932, on April 22nd, 1932.

- Official Conference

Document Number, Conf.

D.C.G. 28 (2)

In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution (Conf. D./C.G./26(1) ), the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, on April 27th, 1932. (Annex 10)" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitations of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Defence Doc. 1904-10

No. 1

文書の成所並に真正に因する證明

本證明書に添附した英語に依り書かれ  
一葉のいはる「Resolution adopted by the General  
Commission of the Conference for the Reduction  
and Limitation of Armaments 1932, on April  
22nd, 1932.」

し題す文書(附屬書ナシ)に私が一九三二年三月に  
一般軍縮會議に専門委員として出席した際配布  
を受け現に私が所持して居る會議議事録の寫に因  
ることを證明する

昭和二十三年七月三十日於東京

根重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲され

同日於同所

立会人

奥山八郎 (印)

No. 2

Defence Doc. 1904-10

一九三三年軍備縮短會議一般委員會に依り  
採擇せられたる決議

一九三三年四月二三日

會議文書番号  
秘 D. C. G. 三六三

前決議(秘 D. C. G. 三六三)に於て之を決定せし如く實質的  
軍縮主義の適用とせらるる爲め會議は陸上海上及  
航空武器の範圍に於ては武器の性質及特に最も  
攻撃的なるものなり又或は國防破壞に最も有効なるもの  
なり又非戦闘員を最も脅威するものなり又も運送  
する目的を以て當該特別委員會に依り検討せらるべ  
しとの意見と有す



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 11

Draft Convention Submitted by the United  
Kingdom Delegation at the Geneva General  
Disarmament Conference, March 16th, 1933.

Article 36.

-Conference Document No. Conf.  
D. 157.

With a view to effecting the reductions necessary to facilitate the attainment of the object referred to in Article 35, the number of aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties who at present possess such aeroplanes shall, by the end of the period of the present Convention, not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the table annexed to this chapter; as regards the other High Contracting Parties, the status quo existing on January 1st, 1933, shall be maintained during the said period.

Each of the High Contracting Parties mentioned in the table annexed to this chapter may keep a number of aeroplanes in immediate reserve, not exceeding in each case 25 per cent of aeroplanes in commission in the land, sea and air forces of such Party.

Table - AEROPLANES

(Note - Figures will have to be inserted subsequently for the other Parties which at present Possess military or naval aeroplanes).

Belgium.....	150	Norway.....	75
United Kingdom.....	500	Poland.....	200
China.....	100	Portugal.....	25
Czechoslovakia.....	200	Roumania.....	150
Denmark.....	50	Siam.....	75
Estonia.....	50	Spain.....	200
Finland.....	25	Sweden.....	75
France.....	500	Switzerland.....	75
Greece.....	75	Turkey.....	100
Italy.....	500	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic..	500
Japan.....	500	United States of America.....	500
Latvia.....	50	Yugoslavia.....	200
Lithuania.....	50		
Netherlands.....	150		



CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, the 2nd Demobilization Office hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Draft Convention Submitted Delegation at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference, March 16th 1952", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30 day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA Hachiro (seal)

「ジュネーブ」軍縮會議一九三三年三月十六日英代表團の提出せる案

會議書類D一五七一

第三六條

第三十五條に示された主旨を遂行する事を容易ならしめるに必要な削減を行ふため、各締約國の陸海空軍にて就役中にして戰時使用可能なる現有航空機數は本條約有効期間終了迄には本章附表に示された數字を越えざる事、又其他の締約國は同期間中は一九三三年一月一日現在の現狀を維持する事。

本表に附表に示さるる各締約國は即時使用可能なる予備兵力たる航空機を保有する事が出来る。但し同國の陸海空軍にて就役中の航空機數の二五パーセントを超過せざる事。



ベルギー	英帝國	支那	チエツコ	デンマーク	エストニア	芬蘭	佛蘭西	ギリシヤ
一五〇	五〇〇	一〇〇	二〇〇	五〇〇	五〇〇	二五〇	五〇〇	七五〇
伊太利	日本	ラトビア	リトアニア	和蘭	ノルウェー	ポーランド	ポルトガル	ルーマニア
五〇〇	五〇〇	五〇〇	五〇〇	一五〇	七五〇	二〇〇	二五〇	一五〇
シヤム	スウェーデン	スウェーデン	スイス	イギリス	ソ連	米	ユゴスラビア	
七五〇	二〇〇	七五〇	七五〇	一〇〇	五〇〇	五〇〇	二〇〇	

表（航空機）

（註）現在軍事並びに海軍機を所有する他の締約國のためには後日數字を挿入する。

立會ノ出所ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道教ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラ  
レタル英語ニ依ツテ書カレ二頁ヨリ成ル Draft Convention Submitted by the United Kingdom  
Delegation at the Geneva General Disarmament  
Conference, March 16th, 1933

(一九三三年三月十六日) ヨーロッパ一般軍縮會議一般委員會ニ於ケル英  
國提出ノ條約案ニト題スル書類ハ日本政府(第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル  
公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル爲シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同 所

立會人 奥山八郎



December 9th, 1932.

PROPOSAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
FOR THE  
REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

- Conference Document No. Conf. D. 150.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the delegations to the Conference the following proposals of the Japanese Government.

---

The Japanese Government, anxious for the realisation of the project of disarmament, whereby the peace of the world is to be consolidated, have been doing their utmost, in co-operation with other Powers concerned, to contribute to the success of the present Disarmament Conference. Paying sincere respect to the initiative taken by the participating Powers, particularly by President Hoover and the British Government, in putting proposals before the Conference, the Japanese Government have given careful consideration to those proposals. Having found, however, that these proposals contain certain points with which the Japanese Government cannot associate themselves, they wish to submit their point of view in so far as the problem of naval disarmament is concerned.

It is the earnest desire of the Japanese Government that, for the purpose of qualitative and quantitative reduction of naval armaments, the following should be observed by the present Conference as its guiding principle: that the Conference, always relying on the basis of the three important resolutions adopted by the General Commission in the early stages of the Conference-viz., those embodying the principle of reduction of

armaments, the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments and the principle of qualitative disarmament-should seek to reduce those forces which are aggressive in character and strong in offensive power, and to find a fair and rational solution of the problem in such a way as to meet existing conditions, giving due consideration to the geographical situation and special circumstances of the various countries, so that the sense of security may not be impaired.

For the success of the Conference, the most careful attention should be given to the procedure to be followed in its future discussions. It is believed to be practically impossible for a World Conference such as the present one to seek to conclude a comprehensive agreement at a single stroke by having all the participating Powers take part in the discussion of every problem regard-less of whether it is of minor importance or of concern to only some of those Powers. Such a method would rather jeopardise the chance of ultimate success. In the future discussion of naval questions, therefore, and with a view to realising the guiding principles set forth above, to facilitating the progress of the Conference, and to assuring the attainment of its object, the Japanese Government propose, as a practical and effective procedure, that:

- (1) The general outline of agreements to be concluded shall form the subject-matter of prior negotiations between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, as was contemplated by the resolution of the General Commission on July 23rd;
- (2) The agreements shall be of two kinds-general and special. Discussions on matters of a general character will be followed by discussions on matters of a sectional and detailed nature;
- (3) A distinction shall be made between powerful naval vessels, which possess a high degree of relativity as between Powers, and less powerful vessels, which, having a close relation to geographical situation and special circumstances, are primarily necessary for defence and patrol services; in other words, such vessels as capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers on the one hand, and such vessels as B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines on the other, shall be dealt with separately.



In the general agreement, qualitative limitation of all categories of naval vessels and quantitative limitation between the five leading naval Powers of capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers are to be effected so that the offensive power of these vessels will be greatly reduced; and the maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the afore-mentioned five Powers, for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively shall be fixed.

In the special agreements, quantitative reduction to be applied mainly to B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines shall be effected within each group of Powers most closely related, taking into account their geographical situation and special circumstances.

The Japanese Government think that the method outlined above should prove to be the most practical way to obtain a fair and equitable agreement.

#### A. GENERAL AGREEMENT.

It is the purpose of this agreement to provide for qualitative limitation of naval vessels of all countries, together with a quantitative limitation between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, of vessels having a great offensive power and to fix the maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the said five Powers, for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively.

1. Reduction in the unit size of the various naval vessels and the calibre of the guns shall be agreed upon.
2. The reduction and limitation of the tonnages of capital ships, aircraft-carriers and A-class cruisers of the above-mentioned five Powers shall be agreed upon.
3. The maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the five naval Powers for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines respectively shall be agreed upon in the general agreement. The actual tonnages of these vessels to be retained by the five Powers shall, however, be fixed as low as possible within the above-mentioned maximum, by means of special agreements, between the

Powers in the respective groups to which the said five Powers belong, taking the tonnages actually possessed by each Power as a basis and also bearing in mind the geographical situation and special circumstances of each country concerned.

4. As for the tonnages of the Powers other than the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, it shall be agreed in the general agreement that they shall be limited and reduced by means of the special agreements, upon the basis of the actual tonnages of the Powers and with due regard to their geographical situation and special circumstances.

### B. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS.

For the purpose of these agreements, the world shall be divided broadly into the Pacific, Atlantic, European and South-American groups, and the limitation and reduction of the tonnage to be actually retained by a country shall be agreed upon between that country and other countries of the same groups on the basis of the provisions embodied in the general agreement. (As for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, the special agreements apply to the tonnages of 3-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines). A country which is closely related to more than one group shall participate in the negotiation of the agreement of each of those groups.

Throughout the discussions of the Conference in the first six months, the most important point unanimously agreed upon was the principle of qualitative limitation, which was adopted with the basic idea in mind of strengthening defensive power by weakening offensive power.

Having this end in view, the Japanese Government urge, first of all, the total abolition of aircraft-carriers, which were admitted by a great majority of the members of the technical Commissions to be most offensive, most efficacious against national defense, and most threatening to civilian populations. The Japanese Government also urge the reduction in the unit size of all categories of naval vessels, especially that of capital ships and A-class cruisers.

In view of the fact that the basic idea referred to above of strengthening defensive power by weakening offensive power necessarily demands a large sacrifice on the part of larger navies in



comparison with that of smaller navies, the former should be prepared to take the lead in larger reductions than the latter. To apply the same percentage of reduction to both large and small navies alike would naturally impair the sense of national security of countries with lesser navies, and this sense of security will diminish as the measure of reduction is increased. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that, in effecting the reduction in the tonnages of vessels possessing a high degree of relativity as between Powers, such as capital ships and A-class cruisers, the above consideration of national security should be taken into account in order that lesser naval Power may not be disturbed in this regard. B-class cruisers and destroyers, having no great offensive power, are less important in the consideration of relativity. The tonnages required by each Power should therefore be determined primarily by the needs of that Power in view of its geographical situation and with due regard to the function of these types of vessels in coastal defense and protection of lines of communication in war-time, and for patrol and similar services in time of peace. Submarines, as was recognised by a large majority of the members of the Naval Commission, are of defensive and not offensive character. The degree of their relativity as between Powers is extremely slight, and they constitute an arm indispensable for the defense of a lesser naval Power. The required tonnage should be determined, therefore, solely by the geographical situation and defensive needs of each country.

In short, the greatest importance should be attached to considerations of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each country in determining the tonnages of B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The Japanese Government therefore propose that the actual tonnages of these vessels to be retained by the various Powers be determined by means of special agreement, and that the uniform maximum tonnages acceptable to all the Powers, for these three types of vessels, be stipulated in the general agreement.

\*\*\*\*\*

In pursuance of the above considerations, the Japanese Government wish to put forward the following concrete proposal for the general agreement:

Def. Doc. No. 1904 Annex 12

1. The maximum unit size and gun-calibre of vessels to be constructed in the future shall be reduced and limited as follows:

Type	Tonnage	Gun-calibre
Capital ship .....	25,000	14 inches (355 mm.)
A-class cruiser .....	8,000	8 inches (203 mm.)
B-class cruiser .....	6,000	6.1 inches (155 mm.)
Destroyer (including flotilla leader .....	1,500	5.1 inches (130 mm.)
Submarine .....	1,800	5.1 inches (130 mm.)

Aircraft-carriers shall be abolished, prohibiting at the same time the construction of aircraft landing platforms of decks on naval vessels.

2. The strength of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan in capital ships, and A-class cruisers shall be reduced to the following figures:

Capital Ships.

	Tonnage	Number of units
United States .....	275,000	11
British Empire .....	275,000	11
Japan .....	200,000	8

For France and Italy, the maximum tonnage shall be fixed at 150,000 (number of units, not fixed); and within that limit the actual tonnage to be allowed each Power shall be agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

A-class Cruisers.

	Tonnage	Number of units
United States .....	96,000	12
British Empire .....	96,000	12
Japan .....	80,000	10

For France and Italy, the maximum tonnage shall be fixed at 56,000 (number of units, 7); and within that limit the actual



tonnage to be allowed each Power shall be agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

3. The maximum tonnages, applying uniformly to the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan for B-class cruisers, destroyers and submarines shall be fixed as follows:

Type	Tonnage
B-class cruiser .....	150,000
Destroyer .....	150,000
Submarine .....	75,000

The proposal of the Japanese Government, based as it is upon the principles of disarmament, which have received the approval of the public opinion of the entire world, offers, in their opinion a fair, reasonable and practical solution of the problems of naval disarmament. In putting forward this proposal, the Japanese Government wish to make it clear that they are animated by the sincere desire to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Conference. It is submitted, not only with the hope that the other naval Powers will encounter no difficulty in accepting it, but with the firm conviction that it will effect an enormous reduction in expenditures on armament that now weigh heavily upon the peoples of the world, and that it will lead the way toward the consolidation of a lasting world peace.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, heroby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Proposal of the Japanese Government for the Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armament" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 20th day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I heroby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Ref Doc 1904-12

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

自分、吉井道敏ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル英語ニ依ツテ書カレ六頁ヨリ成ル「海軍各篇ニ關スル日本政府提案」ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抄萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル爲シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日

於東京

吉井道敏 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同 所

立會人

奥山八郎 (印)

Ref Doc 1904-12

則ヲ含ムノデアリマスガ、本會議ハ進攻性兵力ニシテ攻撃力ノ強大ナモノヲ制限スベキデアリ、安全感ガ弱メラレナイ様ニ各國ノ地理的條件ヤ特殊事情ヲ充分考慮シ、當面ノ諸條件ヲ満足出來ル様ニ公平ニシテ合理的解決ヲ見出スベキデアル。會議ノ成功ヲ期スルニハ今後ノ協議ニ於ケル方法手段ニ對シ最大ノ注意ガ拂ヘルベキデアル。本會議ノ如キ世界的會議ニ於テ參加國全部が問題ノ重要性ヤ、ドノ諸國ニ關スル事項デアルカラ考ヘズニドノ問題ノ協議ニモ參加シタノデハ、一舉ニ總括的協定ヲ結ブコトハ不可能ト考ヘラレマス。ソノ様ナ方法ハ結局ニ於ケル成功ノ機會ヲ失スルカモ知レマセン。海軍問題ノ今後ノ協議ニ於テハ既述ノ指標トナルベキ原則ヲ實現スル意味デ且ツ本會議ノ進行ヲ促進スルタメ、ソシテ會議ノ目的ヲ確實ニスルタメ日本政府ハ次ノ實際的ニシテ有效ナル方法ヲ提議スル。

- (一) 七月二十三日一般委員會ノ決議ニテ企圖サレタ如ク締結サレル協定ノ大體ノ概要ヲ以テ米、英、俄、伊、日間ノ最良的交渉ニ於ケル議題トスル。
- (二) 協定ハ二種類トスル、即チ一般ト特殊ニ分ツ、一般的性格ニ關スル事項ノ協議ニ引續キ部分的乃至詳細ナ性格ヲ持ツ事項ニ入ル。



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(附屬書第十二)

海軍々編ニ關スル日本政府提案

一九三二年十二月九日

事務總長記

事務總長ハ日本代表團ノ要求ニヨリ次ノ日本  
政府提案ヲ本會議ノ各代表團ニ對シ傳遞スル  
ノ光榮ヲ有スル

世界平和確立ノ爲、軍縮計畫ノ實現ヲ切望スル日  
本政府ハ今次軍縮會議ヲ成功サセルべく關係諸國  
ト協力シテ最善ヲ盡シテ参リマシタ。参加諸國ノ  
提案殊ニ「フーバート」大統領ト英政府ニヨル提案  
ニハ深甚ナル敬意ヲ表シ日本政府ハソノ提案ニ對  
シ充分ナル考慮ヲ拂ヒマシタ。然シ此等ノ提案中  
ニハ日本政府トシテ同意出來ナイ點ガ含まレテ居  
ル事ヲ認め、海軍々編問題ニ關シテソノ見解ヲ述  
ベテ見タイト思イマス。

海軍々編ノ質的及ビ量的制限ノ爲ニハ、本會議ニ  
於テ指導的の原則トシテ次ノ事柄ガ認めラレルコト  
ヲ日本政府ハ切望スルモノデアリマス。即チ本會  
議ハソノ初期ノ段階ニ於テ一委員會ノ採擇シタ  
三大決議ヲ基礎トシテ常ニ之ニ順リ、ツマリ、軍  
備縮少ノ原則、軍備制限ノ基準及ビ質的軍縮ノ原

(三) 強力ナル艦艇即チ各國間ニ高度ノ相對性ヲ持ツモノト、並程強力デナイ艦艇即チ地理的條件ヤ特殊事情ト密接ナル關係ヲ持チ防衛ト警戒任務ニハ第一義的ニ必要ナモノトノ間ニ區別ヲ設ケルコト、決言スレバ主力艦、航空母艦、A級巡洋艦トB級巡洋艦、驅逐艦及ビ潛水艦ハ別個ニ取扱フ事

一 般協定ニ於テハ攻撃兵力大削減ノタメ、凡ニル艦艇ノ海軍艦艇ノ質的制限ト五大海軍口間ニ於ケル主力艦、航空母艦ト、A級巡洋艦ノ量的制限ヲ行ヒ、且ツ、B級巡洋艦、驅逐艦及ビ潛水艦ニ於テハ既述ノ五ヶ國ニ共通ニ適用スル最大に取ラ夫々決定スル

特別協定ニ於ケル量的制限ハ主トシテB級巡洋艦、驅逐艦及ビ潛水艦ニ適用サレ地理的條件ヤ特殊事情ヲ考慮ニ入レ取モ密接ナル關係ヲ持ツ國家群ノ内ニ於テ行ハレル事

日本政府ハ上述セル方法コソ、公平ニシテ、不偏ナル協定ニ望ミ得ルニ最も實際的ナモノデアルト思フ。

(A) 一般協定

本協定ノ目的ハ、凡ニル國家間ノ海軍艦艇ノ質的制限ヲ規定シ、且ツ、米、英、佛、伊、日間ニ於ケル大攻撃力ヲ有スル艦艇ノ量的制限ヲ規

Ref Doc 1904-12



Def Doc 1904-12

定シ、而シテ、B級巡洋艦、C級巡艦及ビ潜水艦ニ  
關シテハ上記五ヶ國ニ對シテ共通ニ適用サレル最  
大噸數ヲ決定スルモノデアル。

(一)各種艦船ノ艦型ト砲口徑ノ縮小ニ就イテ決定スル  
上記五ヶ國ノ主力艦、航空母艦、及ビA級巡洋  
艦ノ噸數ノ削減ト制限ヲ協定スル

(以下次頁へ)

(三) 五ヶ國ニ對シ共通ニ適用サレル B 級巡洋艦及  
 ビ潛水艦區區及ビ潛水艦ノ最大噸數ハ一級協  
 定ニ於テ決定スル。五ヶ國ニヨル保有サルベキ  
 石炭積ノ實際的噸數ハ、各國ガ現在保有スル噸  
 數ヲ基礎トシ、各國ノ地理的條件ト特殊事情ヲ  
 考慮シ、且ツ上記五ヶ國ガ夫々屬スル國家群間  
 ニ於テ特殊ナ協定ヲ作り以ツテ既ニ述ベタ最大  
 噸數内ニ於テ出來ルダケ低ク決定スル

(四) 米、英、佛、伊、日以外ノ諸國ノ保有噸數ハ  
 ソノ國ノ現有噸數ヲ基礎トシ、地理的條件ヤ特  
 殊事情ヲ充分考慮ニ入レ、特別協定ノ方法ニヨ  
 リ創設サレ又縮減サレル事ヲ、一級協定ニ於テ  
 決定スル。

(B) 特別協定

之等協定ノ目的ノ爲、世界ヲ大キク太平洋、太  
 西洋、歐洲及ビ南米ノ「ダグループ」ニ分ケル而  
 シテ一國ノ實際ニ保有スル噸數ノ縮減ト創設ト一級協  
 定ノ規定ニ基キ同國ト同國ノ屬スル國家群トノ  
 間テ決定スル。(米、英、佛、伊、日、ニ於テ  
 ハ特別協定ハ B 級巡洋艦及ビ潛水艦ノ噸數ニ適  
 用サレル) 一國群以上トノ間ニ密接ナル關係ヲ  
 有スル國ハ夫々ノ「ダグループ」トノ間ニ於ケル  
 交渉ニ參加スル

當初ノ六ヶ月間ニ於ケル會議ノ結果ヲ通シテ滿

Ref Doc 19c 4-12



Ref Doc 1904-12

協一致ヲ以ツテ同意ヲ見タ最モ重長ナ事柄ハ質  
的制限ノ原則デアリマシタ。ソレハ攻撃力ヲ弱  
メル事ニヨリ防衛兵力ノ強化ト云フ根本概念ヲ  
念頭ニ於イテコソ取リ上ゲラレタノデアル  
此意味ニ於テ日本政府ハ専門委員會ノ大多數ノ  
者ヨリ最モ攻撃的ニシテ国防政策ニ最モ效果的  
且ツ一般民衆ニ對シ最モ脅威ヲ與ヘル事ヲ認メ  
ラレタ航空母艦ノ全面的廢止ヲ先ヅ第一ニ勸メ  
ル。日本政府ハ又アラユル海軍艦船、殊ニ主力  
艦トA級巡洋艦ノ艦型ノ減少ヲ勸メル。  
攻撃兵力ヲ弱メル事ニヨリ防禦兵力ヲ強化スル  
ト言フ既述ノ根本概念ニ鑑ミ石ハ必然的ニ小海  
軍國ニ比シテ大キナ犧牲ヲ要求スルヲ以ツテ前  
者ハ後者ヨリハ一層大キナ縮減ヲ卒先シテ行フ  
ダケノ覺悟ヲ持ツベキデアル。同一割合ノ年額  
ヲ大小兩海軍國ニ等シク適用セバ劣勢海軍國ヲ  
シテ當然國防安全感ヲ損ジ且ツ此ノ安全感ハ縮  
減ノ程度ガ増大スルベスル程失ハレル  
故ニ主力艦ヤA級巡洋艦ノ様ニ國家間ニ高度ノ  
相對性ヲ持ツ艦船噸數ノ減少ヲ行フニハ劣勢海  
軍國家ガ此點ニ關シテ懸念ノナイ様ニ上記ノ國  
家保全ト云フ事ヲ考慮ニ入レナクテハナラナイ  
B級巡洋艦ヤ驅逐艦ハ別ニ大キナ攻撃力ヲ持タ

P

ナイノテ相關性ヲ考慮スル場合差程重要デナイ。  
故ニ各國ニ於テ必要トスル噸數ハ第一ニソノ國  
ノ地理的情況ニ儘ミ且ツ戰時ニ於ケル之等各種  
艦船ノ沿岸防備ヤ保給線ノ保護及ビ平時ニ於ケ  
ル哨戒ヤ同様ナ任務等ノ機能ヲ考慮シ、ソノ國  
ノ必要ニ應ジテ決定サヘルベキデアアル。海軍委  
員會ノ大多數ノ委員ニヨリ認めラント如ク潛水  
艦ハ攻撃的性質ノモノデナク防禦的ナモノデア  
ル。

各國間ニ於ケル相對性モソノ差度ガ甚メテ僅少  
デアリ劣勢海軍國ノ防衛ニハ不可俟ナ軍備ヲ構  
成スルモノデアアル。

必要噸數ハ故ニ各國ノ地理的條件ト防衛上ノ必  
要ニヨツテノミ決定サレルベキデアアル早ク言へ  
バB級巡洋艦四巡艦及ビ潛水艦ノ噸數決定ニ當  
リテハ各國ノ地理的條件ト特殊事情ニコソ最大  
ノ重キヲ置クベキデアアル。

日本政府ハ各國ノ保有スベキ之等艦船ノ實際噸  
數ハ特別協定ニヨリ決定シ且ツ各國共ニ承認出  
來ル同一最大噸數即チ之等三ツノ艦種ニ對スル  
コトハ一級協定ニ於テ規定サレシム事ヲ提議スル  
モノデアアル。

Ref Doc 1904-12



P

ナイノデ相圖往ヲ考慮スル場合差違重要デナイ。  
故ニ各國ニ於テ必要トスル噸數ハ第一ニソノ國  
ノ地理的情況ニ鑑ミ且ツ戰時ニ於ケル之等各種  
艦船ノ沿岸防備ヤ保給線ノ保護及ビ平時ニ於ケ  
ル哨戒ヤ同様ナ任務等ノ機能ヲ考慮シ、ソノ國  
ノ必要ニ應ジテ決定サレルベキデアアル。海軍委  
員會ノ大多數ノ委員ニヨリ認メラレタ如ク潛水  
艦ハ攻撃的性質ノモノデナク防禦的ナモノデア  
ル。

各國間ニ於ケル相對性モソノ程度ガ極メテ僅少  
デアリ劣勢海軍國ノ防衛ニハ不可俟ナ軍備ヲ構  
成スルモノデアアル。

必要噸數ハ故ニ各國ノ地理的條件ト防衛上ノ必  
要ニヨツテノミ決定サレルベキデアアル早ク言へ  
バB級巡洋艦四隻及ビ潛水艦ノ噸數決定ニ當  
リテハ各國ノ地理的條件ト特殊事情ニコソ最大  
ノ重キヲ置クベキデアアル。

日本政府ハ各國ノ保有スベキ之等艦船ノ實際噸  
數ハ特別協定ニヨリ決定シ且ツ各國共ニ承認出  
來ル同一最大噸數即チ之等三ツノ艦種ニ對スル  
コトハ一級協定ニ於テ規定サレン事ヲ提議スル  
モノデアアル。

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協一致ヲ以ツテ同意ヲ見タ最モ重要ナ事柄ハ質  
的制限ノ原則デアリマシタ。ソレハ攻撃力ヲ弱  
メル事ニヨリ防衛兵力ノ強化ト云フ根本概念ヲ  
念頭ニ於イテコソ取り上ゲラレタノデアル  
此意味ニ於テ日本政府ハ専門委員会ノ大多數ノ  
者ヨリ最モ攻撃的ニシテ国防政策ニ最モ效果的  
且ツ一般民衆ニ對シ最モ脅威ヲ與ヘル事ヲ認メ  
ラレタ航空母艦ノ全面的廢止ヲ先ヅ第一ニ勸メ  
ル。日本政府ハ又アラユル海軍艦船、殊ニ主力  
艦トA級巡洋艦ノ艦型ノ減少ヲ勸メル。  
攻撃兵力ヲ弱メル事ニヨリ防禦兵力ヲ強化スル  
ト言フ既述ノ根本概念ニ鑑ミ石ハ必然的ニ小海  
軍國ニ比シテ大キナ犧牲ヲ要求スルヲ以ツテ前  
者ハ後者ヨリハ一層大キナ縮減ヲ卒先シテ行フ  
ダクノ覺悟ヲ持ツベキデアル。同一割合ノ軍縮  
ヲ大小兩海軍國ニ等シク適用セバ劣勢海軍國ヲ  
シテ當然國防安全感ヲ損ジ且ツ此ノ安全感ハ縮  
減ノ程度ガ増スルベスル程失ハレル  
故ニ主力艦ヤA級巡洋艦ノ様ニ國家間ニ高度ノ  
相類似ヲ持ツ艦船類ノ減少ヲ行フニハ劣勢海  
軍國家ガ此點ニ關シテ懸念ノナイ様ニ上記ノ國  
家保全ト云フ事ヲ考慮ニ入レナクテハナラナイ  
B級巡洋艦ヤ驅逐艦ハ別ニ大キナ攻撃力ヲ持タ



P

ナインノテ相臨佐ヲ考慮スル場合整理重要デナイ。  
故ニ各國ニ於テ必要トスル噸數ハ第一ニソノ國  
ノ地理的情況ニ鑑ミ且ツ戰時ニ於ケル之等各種  
艦船ノ沿岸防備ヤ保給線ノ保護及ビ平時ニ於ケ  
ル哨戒ヤ同様ナ任務等ノ機能ヲ考慮シ、ソノ國  
ノ必要ニ應ジテ決定サレルベキデアル。海軍委  
員會ノ大多數ノ委員ニヨリ認メラント如ク潛水  
艦ハ攻撃的性質ノモノデナク防禦的ナモノデア  
ル。

各國間ニ於ケル相對性モソノ程度ガ極メテ僅少  
デアリ劣勢海軍國ノ防衛ニハ不可俟ナ軍備ヲ構  
成スルモノデアル。

必要噸數ハ故ニ各國ノ地理的條件ト防衛上ノ必  
要ニヨツテノミ決定サレルベキデアル早ク言へ  
バB級巡洋艦四巡艦及ビ潛水艦ノ噸數決定ニ當  
リテハ各國ノ地理的條件ト特殊事情ニコソ最大  
ノ重キヲ置クベキデアル。

日本政府ハ各國ノ保有スベキ之等艦船ノ實際噸  
數ハ特別協定ニヨリ決定シ且ツ各國共ニ承認出  
來ル同一最大噸數即チ之等三ツノ艦種ニ對スル  
コトハ一號協定ニ於テ規定サレシ事ヲ提議スル  
モノデアル。

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上記考案ノ下ニ日本政府ハ次ノ具体的提案ヲ一

般協定ニ關シテ提議スル

(一) 將來建造サルベキ船舶ノ最大船型ト砲口徑ノ  
 次ノ條ニ細少シ、制限スル事

(型)

(噸數)

(砲口徑)

主力艦

二萬〇〇〇

二四吋(二三〇〇)

A級巡洋艦

八〇〇〇

八吋(二三〇〇)

B級巡洋艦

六〇〇〇

六吋(二三〇〇)

驅逐艦(雷擊驅逐艦ヲ含ム)

一萬〇〇〇

五吋(二三〇〇)

潛水艦

一萬〇〇〇

五吋(二三〇〇)

航空母艦ハ廢止スル事、同時ニ船舶ニ航空機發着  
 用ノ臺又ハ甲板ノ建造ヲ禁止スル

(二) 米、英、佛、伊、日ノ主力艦勢力ハ次ノ如ク  
 減少スル事

○ 主力艦

(噸數)

(艦數)

米 國

二萬〇〇〇

十一

英 國

二萬〇〇〇

十一

日 本

一〇〇〇〇〇

八

佛、伊、兩國ハ最大噸數ヲ一萬〇〇〇〇トシ、  
 艦數ヲ決定セズ、且ツ右制限内ニ於テ關係諸國  
 家間ニテ各國ニ許サルベキ實際噸數ヲ協定スル  
 事

○ A級巡洋艦

(噸數)

(艦數)



10

米 國	五六〇〇〇	十二
英 國	五六〇〇〇	十二
日 本	八〇〇〇〇	十

佛伊兩國ハ最大噸數ヲ五六、〇〇〇ト決定シ（  
 第七）且ツ石制限内ニ於テ關係諸國間ニテ各  
 國ガ許容サレル實際噸數ヲ協定スル

(三) B級巡洋艦及潜水艦ニ關シ米、英、佛、伊、  
 日間ニ一樣ニ適用サレル最大噸數ハ次ノ通り決  
 定スル

(型)	(噸 數)
B級巡洋艦	一、五〇〇〇〇
驅逐艦	一、五〇〇〇〇
潜水艦	七〇〇〇

日本政府ノ提案ハ全世界ノ輿論ノ承認ヲ得タ軍  
 縮ノ原則ニ基キソノ意見ニヨレバ海軍及艦間題  
 ニ對スル公正合理且ツ實際的解決ヲ提供スルモ  
 ノデアル。此案ヲ提議スルニ當リ日本政府ハ本  
 會議ノ首尾良キ終結ヲ容易ナラシメルコトヲ誠  
 心誠意望シテキル事ヲ明ラカニセント思フ  
 他ノ海軍國ガ之ヲ承諾スルニ應答シナイ事ヲ望  
 ムダケデナク現在世界ノ人々ニ重ク負ハサレテ  
 キル軍備ノ支出ノ巨額ノ減少ヲ冀ス事ヲ確信シ  
 且ツ永續スル世界平和ノ確立ヘ導ク事ヲ信ズル  
 モノデアル。

終

Ref Doc 1904-12

Admiral Nagano's explanation made at the 1st Meeting  
of the heads of delegations (London Naval Conference,  
1935), on 16th December 1935.

- Stenographic Notes  
(L.N.C.(35) (H.D.)  
1st Meeting, P. 7.

Admiral Nagano (Translation): I have stated that the strongest  
must make the greatest sacrifices. As I said on a former occasion, the  
state of my mind in making the Japanese proposal is very similar to  
that of the British Delegate at the Geneva Conference, who, at the  
meeting of the Bureau in November 1932, made a proposal for the reduc-  
tion of air forces. He explained the British proposal to the following  
effect: the British Air Force at present stands fifth in strength; that  
is to say, there are four Powers stronger in the air than Great Britain;  
he would like those four other Powers to come to the British level, and  
then all would effect a reduction of one-third.

The difference between that proposal and ours is that in the  
British proposal the level to which the four Powers were to come down was  
the level of the British Air Force at that time. We have not stated a  
definite level to which we propose all the navies should come down.  
Regarding the position of armament as a whole, it is true there are in  
addition to the navy, land and air forces, but here we are discussing  
only navies and, so far as navies are concerned, we believe that equality



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (1)

of armaments, that is to say, of naval armaments, will best produce a state in which defence is easy and attack difficult. Our thesis is to set the limit as low as possible, and that low limit we propose should be fixed by this Conference.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (1)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Admiral Nagano's explanation made at the 1st Meeting of the heads of delegations (London Naval Conference, 1935), on 16th December 1935 (Annex 13 (1) )" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> London Naval Conference, 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Def Doc #1904 13(1)

文書の出所並に公正に關する証明

本証明書に添附した文書に依る書かれ三葉がうなり

Admiral Nagano's explanation made at the 1st. Meeting  
of the heads of delegations (London Naval Conference, 1935)  
on 16th December 1935,

と題する文書(附屬書第十三号)は私が一九三五年ロンドン海軍  
軍縮會議に専門委員として出席し、自陳配布を受け  
現に私が所持し、この居る會議議事録の箇所であることを  
証明す。

昭和十二年七月三十日 於東京

榎本重治 (榎本)

右署名捺印は自分の面影に於て爲され

同日 於同所

立会人 奥山八郎 (奥山)

No. 1

Ref Doc # 1904 1311

110.2

一九三五年十二月十六日ロンドン軍縮會議第一回

首席代表會議の席上で行はれた永野大將の演説

永野大將(續談)私は最強者が最大の犠牲を拂はねばならぬことを述べた。私は前の機会に述べた如く日本の提案をなすにあたり私の心構は曾て述べた會議に於いて英國代表が述べられたものと真に同様である。同代表は一九三三年十月幹部會會議に於いて空軍の縮少を提案したのをあるが英國の提案を次の如く説明した。當時英國空軍は勢力に於いて第五位にあつた。即ち他の四強國は英國よりも優勢であつた。これらの他の四強國が英國の水準を引下げ全部三分の一の縮少を爲せんことを希望したるがある。右の提案と我國の提案と同一相違は英國提案によれば當時の英國空軍の水準を四大國空軍の水準を低下せしめんとするにあつたが、吾々は凡ての海軍は縮少されねばならぬとするも我が提案は未だ決定的水準を述べていないことである。軍備の割合を見れば實際上海軍に陸軍および空軍の附け加えられてあることは事實であるが然しこゝでは唯だ海軍に關するのみを討議しつゝある。海軍に關する限り吾々は軍備の均等といふことが即ち守るべきものと改むるに難き状態への最善の現出であると信ずる。吾々の題目は制限を下さるがけ低く設定せんとすることをその低制限をこの會議により決定するであらうことを提案するものがある。



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 13 (2)

From the general statement by Sir John  
Simon (United Kingdom) at the twenty-ninth  
meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for  
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments  
(League of Nations), held on November 17th, 1932.  
- Conf. D/Bureau/P.V/29, PP. 14 and 15.

We are bound to face the immediate question that presents itself while the full examination of these wider conceptions is proceeding. Take the case of the United Kingdom Government. In spite of world-wide responsibilities, the Air Force of the United Kingdom has been reduced until it stands only fifth in size to-day, but His Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, prepared, if other countries will reduce their air forces, to go still further, and they suggest as a practical and immediate measure of disarmament (1) the immediate reduction of the air forces of the leading Powers to the level of those of the United Kingdom; (2) a cut of 33 1/3% all round in the air forces of the world thus reduced, the United Kingdom included; (3) and limitation of the unladen weight of military aircraft to the lowest figure upon which general agreement can be obtained. The United Kingdom Government propose that the figures thus arrived at should be subject to a further reduction at a subsequent stage so as to apply to air disarmament the principle of limitation by stages.

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from the General-Statement by Sir John Simon (United Kingdom) at the twenty-ninth meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (League of Nations), held on November 17th, 1932" (Annex 13 (2)) is an official document handed to me when I attended the Geneva Conference of the Reduction and Limitation of Armament in 1932 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Juji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

2



Def Doc #190413(2)

文書の出所及び公正に関する証明

本証明書は添附の英文書に添付する

Excerpt from the general statement by Sir John Simon (United Kingdom) at the twenty ninth meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (League of Nations), held on November 17th, 1932,

この英文書(附属書第十三(二))は昭和七年十一月十七日  
一般軍縮會議に專門委員として出席し、實際配布に  
現行裁減案に於ける會議議案の實情を述べた  
証明である

昭和七年七月三十日 於東京

授本重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自今、面不記入爲す

同日 於同所

倉人 奥山 一郎 (印)

def doc # 904 13(2)

No 2

一九三三年十月十二日國際聯盟軍事縮減會議之限制  
國事、部會會議、以及各國議會、均應予以充分之注意  
一般陳述、概略如下

一、關於縮減、觀念上、應以全般、決定、進行、之、  
二、重要問題、應以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
三、美國政府、之、例、之、限制、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、  
四、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
五、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
六、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
七、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
八、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
九、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、  
十、縮減、之、原則、應、以、和平、平等、之、原則、為、基礎、



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 14

Instructions Sent To Imperial Government Delegates  
At The Preliminary Negotiations Of The Naval Disarmament  
Conference Of 1935.

1. The reason for our Government giving consent to the opening of preliminary negotiations for the Naval disarmament conference which was proposed by Britain in May this year was because the present Naval Disarmament Conference is an important affair and as difficulties were foreseen. Therefore, it is to avoid unnecessary agitation of public opinions, of nations concerned, as well as to exchange opinions fully between nations represented and thereby clarifying the standpoints and assertions of all participant nations and accomplishing our objectives to enable the smooth attainment of the conference aims and also security of our national defense.

2. In view of the present preliminary negotiations inevitably facing a difficult situation the Imperial Government places great expectations to your efforts. In negotiations, follow the basic policy as indicated herein, as well as the import of this instruction and as for naval technical affair consult the senior naval-expert delegate.

As negotiations are expected to be delicate, anything which require fast and appropriate measures are entrusted to your decision within the scope of authority specified in this

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 14

Instructions Sent To Imperial Government Delegates  
At The Preliminary Negotiations Of The Naval Disarmament  
Conference Of 1935.

1. The reason for our Government giving consent to the opening of preliminary negotiations for the Naval disarmament conference which was proposed by Britain in May this year was because the present Naval Disarmament Conference is an important affair and as difficulties were foreseen. Therefore, it is to avoid unnecessary agitation of public opinions, of nations concerned, as well as to exchange opinions fully between nations represented and thereby clarifying the standpoints and assertions of all participant nations and accomplishing our objectives to enable the smooth attainment of the conference aims and also security of our national defense.

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As negotiations are expected to be delicate, anything which require fast and appropriate measures are entrusted to your decision within the scope of authority specified in this



instruction.

3. As to the problem of formalities, exchange of opinions with the main participant nations have already been made but endeavour to accomplish our assertions on items still unsolved at the preliminary negotiations scheduled to open around October this year.

4. The British Government has repeatedly made proposals on debating on the problem of the so-called substantial problem of naval disarmament but it was not necessarily the same with the U.S.

As there seems to be considerable difference between what has been explained to our Embassy at Washington from competent U. S. authorities and what the U. S. delegates spoke to our delegates at London and therefore it is requested that you make it clear at the very beginning of preliminary negotiations if the U. S. is prepared to make sufficient arguments on the problem of substantial disarmament. Even in case the U. S. is not prepared to discuss on the substantial disarmament problem the Imperial Government has no objections in negotiating with Britain but attention must be paid to see that Britain does not lead in negotiations and make our standpoint disadvantageous.

5. In the present Naval disarmament preliminary negotiation, the Government, based on the basic policy as defined

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 14

under No. 6. herein, shall prepare a disposition to form a new agreement which will secure an impartial and adequate naval strength and establish a stable national defense. Thereby reducing the people's burdes in the future and promoting peaceful intercourse between all nations. And after the expiration of already existing naval armament limitation agreements, it must be borne in mind that the Imperial Government will not tolerate the conclusion of any agreement which will continue to force upon us disadvantageous conditions and make our national defense insecure.

6. The following basic policy of the Imperial Government in connection with naval disarmament is viewed with greatest importance and therefore, our basic principles shall be here indicated. It is requested that every effort be exerted to get the recognition by the nations concerned, especially the U. S. and Britain. The basic policy of the Imperial Government is as follows.

The Imperial Government seeks to establish a principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression without impairing the sense of security in national defense for all nations because every nation is entitled to the right of possessing armaments required for the safety of the state. Among major naval powers it is a fundamental problem to agree upon a criterion for common maximum limitation of arms for each nation to



possess, as a measure for reducing arms. In reaching an agreement on this point, in order to demonstrate the true spirit of disarmament minimize the above limitation and drastically curtail offensive arms while adjusting defensive arms. Thereby basing upon the principle of "difficult to aggress and secure in defending". To attain this objective, highly-armed nations will be compelled to make greater sacrifices than the others.

7. In reference to the grounds for the above basic policy, if necessary, you are to begin negotiations on definite problems bearing in mind the following factors.

a. You may assert the complete abolition of capital ships if the condition of the conference permits.

b. Assert the complete abolition of aircraft carriers.

c. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are to be maintained, place restriction on total tonnage of such ships including A and B class cruisers, destroyers and submarines as well. In this case, emphasis should be put on the reduction of capital ships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. Designate tonnage allotment for each type of ship to each nation and the allotment to the U.S. and Japan shall be equal. In the case capital ships and aircraft carriers are abolished this will be applicable.

d. The Imperial Government at an early possible

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date shall demand attaining the standard of the newly agreed military strength, but if necessary, in conformity to the above contents of agreed naval strength we shall consider concluding an agreement in which we will gradually have to attain a standard in a limited time.

8. Depending on the progress of preliminary negotiations, it may confront a situation where negotiations may be closed abruptly or adjourned or even not opened. But the manner in which the present negotiation proceeds will greatly influence the international situation to follow and therefore in such a case utmost care must be taken not to incur any undesirable conditions to our overall plans for the conference.

9. The question of equality in naval strength between France and Italy has been unsettled to this day. In connection with our present assertion, the standpoint of our Government against these two nations shall be extremely delicate. Therefore put the center of negotiation on the two nations of Britain and the U. S. first and thoroughly explain on the point that our assertion is the result of earnest desire cherished by our people. Endeavor to have the U. S. and British understand this point. Again, as for the two countries of France and Italy, according to situation, explain to them that the main objective of our assertion is Britain and the U. S.



As for the relations between France and Italy, make it known to them that we have no objections whatsoever on any adequate compromise reached direct between the nations concerned.

10. The Washington Treaty on naval armament limitation in view of the assertion to be made at the present naval disarmament preliminary negotiation is to be abolished as of 1936 according to our Government policy. Even if we announce its abolition, it does not mean that we do not favor a new naval disarmament agreement but seek to contribute to the establishment of a world peace by forming on impartial and fair new agreement between the nations concerned. Therefore, in the present preliminary negotiations, first indicate our basic policy and impress upon the delegates of the respective participant nations that in view of the above policy the Washington Treaty inevitably must be abolished. Moreover, as our present assertion is based on the earnest hopes of our people the Government has already decided upon its abolition notification, but on the other hand our Government desires to carry out the preliminary negotiations in a friendly and effective manner to the extent it is possible. Therefore, the Government is withholding the notification so it is desirable that efforts be made to guide the negotiations so that this opportunity is taken to take formal steps in

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abolishing it with the mutual understanding of all nations concerned and following which all nations will cooperate in the formation of a new treaty. Thereby it will contribute to the alleviation of public opinion. This point should be explained to the respective delegates.

Of the above nations concerned, the U. S. will show considerable opposition. It appears that some part of the British side are opposed to the continuation of the Washington Disarmament Treaty. On the other hand, two years after the notification of its abolition, all signatories will witness its abolition, so it is wiser to put emphasis on future negotiations and develop it amidst a friendly atmosphere. Persuade the participant powers to consent upon abolishing this agreement by the end of 1936.

However, if case our proposal is not accepted or if the decision hung on a balance, the Imperial Government will announce its abolition by the end of the year according to its independent decision.

11. Any item besides what has been referred to in this instruction, or any matter considered irrelevant to the import of this instruction, it is requested that you cable us.



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 14

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the Demobilization Section of the Demobilization, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Instructions sent to Imperial Government Delegates at the Preliminary Negotiations of the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

P

Ref Doc 1904-114

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道敏ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居  
ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書  
カレ七頁ヨリ成ル「昭和十年海軍軍總合議豫備交渉  
ニ於ケル帝國代表ニ與フル訓令」ト題スル書類ハ日  
本政府（復員廳第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ  
拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日

於東京

吉 井 道 敏 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥 山 八 郎 (印)



昭和十年海軍軍縮會議豫備交渉  
ニ於ケル帝國代表ニ與フル訓令

一帝國ガ本年五月英國政府申入ニ係ル海軍軍縮豫備交渉ノ開始ニ同意セル所以ノモノハ今次海軍軍縮會議ガ重大事項ニシテ且迂餘曲折ノ豫想セラルルニ鑑ミ右交渉ニ依リ關係國民ノ輿論ヲ無用ニ刺激セシムルヲ避クルト同時ニ關係國代表ト充分ナル意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ各關係國ノ立場及主張ヲ明カナラシメ以テ帝國主張ノ貫徹ヲ圖ルト共ニ帝國國防ノ安固ヲ期シ得ル範圍ニ於テ同會議ノ目的達成ヲ容易ナラシメントスルニ在リ

ニ今次豫備交渉ノ複雜ヲ極ムベキニ鑑ミ帝國政府ハ閣下ノ御努力ニ期待スル處大ナルモノアル處右折衝ニ當リテハ後掲根本方針其ノ他本訓令ノ趣旨ヲ體セラレ又海軍専門事項ニ關シテハ首席海軍専門委員ノ意見ヲ徵セラレ度シ

尙交渉ノ機微ナルベキニ鑑ミ其ノ折衝ニ關シテハ閣下ノ裁量ニ依リ訓令ノ範圍内ニ於テ迅速且適切ナル措置ヲ採リ交渉ニ善處セラルベシ

三手續上ノ問題ニ關シテハ既ニ主要關係國ト一應意見ノ交換アリタル處本年十月頃ヨリ再開セラルベキ豫備交渉ニ於テハ未解決ノ事項ニ付テモ我方主

Ref Doc 1904-14

張ヲ貫徹スルニ努メラレ度シ

四 英國政府ニ於テ所謂海軍軍縮ノ實質問題ノ討議方  
ヲ再三我方ニ希望シ來レルモ米國政府ニ關シテハ  
必ズシモ然ラズシテ從來米國當路者ノ在米帝國大  
使ニ説明セル所ト倫敦ニ於テ米國代表者ノ我方ニ  
述べタル所トノ間ニハ相當懸隔アリト認メラルル  
ニ付テハ閣下ハ豫備交渉再開ノ勞頭ニ於テ米國政  
府ニ於テモ實質問題ニ付充分ナル論議ヲ行フノ意  
アルコトヲ明確ニセラレ以テ交渉方法ニ遺漏ナキ  
ヲ期セラレタシ尤モ帝國政府トシテハ米國側ニ於  
テ萬一實質問題ニ付論議ヲ行フノ準備ナキ場合ニ  
於テモ英國側ト便宜右交渉ヲ行フコト差支ナキモ  
英國が專ラ交渉ヲ指導シ從テ我立場ヲ不利ナラシ  
メルガ如キコトナキ様留意スルヲ要ス

五 今次海軍軍縮豫備交渉ニ於テ帝國政府ハ第六號所  
載根本方針ニ則リ兵力ニ關スル公正妥當ニシテ帝  
國國防ノ安固ヲ期スルニ足ル新協定ヲ遂グルノ素  
地ヲ作り將來成ルベク國民負擔ノ緩和ヲ圖リ且各  
國間ノ平和親交ヲ増進セシコトヲ期スルモノナリ  
而シテ既存海軍軍備制限條約實施期間満了後我方  
ニノミ不利ナル拘束ヲ持續シ又ハ帝國國防ヲ不安  
ナラシムルガ如キ協定ヲ締結スルガ如キコトハ帝  
國ノ到底容認シ能ハザル所ナルヲ了シ置カレ度シ



Def Doc 1904-14

六 海軍軍備制限ニ關スル左記帝國政府ノ根本方針ハ  
我方ノ極メテ重要視スル所ナルヲ以テ先ヅ以テ我  
ガ根本方針ヲ提示シ關係國等ニ英米ヲシテ之ヲ承  
認セシムルニ全力ヲ盡サレタシ  
帝國政府ノ根本方針左ノ如シ

帝國ハ國家安全ノ爲必要トスル限度ノ軍備ヲ有  
スルノ權利ハ各國齊シク之ヲ享有シ各國國防ノ  
安全感ヲ害スルコトナク不脅威不侵略ノ原則ヲ  
確立セントスルモノニシテ大海軍國間ニ於ケル  
軍縮ノ方法トシテ各國ノ保有シ得ベキ兵力量ノ  
共通最大限度ヲ規定スルヲ根本義トス  
而シテ之ガ協定ニ當リテハ軍縮ノ精神ヲ發揮ス  
ル爲右限度ヲ小ナラシメ且攻撃的兵力ハ之ヲ極  
力縮減シ防禦的兵力ハ之ヲ整備シ以テ各國ヲシ  
テ攻ムルニ難ク守ルニ不安ナカラシムルヲ基礎  
トセザルベカラズ之ガ爲高度軍備國ハ他ニ比シ  
一層大ナル犧牲ヲ提供スベキハ勿論ナリ

七 前記根本方針ノ論議ニ關連シ必要ニ應ジ右根本方  
針ヲ前提トシテ左記含ミノ上具體的問題ニ關スル  
交渉ヲ開始セラルベシ  
(イ) 主力艦ハ合議對策トシテ之ガ全廢ヲ主張スルコ  
トヲ得

(ロ) 航空母艦ハ之ガ全廢ヲ主張ス  
(ハ) 主力艦、航空母艦存置ノ場合ニ於テハ右兩艦種

Key Doc 1904-14

及甲級巡洋艦ハ乙級巡洋艦、驅逐艦及潛水艦ト  
共ニ一括シテ總噸數ヲ以テ制限ス

此ノ場合主力艦、航空母艦及甲級巡洋艦ニ付キ  
テハ艦力之ヲ總噸シ艦種毎ニ各國ニ對シ割當意  
ヲ定メ帝國及米國ニ對シ右割當ハ同量トス

主力艦、航空母艦ヲ全廢スル場合亦之ニ準ズ

(三)帝國政府ハ成ル可ク早キ時機ニ於テ新協定兵力  
ニ到達スルコトヲ要求スルモノナルモ要スレバ  
右協定兵力ノ内容ニ應ジ一定期間内ニ逐次該兵  
力ニ到達スルヲ目途トシ協定スルコトヲ考慮シ  
得

ハ豫備交渉ノ情況如何ニ依リテハ中途ニテ交渉打切  
リ本合議ニ持越シ又ハ本合議不開催ニ導カントス  
ル事態ニ立到ルヤモ知レザル處今次交渉終止ノ體  
樣如何ハ爾後ノ國際情勢ニ影響スルコト甚大ナル  
モノアルベキガ故ニ之等ノ場合ニ於テ我方合議對  
策ノ大局上ニ不利ヲ招來セシメザル機轉ニ警戒セ  
ラルベシ

ハ佛伊兩國間ノ兵力均等問題ハ未ダ解決ヲ見ズシテ  
今日ニ至レル次第ニテ我方今次ノ主張ト關連シ帝  
國ノ右二國ニ對スル立場ハ極メテ機微ナルモノト  
ナルベキニ付交渉ノ中心ヲ先ヅ英米兩國ニ置キ我  
方主張ガ現下我が國民ノ熾烈ナル稟望トナリ居ル



Def Doc 1904-14

點ニ出ヅルモノナルコトヲ充分説明シ英米ヲシテ  
了解セシムルニ努メ又佛伊側ニ對シテハ狀況ニ應  
ジ我方主張ノ主要目的國ガ英米二國ニ在ル旨ヲ説  
明シ佛伊兩國間ノ關係ニ付テハ直接關係國ノ間ニ  
適當ナル妥結點ヲ見出サルルコトニ付何等ノ異議  
ヲ有セザル旨ヲ可然説明シ置カレ度シ

十、海軍軍備制限ニ關スル華府條約ハ今次海軍軍備限  
備交渉ニ對スル帝國ノ主張ニ鑑ミ昭和十一年末限  
リ之ヲ廢止スル帝國政府ノ方針ナル處我方ニ於テ  
ハ之ガ廢止ヲ爲スモ海軍軍備縮少ニ關スル協定ヲ  
爲サザルコトヲ欲スルニハ非ズシテ關係國間ニ公  
正妥當ナル新協定ヲ遂ゲ以テ世界平和ノ確立ニ貢  
獻セントスルモノナリ從テ今次限備交渉ニ於テ先  
ヅ以テ我方根本方針ヲ提示スルト共ニ右方針ニ照  
ラシ華府制限條約ハ之ヲ廢止スルノ已ムナキニ到  
ルベキコトヲ關係國代表者ニ印象セシムルヲ適當  
ナリト認ム就テハ我方今次ノ主張ガ現下國民ノ熾  
烈ナル要望ニ基クモノニシテ帝國政府トシテハ早  
晩同條約廢止通告ヲ爲スコトニ決定シ居ル次第ナ  
ルモ他方帝國ハ出來得ル限り友好的且效果的ニ限  
備交渉ヲ行ハムト欲シ廢止通告ハ之ヲ差違ヘ居ル  
實情ニシテ此ノ際關係國間ノ合意ニ依リ今年中ニ  
之ガ廢止通告ノ手續ヲ爲シ次デ各國協力シテ新條

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約ノ成立ニ努ムルノ形式ヲ探ルニ於テハ與否ノ優  
和ニ資スルノ效果尠カラザルベキコトヲ洞工閣長  
國代表ニ説明セラレ局面ヲ右ニ導ク様方相成  
シ

右ニ對シ關係國中特ニ米ノ如キハ相當難色ヲ示  
モノト豫想セララルモ英國側ノ一部ニ於テハ華府  
制限條約ノ存續ニ異論アルモノノ如ク他方廢止通  
告後二年ニハ締結國全部ニ關シ同條約ノ廢止ヲ見  
ルニ至ルベキモノナルガ故ニ寧ロ爾後ノ交渉ヲ安  
好的雰囲気裡ニ進展セシムルノ點ニ思ヒテ致シ冬  
國共同シテ昭和十一年末日迄ニ本條約ヲ廢止スル  
ニ同意スル積極説セラレ度シ

但シ右交渉ノ結果關係國が我方提議ヲ應諾セザル  
場合若ハ其ノ諾否ノ態度ヲ明カニセザル場合ニハ  
帝國政府ハ本件ニ關シ帝國獨自ノ見解ニ依リ本年  
末迄ニ廢止通告ヲ爲スベキハ勿論ナリ

十六 本訓令ノ趣旨以外ニ亘ル事項及本訓令ノ趣旨ニ  
據リ難キ事項ニ關シテハ隨時諮詢セラレ度シ



Strictly Confidential

NOTES ON THE MINIMUM BRITISH NAVAL  
STRENGTH NECESSARY FOR SECURITY.

1. At the final meeting of the three Delegations on the 19th December, the Prime Minister urged the representatives of Japan and U.S.A. to realize that Great Britain was basing herself on essentials and asked them, therefore, not to assume that it was only a matter of pressure or time for the United Kingdom to change. The figures that have been communicated to the Japanese and the U.S.A. representatives are, in fact, not maxima up to which the United Kingdom desires to be able to build, but minima below which the British Empire cannot feel a sense of security.

2. As stated in the Japanese fundamental claim "To possess the measure of armaments necessary for national safety is a right to which all nations are equally entitled and "due regard must be given to that right in order ~~that~~ the sense of national security of the various powers might not be impaired." The unique situation of the British Empire lies in the fact that it is not a single unit geographically concentrated in one area of the world but consists of a number of Dominions and Colonies scattered over the whole world. Consequently, the strength of the British Navy must be calculated so as to produce a sense of national security in all the

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Dominions and Colonies, each of which has a right to its own safety.

3. In estimating the naval needs of the British Empire, it is accordingly necessary to take into account responsibilities in European waters and in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. This implies the possession of a fleet of sufficient strength to be able to dispose simultaneously in more than one area forces adequate to meet all reasonable defensive needs.

Capital Ships.

4. When the matter of capital ship strength was considered at Washington in 1922 and again in London in 1930, it was decided that 15 capital ships represented the minimum which would give to the British Empire the requisite defensive strength. Since then Germany has not only built 4 battle-cruisers of a special type but will undoubtedly insist on naval expansion qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Italy is already building 2 capital ships of 35,000 tons each; France will wish to lay down ships of the same size and is understood, in addition, to wish to increase her capital ship strength beyond the limits imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty. If these tendencies continue and if there is no international agreement on naval limitation after 1936, the probabilities are that, far from any decrease in British capital ship strength being possible a further increase in numbers would be rendered necessary.

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5. With less than 15 capital ships it would not be possible to provide reasonable security both in European waters and elsewhere. The tonnage figure in this category communicated to the Japanese representatives, however, is dependant also on the qualitative limit to be arrived at for new capital ships. The British Government have, as is well known, proposed a limit of 25,000 tons with 12" guns, a reduction of 28% on the existing limit. Could this limit be generally agreed upon, the tonnage in the capital ship category could ultimately be correspondingly reduced.

Aircraft Carriers.

6. The under-age tonnage of aircraft carriers that was communicated to the Japanese representatives was calculated on 6 units of the proposed maximum size of 22,000 tons each. This is the least number of units that could be accepted for the normal operations of the British Fleet. The Japanese representatives have proposed, however, that the future qualitative limit should be reduced to 20,000 tons. If there is a reasonable prospect of agreement in other categories, the British Government would be willing to consider this reduction with a corresponding reduction of the tonnage in the category.

7. Further, if it should prove possible to bring about the abolition of bombing, still greater reductions might be made in the aircraft carrier category.



Cruisers.

8. The British Government have already announced their hope of the ultimate abolition of the 8" gun cruiser. All such vessels, however, are comparatively modern, and it is highly improbable that foreign powers would agree to scrap them before the end of 1942. France and Italy each have 7 of these vessels in service already, and Japan has 12, while America has 18 built and building. It is not possible, therefore, for the British Empire to reduce below the 15 ships already built.

9. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire agreed to the new total cruiser figure of 339,000 tons, which was calculated on a basis of 50 cruisers. Even if it were possible to make a further agreement on such a basis (and reasons why it is not are given below) the tonnage figure would have to be considerably larger than 339,000 tons. The British Empire cannot replace existing small wartime cruisers by ships that would be outclassed from the start by those of other navies. From this it follows that there must be an automatic increase, even without any increase in the number of ships, from a tonnage of 339,000 to about 410,000 tons. This figure is based on the general acceptance of a future qualitative limitation of 7,000 tons, and would be made up as follows:-

15 - 8" Gun Cruisers.....	146,800 tons
10 Large 6" Gun Cruisers.....	95,000 "
8 Leanders .....	57,000 "
4 Arethusas .....	20,800 "
13 New ships at 7,000 tons .....	91,000 "
50	410,600 "

10. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire accepted a cruiser tonnage figure based upon the tonnage of 50 cruisers for the following reasons:

- (a) Under the international conditions existing at that time, the prospect for the next six years was more unclouded than it can be said to be today.
- (b) It was accepted subject to the Powers other than the three signatories to Part IIII of the London Naval Treaty agreeing to corresponding reductions. This has not occurred; on the contrary the naval forces in Europe have greatly increased.
- (c) In 1930 we were on the eve of a General Disarmament Conference from which much was hoped.
- (d) In the process of a steady reconstruction of the fleet after the war a halt had been called in cruiser building for some years, in the hope of inducing a corresponding halt in foreign building. Thus, the curve indicating the number of British under-age cruisers was at its lowest during the period of the treaty.

It is unfortunately the case that since the London Naval Treaty was concluded in 1930, a serious deterioration in the international and political outlook has occurred. Further, there are not present today any of the other conditions that rendered possible



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the acceptance in 1930 of a cruiser tonnage based on 50 ships.

11. The British 6" gun cruiser under-age tonnage is governed by the intention of the British Government to arrive, by a programme of steady building of about 3 ships a year, at an ultimate total of (including 15 8" gun cruisers) 70 ships, of which 10 would be over-age. Due to the necessity for building large 6" gun cruisers, brought about by the building of such ships by the U.S.A. and Japan, the 243,800 tons of under-age tonnage at the end of 1942 (the figure given to the U.S.A. and Japanese representatives) would represent only 2 ships, making at that time with the 8" gun cruisers a total of 47 under-age cruisers in all. A balance of over-age ships must, therefore, be retained to provide security.

Destroyers.

12. The 150,000 tons of under-age destroyer tonnage is the same as that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and could only be reduced if submarines were abolished or drastically reduced in numbers. (If submarines were abolished, 100,000 tons of destroyers would be sufficient). As, however, an increase of submarine tonnage appears likely in certain European navies as well as in the Japanese Navy, it will be necessary to retain additional over-age destroyer tonnage.

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Submarines.

13. The British Government desires to abolish all submarines. If this cannot be achieved, however, they neither desire nor intend to increase their tonnage beyond that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and would consider the additional destroyer tonnage required by an increase in the submarine tonnage of others as a provision in lieu of an increase in their own submarine tonnage.

January 15th, 1935.



DEF. DOC. No. 1904 Annex 14-(2)

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief  
of the Archives Section of 23d Demobilization Office,  
hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written  
in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled  
"Notes on the Minimum British Naval Strength Necessary  
for Security" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an  
official document in the custody of Japanese Government  
(2nd Demobilization Office).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were  
affixed hereto in the presence of the "Witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

"Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro  
(seal)

8

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書(三號)

自分吉井道教ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付  
セラレタル英語ニ依ツテ書カレ六頁ヨリ成ル  
Notes on the minimum British Naval  
Strength necessary for security  
(安全ノタメ必要トスル英海軍ノ最低  
勢力ニ關スル覺書)

ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル  
寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日  
於東京吉井道教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於司所  
立會人奥山八郎



(附屬書第十四ノ二)

安全ノ爲必要トスル英海軍ノ最低勢力ニ關スル覺(譯文)

(一) 十二月十九日ノ三國委員ノ最終會談ニ於テ首相ハ日本及米國代表ニ對シ英國ノ主張ハ本然ノ要求ニ基クモノナルコトヲ了解シ從テ厭迫又ハ時日ノ經過ニ依リ英國ヲシテ變更ヲ爲サシメ得ル如キ事項ナリト憶斷セサランコトヲ強調シタリ、日本代表ニ通知シタル數字ハ英國力建造セント欲スル最高限ニ非スシテ右以下ヲ以テシテハ英帝國力安全感ヲ保チ得サル最低限度ノモノナリ

(二) 日本ノ根本主張中ニ述ヘラレタルカ如ク「國家安全ノ爲必要トスル軍備ヲ整備スルハ各國ノ當シク享有スル權利」ニシテ「各國ノ安全感ヲ害セサル様右權利ヲ尊重セサルヘカラス」英帝國ノ特異ナル事情ハ地理的ニ世界ノ一定地域ニ集結シタル一國ニ非スシテ全世界ニ散在スル多數ノ領地及植民地ヨリ成立セル點ニ存ス故ニ英海軍ノ兵力ヲ決定スル場合ニハ領地及植民地ノ全部ノ安全―各領地及植民地モ各自安全ノ權利ヲ有ス―ヲ考 最セサルヘカラス

(三)

事情右ノ如クナルヲ以テ英帝國ノ所要海軍ヲ計畫スルニ方リテハ歐洲海面並ニ地中海、印度洋、太平洋ニ於ケル義務ヲ考慮スルコト必要ニシテ右ハ一地域以上ニ於テ同時ニ防衛上必要トスル各般ノ要求ヲ充スニ足ル充分ナル海軍勢力ヲ保有スベキコトヲ示スモノナリ

「主力艦」

(四)

千九百二十二年華府ニ於テ更ニ又千九百三十年「ロンドン」ニ於テ主力艦勢力ニ關スル事項ガ考究セラレタル際ハ主力艦十五隻ガ英帝國防衛上所要勢力ナリト決定セラレタリ爾來獨逸ハ特型ノ四巡洋戰艦ヲ建造シタルノミナラズ更ニ質的及量的ニ海軍擴張ヲ主張スヘキコトヲ容レズ伊國ハ既ニ各三万五千噸ノ二主力艦ヲ建造中ニシテ佛國ハ同型艦ヲ起工セシコトヲ希望スベク尙更ニ華府條約ノ制限ヲ超エテ主力艦ノ増勢ヲ欲スルモノト思ハル之等ノ傾向繼續シ而モ千九百三十六年後海軍制限ニ關スル國際協定存セサルコトモナラハ英國ノ主力艦ノ減勢ノ如キコトハ思モ寄ラス却テ其ノ隻數ヲ一層増加スルノ必要ヲ招來スルニ至ルヘシト豫想セラル



(五)

十五隻末済ノ主力艦ヲ以テシテハ歐洲海面及他ノ方面ニ於テ安全ヲ適當ニ保全スルコト不可能ナルヘシ尙本艦艦ニ付日本代表ニ通知シタル噸數ハ新主力艦ニ對シ協定セラルヘキ實的限制ト關聯ヲ有スヘキモノトス、英政府ハ周知ノ如ク十二吋砲發備二万五千噸ノ制限即チ限存制限ニ對スル二十八「バーセント」ノ噸少ヲ提案シタルカ若シ此ノ制限力一般ニ受諾セラルレハ主力艦艦ニ於ケル噸數モ從テ削減セラルルニ至ルヘシ

「航空母艦」

(六)

日本代表ニ通知シタル航空母艦ノ艦内噸數ハ申出最大艦型タル二万二千噸型五隻ニ對シ計算シタルモノナリ右ハ英艦隊ノ當時行動ニ適合スル最少隻數ナリ尤モ日本代表ハ將來實的限制ハ二万噸ニ縮少スヘキ旨ヲ提議シタルカ若シ他艦艦ニ於ケル協定ノ見込立タハ英政府ハ本艦艦型縮少ト并ニ之ニ相當スル噸數ヲ縮減スルコトヲ喜ンテ考慮スヘシ尙亦燃發禁止ノ實現可能トナラハ航空母艦々種ニ於テ一層ノ大縮減ヲ爲シ得ヘキナリ。

「巡洋艦」

(八)

英政府ハ既ニ八吋砲巡洋艦ノ終局廢止ノ希望ヲ表明シタリ然レトモ右艦  
船ハ凡テ比較的新艦ナルヲ以テ他ノ諸艦カ十九百四十二年末以前ニ之等  
廢棄ニ同意スルノ可能性殆ンド之ナカルヘシ佛國、伊國ハ夫々七隻ヲ既  
ニ就役セシメ居リ日本ハ十二隻ヲ有シ米國ハ竣工及建造中ノモノ十八隻  
ヲ有ス故ニ英帝國トシテハ既ニ建造シタル十五隻以下ニ漸減スルコトハ  
不可能ナリ

(九)

「ロンドン」海軍條約ニ於テ英帝國ハ巡洋艦五十隻ヲ基礎トシテ計算シ  
タル巡洋艦總數三十三万九千噸ノ小噸數ニ同意シタリ  
縱令右ノ如キ基礎ニ於テ更ニ協定ヲ爲スコト可能ナリトスルモ(而シテ  
其ノ不可能ナル理由ハ以下ニ示サルル如シ)噸數ハ三十三万九千噸ヨリ  
ハ相當大ナルモノトナラサルヲ得サルヘシ  
英帝國ハ現存ノ戰時小巡洋艦ヲ代換スルニ方リ其ノ當初ヨリ他海軍ノ同  
等艦ノモノヨリ劣位ニ置カル、如キ艦船ヲ以テスルコト能ハス此ノ點ヨ  
リ見テ縱令隻數ノ増加ナシトスルモ三十三万九千噸ヨリ約四十一万噸ニ  
自然増加ヲ來ササルヲ得サルコトトナルヘシ、該隻數ハ將來七千噸ノ質



的制限ノ一般受諾ヲ建議トスルモノニテ左ノ如ク整備セラルヘシ

八吋巡	一五隻	一四六、八〇〇噸
六吋大巡	一〇隻	九五、〇〇〇噸
「リンダー」型	八隻	五七、〇〇〇噸
「アレスーザ」型	四隻	二〇、八〇〇噸
新型(七、〇〇〇噸)	一三隻	九一、〇〇〇噸
	五〇隻	四一〇、六〇〇噸

(十)

「ロンドン」條約ニ於テ英帝國ハ巡洋艦五十隻ヲ建議トシタル巡洋艦噸數ヲ受諾シタル理由左ノ如シ

(イ) 當時ノ實際狀況ノ下ニ於テハ爾後六年間ノ展望ハ今日ヨリハ無量ノ狀態ニ在リタリ

(ロ) 右受諾ハ「ロンドン」條約第三編ノ三條約國以外ノ國モ相對的縮減スルヲ條件トシ爲サレタルモノナルカ此ノ事ナクシテ却テ歐洲ニ於ケル海軍力ハ著シク増加シタリ

(ハ) 一九三〇年ニ於テハ吾人ハ大ニ期待シタル一般軍縮會議ノ直前ニ在リタリ

(ニ)

戦後艦隊ヲ整備スルニ方リ巡洋艦ニ付テハ他國ヲシテ同様ニ其ノ建造ヲ休止セシメントスルノ希望ヲ以テ數年間巡洋艦ノ建造休止シタルカ其ノ結果英國ノ艦隊内巡洋艦數ノ四線ハ條約期間内其ノ最低ヲ示スコトナリタリ

不幸ニシテ一九三〇年「ロンドン」條約締結後國際及政治情況甚シク惡化シタリ而シテ今日ニ於テハ一九三〇年ニ於テ五十隻ノ艦隊ニ依リ巡洋艦噸數ノ受諾ヲ可能ナラシメタル他ノ條件ハ一モ存在スルコトナシ

(十一)

英國ノ艦隊内六吋砲巡洋艦噸數ハ毎年約三隻宛削減ナク建造シ十隻ノ艦隊噸數ヲ含ミ終局ニ於テ合計七十隻(八吋砲巡十五隻ヲ包含ス)ニ到達セントスル英國政府ノ目途ニ從ヒ整備セララル

米國及日本ノ六吋砲大型巡洋艦建造ニ對シ此ノ艦隊型ノ建造ヲ必要トスルニ在リ一九四二年末ニ於ケル米國艦隊内巡洋艦二十四萬三千八百噸(米國及日本代表ニ示シタル數字)ハ僅ニ三十二隻ヲ示スニ止マリ該時ニ於ケル艦隊内巡洋艦ノ總數ハ八吋砲巡ヲ加ヘテ四十七隻ナリ故ニ安全ヲ保持スル爲ニハ不足額ニ對シ艦隊超過儘ヲ保有スルノ必要ヲ生ス



「驅逐艦」

(十二) 經船内區逐艦十五万噸ハ「ロンドン」條約ニ於テ協定セラレタル處ト同  
様ニシテ潛水艦力廢止セラルルカ又ハ變數ノ大減減行ハルル場合ニ限り  
之ヲ縮減シ得ヘシ（若シ潛水艦力廢止セラルレハ十萬噸ノ驅逐艦ニテ充  
分ナルヘシ）

然レ共或ル歐洲海軍及日本海軍ニ於テハ潛水艦噸數ヲ增加スヘシト思ハ  
ルルヲ以テ經船超過ノ驅逐艦ヲ追加保有スルノ必要ヲ見ルヘシ  
「潛水艦」

(十三) 英國政府ハ潛水艦ノ全廢ヲ希望ス尤モ全廢ヲ爲シ得サル場合ニ於テモロ  
ンドン條約ニ於テ協定シタル噸數ヲ超過エテ增加スルノ希望ヲ有セス又斯  
ル企圖ヲ爲ササルヘシ而シテ他國ノ潛水艦増加ニ對シ備フル爲メ潛水艦ヲ  
増加スル代リニ驅逐艦ノ増加保有ヲ考慮スヘシ

DDF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.15

EXCERPT FROM MR. GIBSON'S ADDRESS MADE  
AT THE 3RD PLENARY SESSION OF THE THREE  
POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA, AUGUST 4TH,  
1927.

- Official Conference Record  
P 42.

From the first, however, we encountered a serious difficulty in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably large number of cruisers than it now possesses. Instead of the 48 cruisers now in service, the British Empire delegation has set forth in the report of the Technical Committee a need for 15 8-inch gun cruisers and 55 cruisers of a smaller type, a total of 70. The claim for these figures was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American delegation has never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitations on the basis of mutual concessions. If the sole purpose of our negotiation be that of setting forth the view of each Power as to its requirements without regard to the navies of others, it is difficult to see how we can arrive at a treaty for the real limitation of navies.

(Annex No. 15).



DEF. DOC. #1904 Annex No.15

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from Mr. Gibson's Address made at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Three Power Conference at Geneva, Aug. 4, 1927" (Annex 15) is an excerpt from the Collection of Official Report of the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, 1927 which is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 30th day of July, 1947

/S/ Fnomoto Joji  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: /S/ Okuyama Hachiro  
(seal)

2

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No. 1

文書、其所立に公正に因する證明

本證明書に添附一に英訳に依りて書かれ (英訳の語)  
"Excerpt from Mr. Gibson's address made at the  
3rd Plenary Session of the Three Power Conference  
at Geneva, August 4th 1927."

と題する文書(附屬書本十五)は現に私に所持する  
一九二七年三月三國海軍會議の公式記録書の  
取平に相違ないことを證明する。

昭和二年十月三日

於東京

榎本重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自今以前に於てなされ

同日於同所

立會人

奥山一郎 (印)



Def. Sec. 1904-15.

No. 2.

一九三七年八月四日「ロンドン」ニ於テ三國協軍會議ヲ三回  
會ニ於テルギフンニ氏、演説拔萃。

(三式會議記錄四三頁)

會議、初期ヨリ吾人、意著セシ難國、英國則が現ニ其、保  
有スルニヨリ著シク多ク、其洋艦ヲ要求セラル、即チ英國  
全權、現在就役セル巡洋艦四、大隻十七、小隻巡洋艦十五  
隻及小巡洋艦五十五隻計七十隻ヲ必要トスル旨聲明委員  
會ニ於テ表明シ而シテ之ガ必要、理由、英帝國々防上施到  
ノ所要ナルヲ以テセリ、若國全權、之ヲ讓受協ヲ基トシテ軍備  
制限條約ヲ協定セシトスル會意ト國防上、施到所要ノ觀  
念トガ兩立シ得ルモノトナシト權存スルモノナリト意シ、今亦、會議  
ニ於テ他國海軍ト、關係ヲ度モ考慮セテ軍上各國各自  
ノ立場、ミヨリ見タル所要軍備ヲ提示スルニ止ミ、其  
軍備制限、實チ是等ノ協定ニ列建スルニ到底  
不可能ナルナリトナリ。

REPORT BY VICE ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO, REPRESENTATIVE  
TO THE PRELIMINARY NAVAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATION HELD AT  
LONDON IN 1935, TO THE EMPEROR ON FEBRUARY 19, 1935.

I, Isoroku, Your Majesty's most obedient subject, do hereby  
solemnly report before the Throne on the progress made since  
October, 1934, for the preliminary conversation of the naval  
disarmament conference of 1935.

Ordered by the Japanese Government I left Japan last  
September and arrived at London late in October to participate  
in the preliminary negotiation of the 1935 London Naval Disarma-  
ment Conference representing the Imperial Government together  
with Tsunoo MATSUDAIRA, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador  
Plenipotentiary in London. And recently I was ordered back to  
Japan to report to the Government on the negotiation.

The preliminary meeting resumed on October 23, 1934 and  
was solely confined to the negotiations among the three powers,  
Great Britain, the United States and Japan. It was carried out  
chiefly in the form of bilateral, instead of trilateral,  
negotiations on the naval disarmament problem.

At the inception of the resumed meeting the basic principle  
of the Japanese Government as stated below was presented to the  
British and the American delegations. Together with this



presentation the Japanese representatives made clear sincere hope embraced on the part of Japan that the coming agreement of disarmament was to be reached in order to facilitate a secure maintenance of the world peace. And in the light of the new principle, we explained the necessity of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty on Naval Armament Limitation, which had been concluded on the basis of the principle of discriminating ratio. The following is the basic principle proposed by the Japanese Government to the British and American Delegations:

"Each nation equally enjoys the right to equip with armament up to the extent necessary for her to maintain her own national security. With this idea in view, any disarmament agreement must be reached under the principle of 'Non-Aggression and Non-Menace' in order to prevent any one nation from hurting the sense of security of any other nation. To realize the above the best way for us to follow is to adopt a concrete plan such as this: as a formula to be applied to the three greatest naval powers in their disarmament we set a common upper limit to the armaments to be allowed to these powers first of all, and, once this basic principle set, each power is to be allowed to build up and maintain an armament required for its own national security within the limit thus prescribed. And, as a prerequisite for reaching such an agreement, the foregoing limit should be set as low as possible, and offensive

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weapons be reduced to the lowest possible strength with defensive armaments equipped appropriately, with a view to see each nation hardly able to launch offensive while at the same time kept secured in its defense".

Against this proposal of ours the British delegation strongly contended: that in view of the difference of vulnerability among the national securities of various powers, it was only natural for each power to possess a different size of armament from those of other; that if a upper common limit equally binding all participant nations should be rigidly set in spite of the above, states which could be satisfied with a size of armament smaller than the limit could enjoy flexibility in the maintenance of their armament, while a nation whose defense would demand an armament up to the limit would be deprived of such flexibility; and that especially for British, which is situated near the European powers, a room for flexibility had to be always reserved to enable her to cope with the shipbuilding development of the European powers.

Strong opposition also came from the U.S. representatives to the effect that: 1 ) the Washington Naval Armament Limitation Treaty was a fruit of great sacrifice by all of the parties after an exhaustive study of all related affairs in addition to a more analysis of naval armament, it had worked most effectively these ten odd years preventing shipbuilding race



and producing equality of national security among nations, and together with the London Naval Treaty later concluded, it had succeeded in bringing about a framework of peace and security for the world; ii) in the face of the above fact the Japanese proposal just presented was considered to be a result of an idea deviated from the principle of the equality of security which constituted the fundamental thought of the existing treaties for naval armament limitation, and therefore the proposal not only called for a renewed analysis of all related problem including political factors from the very fundamentals, but also it was a truly unfortunate one because such a proposal would soon destined to ruin the peace machinery built up at great sacrifices; iii) moreover, the equality of the size of the armed strength between the United States and Japan would mean in effect a superiority on the part of Japan over the United States because of the advantageous geographic position enjoyed by Japan; iv) the adoption of the Japanese proposal would stimulate a shipbuilding race among nations which would naturally strive to build up to the common upper limit. Thus opposing the Japanese plan the American delegation firmly insisted that the disarmament agreement to be reached henceforth was to be based on the revision of the London Treaty on the one hand and the continuation of the Washington Treaty on the other

In reply to the above mentioned arguments by Britain and

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America we contended that no discrimination was to be allowed to exist among the naval armaments of the various powers concerned in view of the mobility of sea power; that the fruition of the principle of 'non-menace and non-aggression' as proposed by Japan would forestall the consideration of the vulnerability regarding the national defense; that if ever the question of national vulnerability should arise, Japan would prove more vulnerable than the United States; that the Washington Treaty, which was already more than ten years old, now became unapplicable to the situation of today due to the change of international relations, the development of naval vessels and weapons, and the like; and that to attach a discriminating ratio to the armament to be possessed by each nation might create a sense of inequality among its people and this in turn would influence unfavorably the friendly relations between the nations concerned. But both America and Britain persisted in their assertions firmly and did not agree to our contentions.

Moreover, as regards the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, both Britain and the United States did not accept our proposal, although we made clear the standpoint of our country to discontinue the treaty adherence after 1936 when it would expire, and although we advised that all parties to it should concur in notifying the abrogation so that the



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abrogation would be realized in a friendly atmosphere.

In the face of these circumstances a proposal was presented by the British authorities as a step to break the deadlock. The gist of the proposal had suggestions as follows: i) each party would enjoy equal footing on the fact of the treaty stipulation; ii) all parties should confer with each other on their shipbuilding programs to be effective for the several years after 1936 and should make a unilateral announcement of each own program in the form of a voluntary statement. This suggestion, though taking into consideration our proposal, seemed to intend in reality to maintain the existing ratio almost intact, and therefore it was not one acceptable to us offhand. Sometime later on, the British representatives made another suggestion that they would not insist to bind the foregoing unilateral voluntary announcement on a contractual basis; and they furthermore repeatedly presented their desire for reaching some sort of an agreement in having the powers to show with each other their shipbuilding program of the several years to come. Proposing this way they went so far as to show us the shipbuilding plan of their own. According to this plan the size of the armament to be possessed by the British navy was roughly of one million and twenty hundred thousand tons or so, though it might differ a little depending on conditions. Here we could not see almost no difference between this figure and that of the existing treaty strength. Besides, the figures for light

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cruisers and others were bigger than the ones so far admitted. Moreover it was insisted that the plan was for the absolute minimum requirement barely reducible. Such a proposal, far from the line of our contention aiming at a great reduction, could not be accepted by our own side.

The British delegation further suggested that it would be advisable to reach an agreement on a qualitative limitation at least, such as concerning the displacement of individual ships, the size of guns, etc., as a means to curb shipbuilding race in case a quantitative limitation would not be feasible. But this British plan would affect us very unfavorably in view of our plan to equip ourselves with such an armament as to give us a guarantee of national security at a smallest possible armament expenditure. Accordingly we rejected the proposal, too.

As for the United States, the British proposal seemed to have failed to attract any great attention from the delegation. The American representatives showing a firm attitude for the support of the existing treaties with their present ratio, insisted on the twenty per cent reduction from existing armament in a whole sale manner.

Such being the case any further progress seemed to be out of hope for the negotiation. Moreover, the American delegation made clear that it intended to return home temporarily from the necessity to confer with the Government and reconsider all the



related problems at the fundamentals to prepare for the eventualities of the Japanese abrogation of the Washington Treaty. Therefore the representatives of the Three Powers came to an agreement that the meeting was to be adjourned for the time being that each power was to give a renewed consideration to its contentions, and that the British Government was to take an appropriate step as soon as possible when an atmosphere would become ripe for the reopening of the negotiation. The adjournment was made on December 20.

It is to be added in this connection that both France and Italy did not participate in the present preliminary negotiation and that they were placed in a position to be informed by the British Government from time to time of the progress of the Three Power negotiation.

Throughout the preliminary negotiation the representatives of all of the parties exchanged their opinion frankly and freely in a friendly atmosphere and made an earnest endeavour to find out some sort of basis on which an agreement could be reached. There could be seen no shadow of prejudice in which any two parties, conspiring between themselves, oppressed or alienated the other. As for the British side especially, perhaps partly due to its position as the party who called the meeting, its good officers were exerted in an enthusiastic manner throughout the negotiation for the smooth progress with the eager desire

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for the conclusion of disarmament agreement. Moreover both British and American delegations listened to our contention most attentively to enable us to explain the principles of the Japanese Government at the fundamentals, while at the same time we could have the opportunity to know almost fully the British and American contentions. But due to the difference of their stands, the three delegations have so far failed in reaching an agreement.

It is really regretful that the Japanese representative has not succeeded to have our proposal accepted by the British and the United States sides. And it is believed that a further toilful exertion on our part is needed to attain our aim.

I feel highly honored in having been granted Your Majesty's audience throughout to my humble report.

February 19, 1935.



CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief  
of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobiliza-  
tion Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto  
attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 8 pages and  
entitled "Report by Vice Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto" is an  
exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in  
the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization  
Section of Demobilization Bureau)

certified at Tokyo,

on this 10 day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were  
affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

伏

Doc 1904-16

文書、其所註、成立、開、證明書  
自分、吉井道教、復員廳第三復員局文書課長  
職、居、者、上、處、該、添、付、せ、ら、れ、る、日、本、語、ニ、依、リ、書、き、  
八、頁、三、枚、の、復、命、書、ト、題、ス、ル、書、類、ハ、日、本、政、府、(復員廳  
第三復員局)、保、護、三、條、に、公、文、書、ノ、扱、方、ヲ、正、確、ニ、シ、  
具、實、ニ、寫、シ、上、ニ、證、明、ス

昭和二十二年七月十日 於東京

吉井道教 (印)

右署名捺印、自分、面前、ニ、於、テ、為、ス、

同日 於同所

主會人 奥山八郎 (印)

No 1



Ref Doc 1904-16

No 2

昭和十年倫敦海軍會議豫備交渉代表海軍中將  
山本 五十六

復 命 書

謹言、昭和十年海軍軍縮會議豫備交渉三回、昨年十月以降、經過三就、奉呈致三  
臣 五十六

帝國政府、命、昨、九月、本邦、出發致、十月、下旬、リ、  
倫敦、於、主、主、英國、駐、各、特、命、全、權、大、使、松、平、恒、雄、ト、共、三、帝、  
國、代、表、ト、多、昭、和、十、年、海、軍、軍、縮、會、議、豫、備、交、渉、参、列、致、  
三、ト、が、座、今、回、情、況、報、告、為、歸、朝、命、之、タ、御、座、ミ、  
今、回、豫、備、交、渉、昨、年、十、月、二、三、日、再、開、セ、己、日、英、米、三、國、間、  
、交、渉、終、始、タ、御、座、ミ、主、ト、二、國、會、議、形、式、執、リ、  
海、軍、軍、縮、問、題、二、開、シ、討、議、行、タ、御、座、ミ、交、渉、再、開、  
、啓、頭、於、ミ、三、帝、國、側、ハ、英、米、二、對、シ、次、ニ、申、上、ゲ、ス、ル、帝、國、政、  
府、根、本、方、針、提、示、致、シ、ス、ト、共、三、新、大、軍、縮、協、定、到、達、シ、  
以、ラ、國、際、平、和、確、立、維、持、ニ、貢、獻、セ、ス、ル、我、方、真、誠、ト、大、意、  
ヲ、披、瀝、致、シ、タ、御、座、ミ、向、右、根、本、方、針、鑑、ミ、差、違、ハ、率、  
主、義、依、ル、華、府、海、軍、軍、備、制、限、條、約、之、廢、止、ス、ル、要、ハ、ト、モ、  
說、明、致、シ、タ、御、座、ミ、  
英、米、側、ニ、提、示、致、シ、タ、帝、國、政、府、根、本、方、針、ハ、次、ニ、通、シ、御、座、  
ミ、ス、

國家安全為必要トスル限度、軍備有ル權利、各國、齊、  
シ、ク、之、享、有、ス、ル、所、ニ、軍、縮、協、定、ハ、此、義、ヲ、尊、重、シ、テ、各、國、國、  
防、ノ、安、全、感、ヲ、害、ス、ル、ト、ク、不、脅、威、不、侵、略、原、則、下、ニ、為、サ、  
ル、ハ、カ、ス、ル、カ、實、現、具、體、的、方、策、ト、シ、先、ハ、我、等、大、海、軍、國、

間ニ於テ軍縮ノ方式トシテ各國ノ保有シ得ベキ兵力量ノ共通  
最大限度ヲ規定スルヲ根本義トシ右限度内ニ於テ各國國防上  
必要トスル軍備ヲ整理シ得ル如ク爲スル最モ適當トス  
而シテ之カ協定ニ當リテ右限度ヲ未得ニ限リヤラシメ且攻撃  
的兵力ハ極力縮減シ防禦的兵力ハ之ヲ整備シ以テ各國  
シテ改ムルニ難ク守ルニ不安ナカラシムルヲ基礎トセサルベカラス  
右我オノ主張ニ對シテ英國側ハ

各國ハ各國防ノ脆弱性ヲ要スルヲ以テ其ノ兵力ニ差等アルベキ  
ハ當然ナリ然ルモ拘ラス一律ニ共通最大限度ヲ定ムルキハ右限  
度迄兵力ヲ必要トセサル國ハ兵力ノ整備上伸縮ノ自由ヲ有スル  
モ之ヲ必要トスル國ハ右伸縮性ヲ有スル特ニ歐洲諸國ヲ近ク  
ニ控ヘ居ル英國トシテハ常ニ他國ノ建艦ニ對應シ得ル如ク爲  
スノ要アリト趣旨ヲ強硬ニ主張シテ御座リマス  
又未國側ハ

華府海軍軍備制限條約ハ海軍軍備ノミナラス萬般軍事  
情ヲ檢討シ各國共大ナル犧牲ヲ拂ヒ締結シタルモノニシテ建艦競  
争ヲ防止シ各國ニ安全ノ平等ヲ與ヘ爾來數年間最モ有效ニ  
働キ來ルモノニシテ其ノ後更ニ倫敦海軍條約成立シ之ト相俟テ  
茲ニ世界平和ト安全トヲ維持スル機構ヲ建設セリ然ルニ今固ノ  
日本ノ主張ハ現存ノ海軍軍備制限條約ノ基礎タル安全ノ  
平等ト要ナル觀念ヨリ出サレタル以テ之カ討議ニハ問題  
ノ根本ニ至リ歸リ政治的其ノ他一切ノ事情ヲ再檢討スルノ  
要アルノミナラス折角建設シタル平和機構ヲ破壊セシムルモノ  
ニシテ其具ニ不幸ナリ尚又日本ノ兵力ヲ均等トシテ地理的ニ優位



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ヲ享有スル日本、米國ヨリ優勢ト爲ル、且日本提案ニ依  
ルキ、共通、最大限度迄、建造セシムル軍艦競争ヲ惹起  
スベシト、趣旨ヲ以テ反對シ、倫敦條約ハ之ヲ修正シ、華府條  
約ハ之ヲ存続スルニテ、以テ今後、軍縮協定、基礎ヲ与ヘ  
トシ、強硬ニ主張シタム御座リマス。  
是等、英米、主張ニ對シ、海上兵力、移動性ニ鑑ミ、  
各國、保有スベキ兵力ニ何等、差異ヲ附スニ非ラント帝  
國ノ主張スル不備感、不侵略、原則ノ實現ハ國防脆  
弱性、考慮、密ニ主ニシテ、假令國防ハ脆弱性問題  
トシテ、米國ノ脆弱性、米國ニ比シ、大ナルト、華府  
條約、締結以來十數年ヲ閱シ、國際情勢、變化、艦船  
兵器、進歩、速ニ依リ、今日ノ情勢ニ適應セラルニ至リタルト、  
比等ヲ以テ兵力ニ差異ヲ附スニ、國民ニ不平等感ヲ與ヘ、因  
係國間ニ感情上面自ラカニ影響ヲ與ヘ、ト等、趣旨ヲ以テ  
之ニ反對シ、加ヘテ御座リマス、英米共ニ其ノ主張ヲ固持シ  
テ、我方、主張ヲ容認スルニ至ラカク、御座リマス。  
而シテ華府條約廢止ニ因テ、英米ニ對シ、帝國政府、該  
條約ヲ其ノ有効期間タル一九三六年後ニ之ヲ存続セシメ得  
ヤリト明ニ致シタル共ニ、外交的零團氣、理ニ之ヲ廢止  
ヲ實現セシメ、各國共同ニ、華府條約、廢止、通シテ致  
シ、度日申入シ、英米共ニ之ヲ承諾致サカク、御座リマス。  
斯ル情勢ニ於キ、英國側ハ交渉ノ行詰リヲ打開スルニ  
策トシ、一ノ手段、提テ致シ、其ノ要旨ハ、

No 5

Key Doc 1904-16

各國ハ條約ニ依リ平等の立場ヲ有スルコト  
各國ハ一九三六年後數年間ノ建造計畫ヲ協議シ之ヲ  
自發的一方的ニ宣言スルコト

ト言フノ御座リマス

此ノ平暖案ハ表面上我方ノ主張ヲ加味シテ御座リスルカ  
實質ニ於テハ大凡現比事ヲ維持セ下ルモノト認マルルハ御  
座リシテ我方ト致シマスハ遠ニ應諾シ難キモノ御座リマ  
ス其ノ後英國側ハ自發的且一方的宣言ハ之ヲ暫定的  
基礎ニ依ラカントスルモ可ナリトノ意ノ以テカレ更ニ今後數  
ケ年間ノ造艦計畫ヲ合ヒ之ニ依リ何等カ協定ニ  
到達スニシテ希望スル旨繰返シ申出テ自國ノ建艦  
計畫ニモ内示シテ御座リスルカ之ニ依リ見スルニ英國ノ  
保有セシタル兵力量ハ各種條件ニ依リ多少ノ變化アリ  
スルカ大体百ニ拾萬噸程度ヲ御座リシテ現存海軍  
軍備制限條約規定兵力量ト殆ト差カアリマセヌミナ  
乙級巡洋艦等ニ於キシテハ却テ増加シテ居ル情況ヲ  
アリマシム

以下 次頁



Def Rec 1904-16

有モ之ヲ以テ絶対的所要量トシテ之が依下ヲ至難ナリト  
主張致シテ御座リニスルカ大軍縮ヲ為サントスル帝國  
政府、主張ト相隔ルコト遠シ我方ト致シマシハ之ヲ承認スル故  
ニ参ラカクナク御座リニス。

尙英國側、量的制限、協定が不可能ナルニ於テ、建艦競  
争ヲ緩和スル爲單艦噸數及備砲、大々等、實質關スル協定文  
ニモ成立セシメ度旨申出デテ、御座リヌルガ之、最少、軍費  
ヲ以テ国防、安固ヲ期シ得ル軍備ヲ整ヘントスル故ニ執リマシ  
大ニ不利トスル所デアルニ此、英國、提案ホ之ニ拒否シタ  
ルヲ御座リニス。

右國側、英國、亦提案ニ、餘リ興味ヲ有ニカク、豫觀  
察ニシ依然トシテ現存條約、存續、固執、現比率ヲ維持シ  
ツ兵力量、一律ニ割縮減ヲ為サントヲ主張シテ御座リヌ  
右條約者方デ御座リマシテ之以上交渉、進展、望ミ難キ情況  
ト爲リ且右國側、帝國ガ華府條約ヲ廢止スル於テハ根本  
ニ遡リ各種、問題ヲ再檢討スル爲本國政府ト協議スル  
要アルヲ以テ一應帝國シ度竟ニ表不致ニマシテ、三國  
代表協議、結果一旦交渉ヲ休止シ各國共ニ其ノ主張ニ関シ  
再考慮シ交渉再開、機運ヲ熟シ次第成ルベク連ニ英國政  
府ハ適當ナル處置ヲ講ズルコトニ申合フ致シマシテ十一月三日休  
會ト致シテ御座リニス。

No 6

尙佛伊兩國、此、度豫備交渉ニ直接関與スルニマシカク  
シテ、之ヲ日英米三國交渉、経過ニ就キマシハ英國側ヨリ  
之ヲ佛伊兩國ニ臨機通報致シタカ方デ御座リニス。

Ref Doc 1704-16

本豫備交渉ニ於テハ各國代表其ニ終始友好的ニ齊  
圖氣、禮、腹藏、々々、辛、直、ル意見、交換、行、何等カ偏  
走、基礎、登見、之、様、與、摯、之、努力、ヲ、致、シ、テ、御、座、と、シ、或、  
二、國、が、提、携、シ、他、一、國、が、壓、迫、ス、ル、カ、或、ハ、之、ヲ、疎、外、ス、ル、カ、如、キ、ト  
全然見受、ラ、ル、カ、々々、御、座、リ、ス、行、ニ、英、國、關、ハ、招、請、國、々、關  
係、之、ヲ、爲、ト、ハ、存、ニ、ス、ル、ガ、軍、編、協、定、成、立、ヲ、熱、望、シ、交、渉、ヲ、円、滑  
ニ、進、行、セ、シ、ル、如、ク、終、始、最、モ、親、心、ニ、糾、結、致、シ、テ、御、座、と、ス、  
而、シ、テ、英、米、共、ニ、我、方、ノ、主、張、ヲ、最、モ、本、心、以、テ、聽、取、致、シ、  
シ、テ、我、方、ト、致、シ、テ、充、分、ニ、帝、國、政、府、根、本、方、針、ヲ、闡  
明、シ、得、テ、御、座、リ、シ、之、ト、共、ニ、英、米、ノ、主、張、ヲ、大、体、之、ヲ、了、知  
シ、得、テ、御、座、リ、ス、ル、カ、各、國、共、ニ、其、ノ、立、場、ヲ、具、ニ、以、テ、居  
リ、ス、ル、ガ、本、々、各、國、意、見、ノ、一、致、ヲ、見、ル、ニ、至、ラ、ル、カ、々々、御、座、  
と、ス、

英、米、側、ヲ、シ、テ、帝、國、政、府、ノ、主、張、ヲ、容、認、セ、シ、ル、ニ、至、ラ、ル、カ、  
々々、ハ、誠、ニ、遺、憾、ニ、存、ス、ル、カ、方、デ、御、座、リ、シ、之、ヲ、之、ガ、母、貫、徹、ハ、  
更、ニ、今、後、一、層、ノ、努、力、ニ、供、シ、要、ア、ル、モ、ト、信、ズ、ル、ガ、御、座、と、ス、  
謹、ニ、ヲ、奏、上、シ、終、と、ス、

昭和十年三月十九日

No 7



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Studies through Questions and Answers Concerning the  
Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Is there any way of modifying the Washington Treaty?

Ques : In the Treaty the following three different cases are  
provided.

(1) During the period this Treaty is in effect, if in case  
either of the contracting powers considers the requisite for  
its own national security concerning defense by naval strength  
gravely affected by changes in surrounding circumstances, the  
respective signatories shall reconsider the provisions of this  
Treaty in compliance with the request of the nation concerned  
and through mutual agreement a conference shall be convened  
for the purpose of its modification.

(Article 21, Clause 1.)

On this case, reconsideration of the Treaty provisions  
in general will be made and therefore discussions should also  
be made on such important clauses as capacity of military st-  
rength in possession.

Of course the above clause refers to the discussion of  
alterations to be made which is based on the provisions of this  
Treaty and needless to say it could not possibly alter the  
objective of this Treaty. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether  
it is possible or not to lodge a radical protest against such

matters as admitting difference in military strength possessed by the respective powers, which constitutes the basis of this Treaty. In either case at the conference convened in accordance to the foregoing clause and item, all nations will feel a strong inconvenience for them to take unrestricted actions from a free standpoint.

(2) With the object of discussing what changes will be necessary in the Treaty to meet the developments both technically and scientifically, a conference attended by all contracting powers shall be held 8 years after this Treaty takes effect. (Article 21, Clause 2.)

In this case, the object of the conference is to only meet technical and scientific developments, and not the kind of conference to discuss such important problems as the reciprocal relation of military strength in possession.

Further, the above conference was fixed to be held 8 years after this Treaty took effect (that is, in 1931) but as a result of the London Conference of 1930, it became unnecessary. Therefore at the 6th General Meeting held on 22 April 1930 the conference scheduled for 1931 was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer its disposal to the conference to be held in 1935.



(3) The case when either of the signatory powers involves in a war which is considered as affecting the defense of national security by naval strength.

The case when the remaining contracting powers may make a temporary modification in this Treaty.

The case when an amendment conference is held attended by all contracting powers subsequent to the cessation of hostile activities.

(Article 22.)

Ques: The reason for not taking steps to revise the Washington Treaty.

Ans : (1) Measures which can be considered in the steps to revise the Washington Treaty are restricted to provisions set forth in Article 21 Clause I and Clause 2.

Of the above clauses the measure provided in item two deals with the joint agreement on revisions to meet the developments in both technical and scientific fields. The scope of its revision is very limited and cannot ration.

(N.B.) This conference should have been held in 1931 but due to the London Conference it was postponed and an understanding was reached to transfer it to the 1935 conference.

But circumstances are not too clear on how things stand.

Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether or not to discuss items for which purpose the conference was opened on the occasion of the 1935 conference.

In either case, the purpose of the conference is extremely limited. It is interpreted to be intolerable to make discussion on a radical revision of this Treaty.

(N.B.) In January 1922 at the plenipotentiary delegate's conference to draft the Washington Naval Treaty, the British delegate Mr. Palfors proposed to declare the inability of demanding alterations in ratio at a conference opened according to Article 21 Clause 2.

2. He spoke as follows.

"The gathering of eight years later shall be limited to only technical and scientific matters and should not discuss serious issues such as the question of ratio, brought about as a result of political changes. For instance, the limitation of 35,000 ton may require a slight alteration according to scientific changes but the ratio of strength should not be changed."

Furthermore, at the same conference, the French delegate stated that it was unnecessary to limit the items for discussion at the next conference but the U.S. delegate Mr. Hughes replied, "as long as item one of this Treaty provides that discussions may be made on general subjects according to political developments, is it not sufficient as it is?" and to Mr. Palfors stated



that, "This Treaty cannot be revised unless unanimously agreed upon. Of a single nation opposes it would not only be unable to discuss the problem of ratio but also impossible to fix the date of discussion. In the future, when the conference is held again and the ratio problem is discussed, it would be necessary to exchange diplomatic papers before hand. Whether to discuss or not can be decided then and therefore would not require discussing deeply into the matter." Thereby, dissuading Mr. Palfors's assuertion.

In view of the above circumstances and the provision of item one in the Treaty which provides that a conference will be held which may even demand the revision of ratio, it is considered reasonable to interpret that items for discussion at the conference held in conformity with the clause and item of this Treaty will be extremely limited.

(2) The measure provided in Clause One is to be adopted to meet political or any other serious changes in case it possesses a certain condition. Therefore, there is no restriction on items for discussion as the measure provided in Clause Two and free to discuss the provisions of the Washington Treaty in general. But ultimately its object would be the revision of the Washington Treaty and the basis of deliberations would be no other than the Washington Treaty itself. Consequently it would be difficult for the respective powers to take an unrestrained action from a free standpoint.

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Especially in the case of our assertion, not adhering to circumstances of the past and seeking to establish a disarmament agreement on an entirely new basis, it is apparent that it will incur extreme inconvenience. Therefore, it is considered an unadaptable step to call for a revision conference according to the above measure.

(3) In short, the provisions set forth in the Washington Treaty on revision, are in both cases unadaptable in concluding a disarmament agreement desired by our Empire and we deem it necessary to choose a different measure.

Ques: Reasons why the Washington Treaty has to be abolished.

Ans: (1) A long period of time has elapsed since the Washington was concluded and it has become difficult to adapt itself to drastic changes in international situation and radical changes in technical and scientific achievements.

(2) The object of the Washington Treaty has already been achieved. Its term of validity will expire as of 1936 and it appears there are no reasons for further continuation.

(3) The Washington Treaty was based on recognition of possessing graded strength among the respective powers, and there is a radical divergence compared to our present disarmament policy. As it is impossible to reach a reconciliation it is considered advisable to abolish the Washington Treaty and form an agreement on a new foundation.



(4) The Washington Treaty fixed the ratio of military strength to be possessed of capital ships as of 12 December 1921. There is a regret that it did not take into deep consideration the question of national security. Therefore, the prolonged continuation of this Treaty will not be the way to establishment of national security for all nations and to maintain peace.

It is especially so in the case of our Empire which could not even full accomplish the assertions on the possession of minimum limit for national defense at the time.

(5) The replacement construction of capital ships which can be recognized as the most important factor of the Washington Treaty provision was postponed six years as a result of the London Treaty. The above period of postponement expired as of 1936 and all contracting powers have access to immediately commence building replacements from 1937.

However, the London Treaty only postponed the shipbuilding for 6 years and did not fix any arrangements thereafter so unless a new agreement is formed it will lead to the construction of capital ships simultaneously by all the signatory powers at once. Because they could not build them for 6 years. Their capacity will reach a colossal figure and would actually be the same as if no treaty existed.

Further, any limitation in quality would practically bear no significance in view of existing circumstances because they are as extremely restricted. Ultimately, from both angles, in quality or quantity, it may be said that the provisions of the Washington Treaty are ineffective.

The grounds for demanding the continuation of the Washington Treaty, may be acceptable perhaps from a political viewpoint but from the standpoint of actual armament limitation it may be said that it is of practically no value.

Ques: Are there no other nation besides our Empire which sent a notification of renunciation?

Ans : (1) The French Government had been advocating dissatisfaction against the Washington Treaty ever since it was concluded. Thence after, she has been cherishing almost the same feeling but it is unknown whether or not she holds any intention of announcing its abolition right away.

(2) The British Government desired the permanency of this Treaty when it was concluded and even showed reluctance in inserting clauses and items (such as stipulations on revising the Treaty) which tend to lessen the effect of the Treaty. It is believed she adheres to principles of roughly the same significance hence after, but it is worth noting that recently there are some who advocate the abolition of the Treaty.



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(3) The U.S. Government takes pride in being the originator in drawing up the Washington Treaty and desires the permanency of this Treaty. The U.S. especially seeks to fix definitely and unchangeable the naval power ratio decided by the Treaty. Therefore, even if a criticism was made on the provisions of defense armament limitation it could not alter the above powerful influence.

It is surveyed that the U.S. Government would oppose to the abolition of this Treaty.

(4) It is believed that the Italian Government will follow the attitude of the U.S. Government. However, the principle of balanced strength for France and Italy as fixed in the Washington Treaty complies with the desires of Italy and considering her peculiar position she will desire the continuation of this Treaty.

(5) To sum it up, under present circumstances it is difficult to conclude that any other nation except our Empire would willingly take the procedures to renounce the Treaty.

Ques: What are the formalities for sending a notification?

Ans : It is provided in Article 23 of the Washington Treaty. That is, to send a notification in documental form to the U.S. Government. The notification takes effect as of the day above document is received by the U.S. Government.

The notification does not require any adding of reasons.

Ques: The reason why it is necessary to send the notification within the year.

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Ans : To nullify the validity of the Washington Treaty as of 31 December 1936, when the term of validity expires, it is necessary to notify the intentions of renunciation two years before the above date. (Washington Treaty Article 23 Clause 1.)

(2) When the renunciation notification is sent, a conference (Article 23 Clause 2) is to be held by all contracting powers within one year after it takes effect, but should the notification not be sent within the year, there is fear of the conference not being able to open within the next year.

A conference according to the London Treaty is scheduled to be held next year. (London Treaty Article 23 Clause 2.) It is earnestly hoped that these two conferences be held jointly to discuss the general problems on naval armament limitation.

With a view to attain the object of our proposal on disarmament, we particularly feel the necessity to do so.

Ques: During the investigation of the Washington Treaty, the Government explained to the effect that even if our strength was not equal to that of the U.S. the security of national defense can be established. Does the same circumstances prevail today?

Ans : Owing to progress in technical and scientific fields and the changes in international situation, it has become



difficult to rely upon the security of national defense today with the inferior strength fixed by the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, fixing graded strength as in the Washington Treaty gives the impression of admitting gradings between nations and cannot be considered to be fair.

It is necessary to start out from the basic idea of not attaching mechanically any gradings, at least among major powers.

Ques: Is there any difference between our assertions made hitherto at a disarmament conference and our assertions to be made at the conference next year? If there is give reasons.

Ans : They agree completely on the point that the security of national defense is the principal object. However, there are differences in concrete expressions and demands to meet the needs of the time, which is owing to unavoidable circumstances.

Ques: To when does it indicate where it says, "Two years prior to the above term," in Article 23 Clause I of the Washington Treaty.

Ans : Two years before 31 December 1936, that is, prior to 1 January 1935 and it is understood that any time before that time would be justified.

The renunciation of the Washington Treaty will cause considerable grave influence on disarmament.

It will be necessary for all nations to take counter-measures. That is the reason why a minimum two years advance notice period is provided.

It is stipulated in the second clause of the same article to open a conference to work out a remedial measure during this period.

Ques: What are the effects of the notification of renunciation.

Ans : (1) After the lapse of two years from the date the notification takes effect (In case the notification was made within this year it would be 31 December 1936) the Treaty definitely loses its effect.

(II)

However, in case a special arrangement is made at the conference it could bring about a different result.

(2) A conference should be held by all the signatory powers within one year after the renunciation notification takes effect. This conference does not require any special formalities such as sending invitations, and should as a matter of course be held in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.

Ques: The relation between the conference to be held as a result of the abolition notification and the conference



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to be opened in conformity with the provisions of the London Treaty.

Ans : (1) Both conferences will be held for separate reasons but not only do their objectives and matters for discussion bear similarity but almost in an indivisible relation with one another. (2) On Article 23 Clause 2 of the London Treaty it is provided that, "a conference shall be held in 1935 with a view to form a new treaty which will replace this Treaty and moreover accomplish the objectives of this Treaty."

Further, it is stated in the foregoing paragraph to the following effect, "to prevent the dangers entailing competitive armamenting and desire to reduce the burden as well as develop the enterprise entered upon by the Washington Naval Conference."

The conference to be held as a result of renouncing the Washington Treaty will doubtlessly discuss on matters set forth in the Washington Treaty whereby it should be clear that there are common points in the objectives of the two conference.

(3) Participant nations obliged to participate at the conference to be held in conformity with the London Treaty are the three countries of Japan, the U.S. and Britain. However, it was anticipated at the time of treaty signing as five nations, inclusive of Italy and France. Again it is apparent that without the participation by all five nations it will be difficult to form an effective treaty. Therefore, it may be said that

the participant nations in both conferences shall be the same.

(4) It is evident that matters for discussion will chiefly be on items provided in the Washington Treaty on one hand and on items set forth in the provisions of the London Treaty on the other. But if examined into details, there are provisions in the Washington Treaty besides limitation of capital ships and aircraft-carriers, those one exempt vessels (Article 11), types of auxiliary vessels (Article 12) notification on warship construction (Article 16), prohibition of using warships being constructed for third powers (Article 17), prohibition of alienating warships (Article 18) etc.

Again in Article 1 of the London Treaty, a stipulation is made on the postponement of capital ship replacement. Also in Article Two a provision is set forth on the abolition of capital ships.

In Article Three there is a provision on aircraft-carriers, and in Article 8 there is a provision on exempt vessels.

From what has already been stated we learn that some portions of the items in both treaties correlate with one another. Therefore, the items to be discussed at both conferences should also bear mutual correlation.

(5) In view of the fact that the circumstances and naval disarmament situation stand as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, an exhaustive and impartial conclusion will be difficult to reach without an extensive investigation on naval



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armament. Thereby it is considered vital to hold both conference jointly.

Ques: On the nature etc. of the preparatory negotiations.

Ans : (1) Preparatory negotiations have always been made in conferences up to date, for the purpose of deciding the place and subjects for discussion at the conference, and with a aim to pave the way for smooth progress of the conference.

(2) In view of the conference to be held next year expected to be important and complicated, and also deemed necessary to clarify our basic points on disarmament, the Empire attaches much importance on the preparatory talks and has arranged for sufficient preparation.

(3) The preparatory negotiations will not restrain the respective powers from a legal point of view, but will undoubtedly show real effect from a moral standpoint. Consequently, the words or action made by the respective government representatives at the preparatory negotiations will bear effect at the regular conference.

(4) It is difficult to forecast the preparatory conference outcomes, or definite items for negotiation at the present.

Ques: Nations to be invited.

Ans : In both, the conference to be held in accordance with

the London Treaty and the conference to be held due to the abolition notification of the Washington Treaty, do not stipulate any provisions in the Treaties as regards the invitation of nations.

It is something which needs to be decided at the preparatory negotiation. The conference to be held as a result of the Washington Treaty abolition obligates all signatory powers to participate and therefore it is understood that there is no need for sending invitations. The conference to be held in accordance with the London Treaty we believe requires the taking of some steps against Italy and France. Therefore, it is probable that it will be necessary for a certain nation, or a few nations, jointly send invitations to the above countries.

In case, the above two conferences are held jointly it will follow the case of the conference to be held due to the Washington Treaty abolition notification.

Ques: Do you intend to retain the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty etc, as they are?

Ans : Both, the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty do have direct connection with the Washington Treaty.

Again, as it cannot be thought to be an obstacle in concluding a new agreement on disarmament we shall not any steps at the present dealing with them.



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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the 2nd Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 26 pages and entitled "Studies through Questions and Answers concerning the Notification of Abolishing the Washington Treaty" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section Office).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, hachiro (seal)

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道教ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セ  
レタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ二六頁ヨリ成ル「華府條約廢止通告ニ關ス  
ル研究」ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ  
拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナ、右トヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道教

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人奥山八郎



(附屬誓第十七)

華府條約廢止通告ニ關スル研究

(問) 華府條約改訂ノ方法アリヤ

(答) 同條約ニハ左ノ三種ノ場合ヲ想定シアリ

(一) 本條約有効期間中何レカノ締約國對於テ軍事力ニ依ル防衛ニ關スル  
自國安全ノ要件ガ四國ノ狀況ノ變化ニ依リ重大ナル影響ヲ受ケタリ  
ト認メタル場合ニ於テハ締約國ハ該國ノ要求ニ基キ本條約ノ規定ヲ  
再議シ且相互ノ協定ニ依リ之カ修正ノ目的ヲ以テ會議ヲ開催スル場  
合ハ第二十一條第一項)

2

此ノ場合ハ條約規定全體ニ付テ再議スルモノナルヲ以テ保有兵力量  
ノ如キ重要事項ニ付テモ審議ノ得ベキナリ、尤モ右ハ本條約ノ規定  
ヲ基礎トシ之ニ如何ナル改變ヲ加フベキヤヲ審議スルモノナレバ本  
條約ノ目的ヲ變改スルヲ許サレザルベキハ勿論本條約ノ根底ヲ爲ス  
件例セバ各國保有兵力ニ差等ヲ認ムルガ如キモノニ付テ根本的異點  
ヲ立ツルコト可能ナリヤ否ヤニ付テモ疑議ナキ能ハズ

孰レニスルモ此ノ條項ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ各國共自由ノ立場ニ於テ不  
ノ行動ヲ孰ルニハ甚ダシク不自由ヲ感ズベシ。

(二) 技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スル爲本條約中如何ナル變更ヲ必要トスベ

キカラ審議スルノ目的ヲ以テ本條約實施ノ時ヨリ八年ヲ經過シタル後、

締約國全部ノ會議ヲ開催スル場合(第二十一條第二項)

此ノ場合ハ單ニ技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スルヲ目的トスルモノナ  
ルヲ以テ保有兵力ノ相對關係ノ如キ重要問題ヲ審議スル性質ノモノニ  
非ズ

尙ホ、右會議ハ本條約實施後八年ヲ經過シタル後(即チ一九三一年ニ  
於テ)開催スベキ旨ヲ定メフリアル所、一九三〇年「ロンドン」會議  
ノ結果其ノ開催ヲ必要トセザルニ至リタルヲ以テ昭和五年四月二十二  
日第六回總會ニ於テ一九三一年ノ會議ニ移議スルコトノ了解成レリ。



(三) 何レカノ締約國ガ海軍力ニ依ル自國安全ノ防衛ニ影響ヲ及ボスト認ム  
ル體ニ從事スルニ至リタル場合兩餘ノ締約國ガ本條約ニ對シ爲スコ  
トアルベキ一時的修正ヲ爲ス場合及敵對行爲終了後締約國全部參加ス  
ル修正會議開催ノ場合(第二十二條)

(問) 華府條約改訂ノ手續ヲ執ラザル理由

(答)

一 華府條約手續中、考慮シ得ベキ方法ハ第二十一條第一項及同第二項ニ規定セフレタルモノニ限ラル

右ノ中第二項ニ規定セラルル方法ハ技術上及科學上ノ發達ニ適應スル改訂ヲ同約トスルモノニシテ其ノ改訂ノ範圍ハ極メテ限局セフレ比率ノ變更ノ如キ重大問題ヲ包シ得ザルモノナリ(註)加之此ノ會議ハ一九三一年ニ開催セラルベキモノヲ「ロンドン」會議ノ結果延期セラレ一九三五年會議ニ移譲セラルルノ了係アリタルモノノ間ノ消息余リ明確ニ非ズ從テ一九三五年會議ノ際當然此ノ會議ノ目的トスル事項モ審議セラルベキモノナリヤ否ヤハ多少ノ疑義アリ孰レニスルモ此ノ會議ハ其ノ目的ガ程度ニ限局セラレアリ本條約ニ對シ大改訂ヲ加フル討議ヲ爲スコトハ許容セラレザルモノト解ス



(註)

大正十一年一月華府海軍條約起草ニ關スル全權會議ニ於テ英國全權「バルフォア」ハ第二十一條第二項中ニ本條項ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ比率變更ヲ求メ得ザル旨ヲ明言センコトヲ提議シ左ノ如ク述べタリ

「八年後ノ會合ハ單ニ技術的科學的事項ニ限ルモノニシテ政治的變化ヨリ來ル比率問題ノ如キ重大事項ヲ議スベキニ非ズ例セバ三萬五千噸ノ制限ノ如キハ科學的變化ニ應シテ若干増減ノ必要生スベキモ之ガ爲ニ勢力比ヲ動カスベキニ非ズ」

尙同會議ニ於テ德國全權「サロー」ハ次同ノ會議ニ議スベキ事項ヲ制限スルノ必要ナキ旨ヲ述べタルガ米國全權「ヒューズ」ハ之ニ對シ

「本條第一項力政治的變遷ノ必要ニ基ツキ一般事項ノ討論ヲ爲シ得ルコトヲ規定セル以上夫レニテ充分ナリ」トシ「バルフォア」ニ對シテハ

「本條約ハ滿場一致ニ非ザレハ改定スルヲ得ズ一國反對セバ比率問題

ヲ辭スル能ハザルハ勿論之ガ辭ノ時期ヲ定ムルコトモ不可能ナ  
リ將來會議再開ニ際シ比率問題ヲ議セントスル場合ニハ前以テ外  
交文書ノ交換ヲ必要トスベク之ヲ議スルト否トハ斯カル限ニ決定  
シ得ルヲ以テ今日深ク立入りテ討論スルニ及バザルベシト

訖ベ「バルフォア」ノ明言要求ヲ思ヒ止マフシメタリ。

以上ノ經緯及同條第一項ニ比率決定ヲモ求メ得ベキ會議開催ヲ決定シ  
居ルニ鑑ミ本條項ニ依ル會議ニ於ケル審議事項ハ若シク限局セフレタ  
ルモノト解スルヲ至當トス。

(二)

第一項ニ規定セフル方法ハ一定條件ヲ具備シタル場合ニ政治的其ノ  
他重大ナル變遷ニ對應スル爲ニ行ハルルモノナレバ第二項ニ規定セフ  
ル方法ノ如ク審議事項ニ制限ナク軍府條約ノ規定全條ニ付審議ヲ得シ  
得ベキモ結局軍府條約ノ改訂ヲ目的トスルモノナレバ討論ノ基礎ト爲  
ルモノハ軍府條約其ノモノニ外ナラズ各國ハ自由ノ立基ニ於テ不獨ノ  
行動ヲ執ルコト困難ナリ特ニ帝國主義ノ如ク過去ノ經濟ニ膠着セズ全  
然新シキ基礎ノ下ニ軍備協定ヲ爲サントスルニハ蓋シキ支障ヲ來スコ



ト明瞭ナリ。從ツテ

右方法ニ依リ訂會議ヲ要求スルコトハ適當ノ措置ト言フベカラズ

(三) 要スルニ華府條約ニ決定セララル規定ハ其ノ何レニ依ルモ帝國ノ所望スル軍費協定ヲ締結スルニハ不適當ノモノナルヲ以テ別途ノ手段ニ出ズルコトヲ必要トス。

(問) 華府條約ヲ廢止セザルベカラサル理由

(答)

(一) 華府條約ハ締結後長期間ヲ經過シ國際情勢ノ著シキ變化及急激ナル技術上科學上ノ進歩ニ順應シ難キに至レリ。

(二) 華府條約ハ既ニ其ノ目的ヲ達成シ昭和十一年ヲ以テ有效期間満了スベキモノニシテ更ニ之ヲ延長セザルベカラサル程ノ事由ナキガ如シ

(三) 華府條約ハ各國間ニ差等勢力ノ保有ヲ認ムルコトヲ基調トシタルモノナルヲ以テ今次帝國ノ軍縮方針ト根本的ノ相違アリテ其ノ間諷和點ヲ見出スコト不可能ナルヲ以テ華府條約ハ之ヲ廢止シ新シキ基礎ノ下ニ

協定ヲ締結スルニ努ムルヲ可トス。

(四) 華府條約ハ大正十年十一月十二日ニ於ケル各國主力艦ノ現有勢力ヲ以テ各國ノ將來ノ保有兵力ノ比率ヲ定メタルモノニシテ國ノ安全ノ如キハ深ク考慮セラレザリシ憾アリ從テ此ノ條約ヲ長ク繼續スルコトハ各國ノ國家安全ヲ關係シ平和ヲ維持スル所以ニ非ズ殊ニ帝國ノ如ク當時ニ於テ國防上ノ最底限度ノ保有兵力主張ヲモ十分貫徹シ居ラザル國ニ付テ然リトス。

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(五) 華府條約協定中最重要ト認メラル主力艦ノ代艦建造ハ「ロンドン」條約ノ結果六年間延期セラレタルガ右延期期間昭和十一年ヲ以テ滿了シ締約國ハ昭和十二年ヨリ直チニ代艦建造ニ着手シ得ル次第ナリ然ルニ「ロンドン」條約ハ唯單ニ六年間建造ヲ延期シタルニ止マリ爾後ノ處置ヲ定メ居ラザルヲ以テ新協定ヲ取締バサル限り各締約國ハ六年間中ニ建造シ得ベカリシ主力艦ヲ一時ニ起工シ得ル譯ニシテ其ノ量ハ莫大ノ數ニ上リ事實上無條約ノ場合ト擇ブ所ナシ



加之質的制限ノ如キモ今日ノ狀況ヨリ見テ其ノ制限ハ殆ンド無意義ニ  
近キ程高度ノ制限ヲ示セルモノナルヲ以テ究極スル所質的量的ノ兩方  
面ヨリ見テ華府條約ノ規定ハ實際ナキモノト見ルヲ得ベシ  
華府條約ノ存置ヲ必要トスルノ根據ハ政治的方面ヨリハ或ハ之ヲ認メ  
得ベケシモ實際ノ軍備制限ノ上ヨリ見レバ殆ンド無價值ニ等シキモノ  
ト言フヲ得ベシ

(問) 帝國以外ニ廢止通告ヲ爲ス國ナキヤ

(答)

(一) 佛國政府ハ華府條約ニ對シ其ノ締結當時ヨリ不滿ヲ唱ヘ爾後モ時同様  
ノ感想ヲ懷キ居ルモ今直チニ廢止ノ通告ヲ爲ス意思ヲ有スルヤ否ヤ不  
明ナリ

(二) 英國政府ハ條約締結ニ方リ本條約ノ永續ヲ希望シ本條約中ニ其ノ效果

ヲ減殺スルガ如キ條項（條約改訂條項等）ノ挿入サヘ悦バザル態度ヲ示シタル程ニシテ爾後ニ於テモ大体同意旨ノ方針ヲ持スルモノト思ハルルモ最近ニ於テ二、三同條約ヲ廢止スベシトノ意見ヲ唱フルモノヲ生ジタルハ注目ニ價ス

三 米國政府ハ華府條約ノ作成主動者タルコトヲ矜リ居リ本條約ノ永續ヲ希望シ殊ニ本條約ニ定メタル海軍勢力比率ヲ確定不變ノモノト爲サンコトヲ努メ居レルヲ以テ防備制限條項ニ關シ時ニ非議ヲ加フル者アルモ素ヨリ右大勢ヲ動カスニ足ラズ從テ米國政府ハ本條約ノ廢止ニハ反對スベシト觀測セラル

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四

伊國政府ハ米國政府ノ態度ニ追隨スベシト思ハル尤モ華府條約定ムル佛伊勢力均等ノ主義ハ伊國政府ノ所望ニ合スルヲ以テ本條約ノ存廢ハ其ノ獨自ノ立場ヨリ見ルモ希望スベシ

五 現下ノ狀態ニ於テハ帝國以外ニ進ンデ華府條約廢止ノ手續ヲ執ル國アリト推斷スルコト困難ナリ



(問) 通告手續如何

(答) 華府條約第二十三條ニ規定シアリ即チ合衆國政府ニ對シ書面ヲ以テ

テ通告スルコトト爲リ居レリ

通告ノ效力ハ右書面ガ合衆國政府ニ依リ受領セラレタル日ヨリ生

スルモノトス

通告ニハ別段理由ヲ附スルノ必要ナキモノトス

(問) 本年中ニ通告ヲ爲スヲ要スル理由

(答)

一 華府條約ヲ其ノ有効期間タル一九三六年十二月三十一日ヲ以テ效力

ヲ喪ハシムル爲ニハ右期日ノ二年前ニ廢止ノ意思ヲ通告スルコトヲ要

ス(華府條約第二十三條第一項)

(二) 廢止通告アリタルトキ其ノ效力ヲ生ジタル日ヨリ一年內ニ締約國全

部ノ會議ヲ開催スルコト爲ル(第二十三條第二項)處本年中ニ通告

ヲ爲サザルトキハ右會議ガ明年中ニ開催シ得ザルニ至ル虞アリ

明年ハ「ロンドン」條約ニ依ル會議開催ニ「ロンドン」條約第二十

三條第二項）セラルル豫定ナルニ付此ノ兩會議ハ是非合併シテ  
開催シ海軍軍備制限ニ關スル全般的問題ヲ討議スルノ必要アリ帝  
國ノ懷抱スル軍備案ヲ徹底セシムル上ニ於テ特ニ其ノ要ヲ感ズ

（問）華府條約締結ノ際政府當局ハ對米勢力ガ必ズシモ同等ナラズト

モ國防ノ安全ヲ確保シ得ル旨ヲ説明シタリ

今日ニ於テモ同様ノ事情存スルヤ

（答）

技術、科學ノ進歩、國際情勢ノ變化ニ依リ華府條約ニ定ムル  
ガ如キ劣勢ヲ以テシテハ今日ニ於テハ國防ノ安固ヲ期シ難キニ  
至リ

尙又華府條約ノ如ク差等勢力ヲ定ムルコトハ國家間ニ差等ヲ認  
ムルガ如キ印象ヲ與ヘ公平ト言フベカラズ少クトモ大國間ニ於  
テハ機械的ニ差等ヲ附セズトノ差等觀念ヲ出發點トスルヲ要ス

（問）帝國ガ從來軍備會議ニ於テ爲シタル主張ト明年會議ニ於テスベ



(答) キ主張トノ間ニ差違アリヤ、差違アリトセバ其ノ理由ヲ如何  
國防ヲ安固ニスルヲ主眼トスル點ニ於テ全ク一致シ居レリ、但  
シ時代ノ要求ニ應シ具體的表現及要求ニ於テ異同アルモ之ハ已  
ヲ得ザルコトナリ

(問) 華府條約第二十三條第一項中「右期間ノ二年前」トアルハ何時  
ヲ指スモノナリヤ

(答) 一九三六年十二月三十一日ノ二年前即チ昭和十年一月一日前ノ  
義ニシテ夫レ以前ナラバ何時ニテモ差支ナキモノト了解シ居レ  
リ

華府條約ノ廢止ハ軍備上相當重要アルニ依リ最短二年間ノ予告  
期間ヲ置キタルモノナリ此ノ期間中ニ於キテ善後措置ヲ講スル  
會議ヲ開催スベキコトハ同條第二項ニ規定スル所ナリ

(問) 廢止通告ノ效果如何

(答)

(一) 通告効力發生ノ日ヨリ二年經過後(今年中ニ通告ヲ爲シタル場合ニハ一九三六年十二月三十一日限り)條約ハ確定的ニ効力ヲ喪フ  
尤モ會議ニ於テ別段ノ取極ヲ爲シタル場合ニハ之ト異ナル結果トナルコトアルベシ

(二) 通告効力發生後一年內ニ締約口全部ノ會議ヲ開催スルヲ要ス此ノ會議ハ招請等ノ特別ノ手續ヲ俟タズ條約規定ノ結果、當然開催ノコトト爲ル

(問) 廢止通告ニ因ル會議ト「ロンドン」條約ノ規定ニ依ル會議トノ關係

(答)

(一) 兩會議ハ各別ノ根據ニ因リ開催セラルルモノナルモ其ノ目的、審議事項ハ相似スルモノミナラズ殆ンド不可分ノ關係ニ在リ

(二) 「ロンドン」條約第二十三條第二項ニハ「本條約ニ代リ且本條約



ノ目的ヲ遂行スル新條約ヲ作成スル爲一九三五年ニ會議ヲ開催スベシ。ト決定ス而シテ國條約前文ニハ「競争的軍備ニ常ニ伴フ危險ヲ防止シ且負擔ヲ軽減センコトヲ希望シ並ニ「ワシントン」海軍會議ニ依リ開始セラレタル事業ヲ進展セシメ。ト」ト掲載シアリ」

而シテ舊條約ノ廢止ニ因ル會議ハ舊條約ニ規定セラルル事項ニ關シ舊條約ヲ行フモノニ外ナラサルヲ以テ兩會議ノ目的ニ共通點アルヲ知ルベシ

(三) 參加國ハ「ロンドン」條約ニ依ル會議ニ於テハ參加義務ヲ有スルモノ

ハ日、英、米ノ三國ナリト雖モ條約締結當時予想シタルハ佛、伊ヲモ加ヘタル五國ニシテ又實際五國全部ノ參加ガナケレバ有效ナル協定ヲ成立セシメ難キコト明ナリ

即チ兩會議ノ參加國ハ同一國ナリト見テ差支ナシ

(四) 條約事項ハ一ハ舊條約ニ規定セラルル事項ヲ主トシ一ハ「ロンドン」

條約ニ規定セラルル事項ヲ主トスベキコト明ナルモ仔細ニ檢討スレバ  
華府條約中ニハ主力艦航空母艦ノ外制限外艦船（第十一條）補助艦ノ  
艦型（第十二條）軍艦ノ建造通知（第十六條）他國ノ爲ニ建造中ノ軍  
艦ノ使用禁止（第十七條）、軍艦讓渡禁止（第十八條）等各種艦型ニ  
付テモ規定シアリ

又「ロンドン」條約第一條ニハ主力艦代換延期ニ付、同第二條ニハ主力  
艦廢止ニ付規定シ同第三條以下ニハ航空母艦ノ規定ヲ設ケ又同第八條  
ニハ制限外艦艇ノ規定ヲ設ケタリ

右ニ依リテ兩條約ノ規定事項ハ相錯綜セル部分アルヲ知り得ベク從テ  
兩會議ニ於テ審議スベキ事項モ自ラ相互關聯ヲ有スルニ至ルベキナリ  
(五) 如上ノ事情及海軍軍縮ハ海軍軍備ヲ全般的ニ檢討セザレバ徹底的ニシ  
テ公平ナル結論ニ達シ難キニ鑑ミ兩會議ハ合併シテ行フコト肝要ナリ  
トス

(問) 予備交渉ノ性質等



(答)

(一) 予備交渉ハ從來ノ會議ニ於テモ常ニ行ハレタル所ニシテ會議地議題等ヲ決定スルノ外能フ限リ本會議ノ進行ヲ圓滿ナラシメンスル爲ニ行ハ

ル

(二) 來年ノ會議ノ重要複雑ナルニ鑑ミ又帝國ノ抱懷スル軍縮ニ對スル根本ヲ闡明スルコト必要ト認メラルルニミ帝國トシテハ予備交渉ヲ重視

シ十全ノ準備ヲ整ヘタリ

(三) 予備交渉ハ法律上各國政府ヲ拘束スルモノニ非ザルモ道德的方面ヨリ見テ實效ヲ有スルコト勿論ナリ從テ予備交渉ニ於ケル各國政府代表ノ

言動ハ結局本會議ニ作用スルコトト爲ルベシ

(四) 予備交渉ノ見込、具体的交渉事項ノ如キコトハ今ヨリ確言シ難シ

(問) 招請國

(答)

「ロンドン」條約ニ基ク會議及華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議共ニ條約ニハ招請國ニ關シ規定ヲ存セズ

予備交渉ニ於テ決定スルヲ要スル事項ナリ  
華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議ハ締約國全部ガ義務トシテ参加スルコ  
トト爲ルヲ以テ特ニ會議招請ノ必要ナキモノト解セラル「ロンドン」  
條約ニ基ク會議ハ佛伊兩國ニ對シ何等カノ手段ヲ講ズル必要アリト  
思ハルルヲ以テ特定ノ一國又ハ數國連合シテ右二國ニ對シ招請ヲ爲  
スノ必要ヲ生ズルコトアルベシ  
右兩會議合同シタル場合ニハ華府條約廢止通告ニ因ル會議ノ場合ニ  
準ズルコトト爲ルベシ

(問) 四國條約九國條約等ハ其ノ儘存置スル趣旨ナリヤ

(答) 四國條約九國條約ハ直接華府海軍條約ト關係ヲ有スルモノニ非ズ又  
軍縮新協定ヲ締結スルニ方リ障害ヲ與フルモノトモ思考セラレザル  
ニ依リ今直ニ之ヲ處理スルノ手段ハ執ラズ



A Study of War Expenditures of Various  
Nations Based On Past Records.

-- Excerpt from the Report submitted (August 15th  
1934) by the Committee to investigate the  
matters concerning the Conference for the  
Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1935.

1. Japan.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures against national income just before the Washington Treaty (not including expenditures for interim cases) were from 1917 to 1921, an average of 7.72% for the 5 years. Applying this to the national income for the year 1930 which was 10,440,000,000 yen it would amount to 790,000,000 yen.

(b)

(1) The average percentage of military expenditures against the annual expenditure for general accounts before the Russo-Japanese War from 1897 to 1903, a period of 7 years was 41.77%.

(2) The percentage of military expenditures (not including any contingent outlays) against the annual expenditures from General accounts were for the 5 year period from 1917 to 1921 an average 43.54 percent.

The average annual military expenditure during the above 5 year period (not including contingent outlays) was little less than 516,000,000 yen.

(During the above 5 year period, the average price index as of July 1914 based on a research conducted by the Bank of Japan was 217.7).

Vessels completed during the 5 year period from January 1, 1917 to end of 1921.

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Battleships (From YAMASHIRO to MUTSU)	5 ships
154,750 tons	
B Class Cruisers	7 ships
31,960 tons	
Destroyers	43 ships
40,645 tons	
Submarines	17 ships
12,899 tons	
Total	72 ships
240,254 tons	
Average yearly	48,051 tons
Exempted ships	9 ships
85,300 tons	
Grand total	81 ships
325,554 tons	
Average yearly	65,111 tons

(3) Average percentage of military expenses against the annual expenditure from general accounts during the 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 30.3%.

The annual average expenditure of military expenses during the above 9 years was 527,000,000 yen. (The average price index as of July 1914 based on a survey made by the Bank of Japan was 163.2).

To step up the above annual average to the percentage at the time immediately prior to the Washington Conference would be 760,000,000 yen.



Ships completed during the 9 years period from January 1, 1925 to the end of 1933.

Aircraft carriers 3 vessels  
60,900 tons

A Class Cruisers 12 vessels  
107,800 tons

B Class Cruisers 5 vessels  
15,560 tons

Destroyers 41 vessels  
63,126 tons

Submarines 31 vessels  
45,826 tons

Total 90 vessels

293,248 tons

Average 32,582 tons

Exempted ships 9 vessels

6,600 tons

Grand Total 99 vessels

299,908 tons

Annual Average 33,524 tons

(4) 44.77% of the estimated annual revenue for 1937 at 1,800,000,000

yen would be 750,000,000 yen and 43.55% of 1,800,000,000 yen would be 785,000,000 yen.

...

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(c) The percentage of military expenses for the 3 year period from 1932 to 1934 against the national income for 1930 was 8.08 percent.

The percentage of military expenses for 1934 against the annual expenditure from general accounts (including public loans to fill the deficits amounting to approximately 810,000,000 yen) was approximately 44 percent and, reaches the percentage in the foregoing items of (1), (2) of (a) or (b).

2. The United States.

(a) Percentage and outlines of naval vessel construction of military expenses immediately before the Washington Conference and recent 9 year period against total annual expenditures.

(1) From 1919 to 1922.

Average for 4 Year period 297%.

(Average price index based on standard of July 1914 was 173.8)

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to 1922.

Battleships	4 vessels	127,200 tons
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Destroyers	210 vessels	236,366 tons
------------	-------------	--------------

Submarines	43 vessels	29,360 tons
------------	------------	-------------

Total	257 ships	392,926 tons
-------	-----------	--------------

Average annually		98,231 tons
------------------	--	-------------

(2) Average for 9 year period from 1925 to 1933 was 17%.

Annual average of military expenses during the above period of 9 years.

Approximately 770,000,000 dollars. (Average price index in the



above 9 year period as based on standard of July 1914 was 127.1).

23 percent of the national expenditure (percentage of military expenses just before the Washington Treaty) for the recent 9 year period and based upon figures presented above, would be roughly 1,200,000,000 dollars.

Vessels completed in 9 year period from January 1, 1925 to end of 1933

Aircraft Carriers	2 vessels	66,000 tons
A Class Cruisers	10 vessels	92,550 tons
B Class Cruisers	1 vessels	7,250 tons
Submarines	10 vessels	17,110 tons

Total 182,910 tons

Annual Average 20,312 tons

(b) The percentage of military expenses against national income in the period immediately prior to the Washington Treaty and recent 3 years.

From 1919 to 1922. The average of 4 years. 2.26%.

From 1931 to 1933. The average of 3 years. 2.05%.

And the 2.26% of the recent national income is approximately 900,000,000 dollars.

(c) If the percentage of war expenditures at the time just before the Washington Treaty is regarded as tolerable in peacetime by the U.S. people, under present circumstances the military expenses would be estimated to be approximately 8,000,000,000 dollars.

And in the U.S., Military expenditures for the army and navy are roughly the same.

The projected naval estimates for 1935 of approximately 455,000,000 dollars (including expenditures for rehabilitation of industries) and yearly tonnage for ship-construction in 1934 at approximately 62,300 tons (as investigated by Section Five, Navy General Staff) can be regarded as approaching the limit mark in peacetime.

Moreover, it should be noted that deficit in the 1934 year annual revenue was approximately 4,000,000,000 dollars.

3. Britain.

(a) Percentage and outlines of ship-constructions of past war expenditures against total annual revenue.

(1) Average for the 9 year period (Shipbuilding competition period between Britain and Germany) from 1906 to 1914 was 38.2%. War expenditures for the above 9 year period. Average annual expenditure was little over 67,000,000 pounds.

(2) From 1919 to 1922. Average for the 4 year period (immediately before the Washington Treaty) 22.6%.

The average annual war expenditures during the above 4 years period was little over 289,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during the above 4 year period as based on the standard of 1914 was 250.4).

Vessels completed in the 4 year period from January 1, 1919 to end of 1922.

Battleships	1 Vessel	42,100 tons
Cruisers	11 vessels	55,950 tons



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Destroyer	46 vessels	46,040 tons
Submarines	22 vessels	14,830 tons
Total	80 vessels	158,920 tons
Annual average		39,720 tons.

(3) From 1925 to 1933.

Average for 9 year period 14.3%.

Annual average of war expenditures during the above 9 year period.

Approximately 113,000,000 pounds. (Average price index during the above 9 year period, taking the standard of 1914 was 129.9).

Vessels completed during the period of 9 years from January

1, 1925 to end of 1933.

Battleships	2 vessels	67,400 tons
A Class Cruisers	15 vessels	143,970 tons
B Class Cruisers	5 vessels	39,070 tons
Destroyers	38 vessels	52,064 tons
Submarines	28 vessels	36,794 tons
Total	88 vessels	399,298 tons

Annual average

(b) Percentage of armament expense against national income in the past.

1913 3.3%

1924 - 1925 average 3.6%

1931 - 1932 average 3.4%

(c) The general economic world was still in a state of depression but recently it recovered a little to make some margin in the yearly budget.

(d) Judging from the foregoing facts it can be observed that it is considerably difficult to effect any ship construction which is beyond the

present standards.

Def. Doc. #1904  
Anex 13

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 11 pages and entitled "A Study of War Expenditures of Various Nations Based on Past Records" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau)

Certified at Tokyo, on this 8th day of August, 1947

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



附屬卷第十八

昭和十年海軍及陸軍會議算備制限研究委員會報告  
（昭和九年八月十五日）披露

過去ノ趨勢ヲ考察スル各國ノ軍費ニ關スル考察

一 帝國

（一）華府會議直前ノ軍費ハ臨時事件費ヲ含マズノ國民所得ニ對スル割合

ハ

自大正六年（一九一七年）度

至大正十年（一九二一年）度

五年間平均 七。七二%

之ヲ昭和五年國民所得百二億四千萬圓ニ當テ換ムレバ

七億九千萬圓

（二）

（一）日露戰爭前自明治三〇年（一八九七年）度至明治三十六年（一九〇三

年）迄七年間ノ軍費ノ一般會計歳出ニ對スル割合ノ平均

四一。七七%

（二）華府會議直前ノ軍費（臨時事件費ヲ含マズ）ノ一般會計歳出ニ對ス  
ル割合ハ



自大正六年（一九一七年）度		至大正十年（一九二一年）度	五年間平均	四三・五四%
右五年間ニ於ケル軍費（臨時事件費ヲ含マズ）年額平均		五億一千六百萬圓弱		
（右五年間ニ於ケル大正三年（一九一四年）七月基準日本銀行調		物價指數平均二一七・七）		
目大正六年（一九一七年）一月一日至大正十年（一九二一年）末		日五年間ニ竣工セルモノ		
戰艦（目山級至陸奥）		五隻	一五四、七五〇噸	
乙級巡洋艦		七隻	三一、九六〇噸	
驅逐艦		四三隻	四〇、六四五噸	
潛水艦		一七隻	一二、八九九噸	
計		七二隻	二四〇、二五四噸	
年平均		四八、〇五一噸		
外ニ制限外艦船		九隻	八五、三〇〇噸	
總計		八一隻	三二五、五五四噸	
年平均			六五、一一一噸	



(三) 自大正十四年（一九二五年）度至昭和八年（一九三三年）度九年間ノ軍費ノ一覽會計表出ニ對スル割合平均

三〇。三%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費ノ年額平均 五億二千七百萬圓

（右九年間ニ於ケル大正三年（一九一四年）七月基準日本銀行

調物價指數平均一六三。二）

右年額平均ヲ軍府會廳直前當時ノ割合ニ達セシムレバ

七億六千萬圓

自大正十四年（一九二五年）一月一日至昭和八年（一九三三年）末九年間ニ於工セラルモノ

航空母艦	三隻	六〇、九〇〇噸
甲級巡洋艦	一二隻	一〇七、八〇〇噸
乙級巡洋艦	三隻	一五、五六〇噸
驅逐艦	四一隻	六三、一二六噸
潛水艦	三一隻	四五、八二六噸
計	九〇隻	二九三、二四八噸

二米

（イ）華府會議直前及最近九年間ノ軍費ノ總歲出ニ對スル割合及建造艦船概要

ニシテ前掲イ及ロノ一ニノ割合ニ違シ居レリ

昭和九年度軍費ノ一般會計歳出（歳入不足補填公債約八億一千萬圓ヲ含ム）ニ對スル割合

約四四%

八。〇。八。分。

(ハ) 自昭和七年（一九三二年）度至昭和九年（一九三四年）度三年間ノ軍費ノ昭和五年（一九三〇年）國民所得ニ對スル割合

四昭和十二年（一九三七年）歲入豫想十八億圓ノ

四一。七七〇八	七億五千萬元
四三。五五〇八	七億八千五百萬元

年 平 均	外ニ制限外艦船	總 計
三二、五八三噸	九隻	九隻
六、六六〇噸	二九九、九〇八噸	三三、三二四噸



(一) 自一九一九年度  
至一九二二年度

四年間平均

二三%

(右四年間ニ於ケル一九一四年七月基準物價指數平均一七三。八)  
自一九一九年一月一日至一九二二年末日四年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦

四隻

一二七、二〇〇噸

驅逐艦

二一〇隻

二三六、三六六噸

潛水艦

四三隻

二九、三六〇噸

計

二五七隻

三九二、九二六噸

年平均

九八、二三一噸

(二) 自一九二五年度  
至一九三三年度

九年間平均

一七%

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費ノ年額平均 約七億七千萬弗

(右九年間ニ於ケル一九一四年七月基準物價指數平均一二七。一)

前掲ノ數字ヲ基礎トシテ最近九年間ノ國費ノ二三% (華府會議直

前ノ軍費ノ割合)ヲ求ムレバ約十一億弗ト爲ル

自一九二五年一月一日至一九三三年末日九年間ニ竣工セルモノ

航空母艦

二隻

六六、〇〇〇噸

甲級巡洋艦	一〇隻	九二、六五〇噸
	乙級巡洋艦	七、〇五〇噸
潛水艦	一〇隻	一七、一一〇噸
	計	一八二、八一〇噸
平均	平均	二〇、三一二噸
口 華府會議直前及最近三年間ノ國民所得ニ對スル軍費ノ割合ハ		
自一九一九年度	四年間平均	二、二六%
至一九二二年度		
自一九三一年度	三年間平均	二、〇五%
至一九三三年度		
ニシテ最近ノ國民所得ノ二。二六%ハ約九億弗ナリ		
ハ華府會議直前ノ軍費ノ割合ガ概ネ平時米國民ガ我慢シ得ル限度ト見		
做セバ現在ノ情況ニ於テ米國ノ軍費ノ限度ハ概ネ十億弗見當ナルベ		
シ而シテ米國ニ於ケル軍費ハ陸海軍略同額ニシテ一九三三年度ノ海		
軍費提出豫算約四億五千五百萬弗（産業復興費ヲ含ム）及一九三四		
年ニ於ケル建造年量約六萬二千三百噸（軍令部第五課調査）ハ平時		
ニ於ケル限度附近ニ達セルモノト考ヘ得ベシ		



## 英國

尙一九三四年度ノ歳入不足約四〇億弗ナリシコトニ注意スルヲ要ス

(イ) 過去ニ於ケル軍費ノ總歳出ニ對スル割合及建造艦船概要

(一) 自一九〇六年度 九年度間平均 (英獨建艦 競爭時代) 三八・二%

右九年度間ニ於ケル軍費ノ平均年額 六千七百萬磅強

(二) 自一九一九年度 四年度間平均 (華府會議 前) 二二・六%

(右四年度間ニ於ケル一九一四年基準物價指數平均二五〇・四)

自一九一九年一月一日至一九二二年末日四年度間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦	巡洋艦	驅逐艦	潛水艦	計	年平均	(三) 自一九二五年度至一九三三年度 九年度間平均
一隻	一隻	四六隻	二二隻	八〇隻		一四・三%
四二、一〇〇噸	五五、九五〇噸	四六、〇四〇噸	一四、八三〇噸	一五八、九二〇噸		
				三九、七二〇噸		

右九年間ニ於ケル軍費年額平均 約一億一千三百萬磅  
 (右九年間ニ於ケル一九一四年基準物價指數平均一二九。九)  
 自一九二五年一月一日至一九三三年末日九年間ニ竣工セルモノ

戰艦	甲級巡洋艦	乙級巡洋艦	驅逐艦	潛水艦	計	年平均	過去ニ於ケル國民所得ニ對スル軍備ノ割合
二隻	一五隻	五隻	三八隻	二八隻	八八隻		一九一三年 三。三%
六七、四〇〇噸	一四三、九七〇噸	三九、〇七〇噸	五二、〇六四噸	三六、七九四噸	三三九、二九八噸		一九二四、一九二五年平均 三。六%
					三七、七〇〇噸		一九三一、一九三二年平均 三。四%
							(ハ)一般經濟界ハ尙不況タルヲ免レザルモ近來稍景氣恢復シ其ノ歲計ハ若干餘裕ヲ生ズルニ至リタリ



(二) 以上ヲ綜合スルニ現程度以上ノ基礎ヲ行フコトハ相當ノ困難トスル  
所ナリト觀察セラル

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分吉井道教ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ十一頁ヨリ成ル過去ノ記録ヲ基礎トスル各國ノ軍備ニ關スル考察ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(復員廳第二復員局)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル爲シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年八月八日 於東京

吉井通教

10

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎



To Foreign Minister Hirota From Disarmament

Delegate Message No. 54 Part 1.

We have first discussed the problem of quantitative disarmament and urged the consolidation of a basis for a disarmament agreement. You are doubtless already informed on the procedure of the conference having progressed as we desired. However, after the recess the Conference turned its attention from declaration of shipbuilding program to construction notification as reported in telegram No. 49.

As the situation thus showed a tendency to drift away from the problem of quantitative disarmament, our delegation considered it important to prevent it at an early stage, and on the 8th strongly emphasized the necessity of first discussing the quantitative problem and to leave the notification problem to a later date.

However, as you have already been informed by telegram No. 52, it was suggested by the British delegation that if our contentions were to be recognized it would mean that a decision would have to be made on our proposal before all the other proposals; in which event,

- (1) If the Japanese proposal were rejected, would the Japanese delegation be prepared to remain in the Conference and to discuss the other proposals; and
- (2) if the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Conference and the other four powers continued with the Conference, would our delegation be willing to send an observer?

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 19

Telegram 54 Part 2.

We, the members of the Japanese delegation have endeavored to our utmost since our arrival in London, both in and out of the Conference chambers in observance of the purport of your instructions to achieve the basic principles advocated by Japan. It is deeply regrettable that we could not convince the powers concerned. However, as the situation was as previously stated, we shall, after making further detailed explanation of our contention at the committee meeting to be held for the discussion of our empire's proposal on the 13th at 1730 hours, ask for definite expressions of opinion by all the powers. And after it has thus been ascertained that they are all opposed to our proposal, we believe that there will be no alternative for us but to withdraw from the conference with an explanation of the reasons for our inability to remain. Should the four powers continue the conference after our withdrawal, we can see no objection to the presence of a mere observer, since such a step should not work to our disadvantage.

Will you, therefore, give your careful consideration to situation in the conference, and then inform us as soon as possible of your opinion on the steps we propose to take, as abovementioned, and on the advisability of taking part in the discussion of the question of restrictions on the use of submarines.

If there is no prospect of your instructions reaching us in time for the meeting on the 13th, we propose to ask for a postponement of the said meeting. Will you, therefore, inform us also as to the date on which we may expect your instructions to reach us.



CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of 2nd Demobilization office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "To Foreign Minister Hirota from Disarmament Delegate Masago No. 54 Part 11", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Office).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30 day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

文附屬書第十九

昭和11 四六三 暗

倫敦 十日午後  
本省 一月十一日前着

廣田外務大臣

軍縮全權

縮第五四號ノ一(大至急、極秘、館長符號扱)

當方ニ於テ量的問題ヲ先議シ軍縮協定ノ基礎確立ヲ主張シ會議モ我方希  
望通り經過シ來リタル次第ハ既ニ御了知ノ趣ナル處休會明ケノ會議ハ往  
電縮第四九號報告ノ通建艦計畫宣言ヨリ建造通報ニ轉化セリ斯レテ量的問  
題ヨリ脫離セントスル形勢ヲ早シ來リタルヲ以テ本委員等ハ早キニ及ン  
テ之ヲ阻止スルヲ緊要ト認メ八日委員會ノ席上通報問題ヲ復廻ハシトシ  
量的問題ヲ先議スベキコトヲ極力主張セリ  
然ルニ往電縮第五二號ニテ御了承相成ルヘキ通り英國側ノ措置トシテハ  
右方ノ主張ニハ從ヘハ目下提出ノ諸案中先ツ帝國提案ニ關シ決定ヲ爲  
スコトトナルヘキ處



(一) 若シ帝國提案否決ノ場合我方ハ尙會議ニ殘留シ他ノ案ヲ計議スル意思アリヤ及

(二) 我方カ會議ヲ脱退シ他ノ四國カ會議ヲ續行スル場合我方ヨリ「オヴザバー」ヲ參加セシメ得サルヤヲ承知シタシト申出テタリ

(續ク)

縮第五四號ノ二（大至急 極秘 館長符號抜）

本委員等倫敦到着以來御訓令ノ趣旨ヲ諳シ會議ノ内外ニ於テ帝國ノ根本主張貫徹ノ爲極力努メタルモ遂ニ關係國ヲ説得シ得サルハ甚ニ遺憾トスル所ナリ然レトモ情勢右ノ如クナルヲ以テ我方トシテハ十三日午後五時半帝國案ヲ議題トシテ開カルヘキ委員會ニ於テ我主張ヲ更ニ詳細説明シ各國ノ決定的意響表明ヲ求メ反對ナルコトヲ明カニシタル上會議ニ留マリ得サル理由ヲ明カニシ會議ヨリ脱退スルノ外ナカルヘシト思考シ居レリ尙帝國ノ會議脱退後四國會議續行セラルル場合我方ヨリ單ナル「オヴザーパー」ヲ参列セシムルコトハ格別不利ヲ招來セサルヘキヲ以テ之ニ應シ差支ナシト認メ居レリ

就テハ會議ノ形勢篤ト御賢察ノ上本委員等ノ左措置並ニ潛水艇使用制限問題討議ニ應スルノ可否ニ對スル御意見大至急御同示アリタシ追テ十三日ノ會合ニ間ニ合フ様御同訓ノ運トナラサル御見込ナルニ於テハ同日ノ會合ヲ更ニ延期方申入レ度キニ付其ノ旨御同訓日取ノ御見込ト共ニ折返シ御電

（終）



Def Doc 1904  
Annex 19

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎

昭和二十二年七月三十日

於東京

吉井道敏

自分吉井道敏ハ第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ四頁ヨリ成ル廣田外務大臣宛草繕全權發電ハ日本政府（第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書（三號）

4

Def. Doc. #1904  
Annex 20

Date of dispatch: (P.M.) 12th January 1936

To : Plenipotentiary, Disarmament Conference.

From : Foreign Minister HIROTA

Subject : Instructions in response to request made  
by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament  
Conference.

(Code) Disarmament. No. 13

(Secret: )

On response to your telegram No. 54 Thanking every member of the  
delegation for your efforts.

1. You are to explain exhaustively our previous assertions at the  
next committee meeting and at other occasions that the basic  
policy of the Imperial Government is to establish a common  
maximum limitation as well as reducing offensive military  
strength both in quantity and quality thereby establishing a  
principle of non-intimidation and non-aggression, and also our  
assertions on a complete disarmament plan, that is, the complete  
abolition or extreme (drastic) reduction of aircraft carriers,  
capital ships and A-class cruisers which may be classed as  
offensive strength, which is in an inseparable connection with  
the common maximum limitation plan. Clearly explain that the



Imperial Government cherishes no other intentions and earnestly hopes for the conclusion of an impartial and fair disarmament agreement based on the above basic policy. Endeavour to express our sincerity towards the disarmament project. And still if our basic assertions are not recognized the Imperial Government does not hold any intention of remaining in conference to discuss over a shipbuilding notification plan or the plan on restricting quality. Consequently, cession from the conference would be inevitable.

2. In conformity with the above, endeavor to persuade other plenipotentiaries (delegates) to reconsider our proposal, but without pressing for its adoption. While on the other hand make it clear that there are no objections in settling restrictions on ----- and submarines, thereby concluding between the five nations concerned any possible agreements such as the restriction on using submarines at an early possible date. Moreover, lead the conference so it would be closed by announcing a joint statement to the effect that there would be no competitive armamenting among the participant nations. As for the other problems, in case it should be the request of the other powers, it is considered advisable if it took the form of transferring it to another new conference when the Imperial Government will not participate.

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3. The British side cherishes the opinion of retaining Clause 22, Chapter 4 of the London Treaty, concerning the restriction on employing submarines, as an independent agreement. The Imperial Government also does not have any objection towards the same provision becoming an independent agreement. If needs be, we have no objections in continuing the various clauses in the Washington Treaty, such as Clause 14 (restriction on arming merchant ships), Clause 17 (prohibition of using a warship under construction for another power, during war.), Clause 18 (agreements on disposition of warships). There are no objections in proceeding with negotiations, with the representatives of nations concerned, in adjusting such clauses and forming a new agreement.
4. In the case a conference should be held with our Government excluded, there is no objection in sending an observer to the conference. However, as to the selection of the observer you will wait for instructions.



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Annex 20

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Instructions in response to request made by the Plenipotentiary at the Disarmament Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947

(signed) YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

4

Ref Voc 1764-20

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書（三號）

自分吉井道致ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ二頁ヨリ成ル一單縮會議全權ニ對スル同訓一ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復員廳第二復員局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日 於東京

吉井道致印

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日 於 同 所

立會人 吳山八郎印



(附屬書第二〇)

發電昭和十一年一月十二日 後

軍 縮 全 權 廣田外務大臣

軍縮會議全權ニ對スル回訓

(暗) 緒第一三號(極秘館長符號扱)

貴殿第五四號ニ關シ

貴全權等ノ御努力ヲ深謝ス

一次同ノ委員會其ノ他ニ於テ貴全權ハ帝國政府ノ根本方針ハ共通最大限度ヲ設定スルト共ニ攻撃的兵力ハ量質兩方面ニ亘リ之ヲ縮減シ以テ不脅威不侵略ノ原則ヲ確立スルニ在ルコト竝ニ共通最大限度案ト不離ノ關係ニ在ル我徹底の縮少案即チ航空母艦、主力艦及甲級巡洋艦等攻撃的艦船ノ全廢若クハ極度ノ縮減ニ關スル豫テノ主張ヲ懇切ニ説明シ帝國政府ハ右根本方針ニ基ク公正妥當ナル軍縮條約ノ締結ヲ熱望スル以外他意ナキコトヲ闡明シテ我方ノ軍縮事業ニ對スル誠意ヲ披瀝スルノ方法ヲ盡サレ度シ而モ猶我方根本主張貫徹セザル場合ニハ帝國政府ハ會議ニ殘留シテ建艦通報案、質的制限案ヲ討議スベキ意思ナク窮極ノトコロ會議脫退ハ已ムヲ得ザル所ナリ

ニ右ニ依リ帝國提案ニ對シ篇ト各國全權ノ再考ヲ促スト共ニ之ガ採決ヲ強フルコトナク他方後類三、潜水艦使用制限等ノ取極ニハ異存ナキコトヲ明ニ

Ref Dec 1904-20

Ref Doc 1904-20

シ以テ成ル可ク早目ニ關係五國間ニ潜水艦使用制限等協定可能ナルモノヲ取決メ尙關係國間ニ競争ヲ爲サズト言フガ如キ共同宣言ヲ爲シテ競争ヲ終了セシムル様誘導シ爾餘ノ問題ニ付キ各國ノ希望スル場合ニハ帝國ノ参加セザル新ナル會議ニ讓ルガ如キ形式ヲ採ラシムルニ於テハ局面收斂上得策ナリト思考セラル

三 英國側ニ於テハ倫敦條約第四編第二十二條ノ潜水艦使用制限ニ關スル條項ヲ獨立ノ協定トシテ存置セツメタキ意願ヲ有スル處同條ノ規定ハ我方ニ於テモ之ヲ獨立ノ協定トナスニ異議ナク又云スレバ華府條約中第十四條（商船ノ武装ニ關スル制限）第十七條（戰事中他國ノ爲ニ建造中ノ軍艦使用禁止）第十八條（軍艦ノ處分方法ニ關スル約定）ノ諸條項ハ其ノ趣旨ヲ存續スルコトニ我方トシテ異議ナキ處ナルヲ以テ之等諸條項ヲ整理シ新ナル協定トナスコトニ付キ關係國代表ト折衝ヲ續クルコト差支ナシ

四 帝國ヲ除ク會議ヲ開催スルニ於テハ之ニ對シ帝國ヨリ「オブザーバー」ヲ出スコトニハ同意セラレ差支ナシ但シ人選ニ關シテハ追テ指示スベシ



JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON UPPER LIMIT  
OF NAVAL TONNAGE.

- L.N.C. (35)(1st Committee)  
10th Meeting on Wednesday,  
15th January 1936.

1. Although I have tried at past meetings of this Committee to explain our proposal at considerable length and in sufficient detail to clarify its purport as well as to point out its implications, it does not appear that I have succeeded in my task to the extent of removing all doubts from the minds of the other Delegations. I wish to be permitted to-day, therefore, to undertake a further elaboration of our plan by supplementing the explanations already given and, in order to assure a more complete understanding of our proposals, to offer our views on certain of the observations which the other Delegations have been good enough to make with reference thereto.

If any part of what I am about to say appears to you to be in the nature of repetition of statements I have already made, I can only ask your indulgence, for I feel that a certain measure of repetition is inevitable if I am to present the Japanese plan to you in the clearest possible light.

I wish further to state-with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers-that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace. It is our guiding principle in international politics that all nations should mutual understanding, that it should be made possible for all peoples, happily free from anxieties concerning their national security, to work out their respective destinies in an atmosphere of happiness and contentment that can only come as a blessing of peace among nations.

In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned. A plan of disarmament, to be adopted, must, of course, be one which does not give rise to the fallacious notion that there can be any justification for discriminatory treatment between nations, and we have taken great care to assure that the plan should moreover be a practical one.

Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in

discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.

As we are now about to enter on the final examination of the Japanese proposal, I venture to express the hope that the Delegations will find it possible, without undue attachment to existing facts or past circumstances, to approach the task in hand with a firm determination to draft a new and the very best possible plan, and, to that end, to study and discuss the Japanese proposal from every possible angle and with a sympathetic understanding of its spirit and purpose.

II. If any Power were to put forward a claim for a very large naval force in anticipation of a need therefore arising simultaneously in various parts of the world, such a claim might, in effect, amount to a demand for a naval force sufficient to deal with two or more Powers. Such a demand might tend to militate against the chances of reaching agreement on the disarmament question, which should, in any case, be considered on the basis of a "one Power versus one Power" relationship.

It two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.

Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially of those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in "A" class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposals that, as regards "B" class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally. It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility; and it goes without saying that this characteristic will become more and more pronounced in the future as improvements in the technique of naval construction continue. It is, moreover, a fundamental rule of naval strategy that forces which are scattered over several seas shall be concentrated in a single area whenever necessary for technical reasons. That this can be done-and, what is more, that a Power can concentrate its forces in a particular area so as to constitute a mortal threat to another Power-is borne out by numerous instances in naval history. Consequently, when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all the vessels



capable of participating in naval engagements shall be taken into consideration, and, if the total of such vessels of one Power is superior to that of the other, the only possible consequence is that the inferior Power will have its sense of security impaired, while the superior naval Power will be in a position to exceed the actual needs of its national defence, even to the point of becoming a menace to others.

Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and "A" class cruisers. But if there were a general general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.

As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

If this feature of the Japanese proposal were to be put into effect, we believe that naval forces would be largely deprived of their capacity for menacing other Powers. The complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments would not only result directly in a very substantial measure of reduction, but it would also have the indirect effect of producing still further reductions all round because the strengthening of the sense of security consequent on the disappearance of offensive types is bound to give rise to a general tendency on the part of the naval Powers to reduce further the sizes of their navies.

III. In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal features of the Japanese proposal, I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula, somewhat as follows:-

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned might exceed. This maximum global tonnage must not only be a suitable one for practical purposes, but it must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage, there would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognized to be predominantly offensive in character-namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and "A" class cruisers-a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards "E" class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognized to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories, so as to make it possible for each Power to determine,

in accordance with its own needs, the tonnage which it may deem appropriate in each of those categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances, may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in "A" class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories mentioned in paragraph (3). Although there may conceivably be numerous ways of effecting the above-mentioned reduction and increase, we believe it should be made the subject of technical examination.

This provision, together with the provision of paragraph (3), would give to each Power a very wide scope for making adjustments so as to compensate for its vulnerability.

(5) Since the powers concerned would be left to work out their naval problems according to their own free will within the scope of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Japan plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as a declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and, if it were proved to be reasonable and well-founded, Japan would not refuse its recognition. But since, as I have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a state of non-aggression and non-menace is at the very basis of our proposal, I think it can be readily understood that, while we might be able to recognise a claim for additional adjustment based on purely defensive needs arising from the special circumstances of the Power concerned, we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-aggression and non-menace.

Moreover, it is not intended that, a common upper limit having once been set, all Powers must build up to it. It goes without saying that each should restrict its navy to the smallest size with which its defensive needs can be adequately met. In this regard, goodwill and mutual trust among the various Powers are absolutely indispensable, and I believe the Committee will agree with us that, without such goodwill and mutual trust, agreement on any kind of a disarmament treaty is impossible, no matter by what formula or on what principles the attempt may be made.

If, on the other hand, it should be possible to deprive naval armaments of their capacity to menace other Powers, as is contemplated by the Japanese proposal, the various Powers would not feel the necessity of extensive naval construction; in fact, there would probably be no Power that would even contemplate huge naval programmes. We believe, in other words, that there is no ground for apprehension that the establishment of a common upper limit will give impetus to a general movement for larger navies.



IV. May I be permitted at this stage to consider in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, which I have just explained, a few of the points raised by the other Delegations in the course of their observations upon our plan, for I feel that the explanation of our plan will be facilitated by my so doing.

The view that a nation, by reason of its being also a Pacific Power, should be entitled to possess in the Pacific a naval strength equal to that of the other Powers in the same waters, in addition to other naval forces which it claims to be necessary in European waters or in the Atlantic Ocean, appears to us tantamount, in effect, to a claim to the right to possess a navy equal in strength to the combined strengths of the navies of two or more countries. Such a claim, it appears to us, may be said to be hardly commendable as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. And, as I have pointed out already, it would not be possible for us to support such a claim, in view of the highly mobile character of Naval armaments.

We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous overseas territories and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea, but which are suitable for coast patrol, defence of harbours and other similar purposes. But, if for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the condition of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their overseas possessions and lines of communication.

Frequent references have been made to the defensive needs of certain outlying possessions. But we find it difficult to see the reasonableness of a claim for superior forces for the defence of such outlying possessions if, as a consequence, the very heart of another Power will be menaced thereby.

It appears to us quite clear that a nation's ability to protect its overseas possessions and sea routes depends wholly upon whether or not it can control the seas.

Considering the question of overseas possessions and colonies from another angle, it would seem clear that, through the possession of such interests overseas, a nation enjoys the advantage of having bases and sources of supplies located in widely scattered parts of the world. That, we believe, may be an incalculable advantage, not only as regards the protection of lines of communication, but also in facilitating the movement and concentration of naval forces.

If we were to subscribe to the view that has been expressed, that a nation which is dependent on the sea requires a large naval force, it could be said for Japan that she too is wholly dependent on the sea. What is more, she is poor in natural resources and, with Her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence as well as for the raw materials for her industries. There is thus a vast difference between Japan and the countries which, though obtaining part of their supplies from abroad, can nevertheless have most of their needs supplied by their own territorial possessions; and this difference becomes even more pronounced when comparison is made with a country which has an abundance of resources at home and which is for the most part self-supporting and self-sufficient. Considered in that light, it is difficult to see how a country, so situated as Japan is, can be expected to feel secure with a naval force inferior to that of another whose circumstances are far more favourable.

V. By way of conclusion, I desire to say that, while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on attaining the impossible.

The plan which the Japanese Delegation has submitted to this Conference was prepared in the light of the experience and results of past disarmament conferences, with due attention to the actualities of the international situation of the day and with careful consideration of the various relevant problems from every possible angle. And it is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal, the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

Once the Japanese proposal is adopted by the Conference, the way could be found for incorporating therein the important features of the other proposals with such modifications as may be deemed suitable. For the Japanese proposal, as a formula for disarmament, is neither rigid nor academic. It is a practical one, marked by its comprehensive character and flexibility.

The Japanese Delegation, in submitting its proposal, was anxious that it should thereby be able to give satisfaction to all the Powers concerned in equal measure. It is only after the most careful study and mature consideration, prompted by our recognition of the urgent world-wide desire for effective measures of disarmament, that we have brought ourselves to place our proposal before this Conference.

I therefore desire finally to urge that all the Delegates be good enough to give their most mature consideration to our plan sympathetically and with an open mind.



Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Japanese Proposal for a Common Upper Limit of Naval Tonnage" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> London Naval Conference, 1935" as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Jui (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

文書の出所並に公正に関する證明

Def Doc # 1904-21

本證明書に添附した英語に依つて書かれ、東京からなる「Japanese Proposal for a Common Upper Limit of Naval Tonnage」と題する文書(附屬書第三十二)は私が一九三五年ロンドン海軍會議に専門委員として出席した際配布を受け、現に私が所持して居る會議議事録の寫であることを證明する。

昭和二十二年七月三十日於東京

榎本重治 (榎)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て爲された

同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎 (奥)

No. 1



Def Doc # 1904-21

110.2

一月十五日第十回委員會ニ於ケル

永野全權委員陳述

(I.N.C. (33))

第二

本日再び帝國提案、審議、機會ヲ得タルコトハ  
余の欣幸トスル所ナリ、時間ヲ節約スル爲日本  
代表、陳述ハ翻譯文ヲ朗讀セシムベシ  
我方提案ニ付テハ今日迄累次説明シ其趣旨  
ハ充分述べタル次第ナルガ尚或點ニ付テハ幾分  
疑義ヲ有スルル向モアルヤニ察セラルルニ付更ニ  
茲ニ説明ヲ補足スルコトヲ解、捷徑トシテ曩  
ニ我方提案ニ對シ提起セラレタル諸意見ニ對スル  
見解ヲモ開陳スル豫定ナリ或ハ或部分ニ付テハ  
重複ニ亘ルヤモ知シガルモ我方提案趣旨ヲ最モ  
明瞭ニスル爲必要已ムヲ得ザルニ出ズルモノナルヲ以  
テ豫メ御寛恕アラニコトナリ  
尚豫メ御了承ヲ得置キタキ一點ハ日本帝國  
ハ世界平和ヲ欲スルコトニ於テ何國ニモ譲ルモ  
ニ非ズ其信條トスル所ハ各國共ニ相互了解  
下ニ友好關係ヲ最モ敦厚ニシ各國民ハ各自其  
國家ノ安全、慶澤ニ浴シ平和、同ニ各自、  
運命ヲ開拓シ人類、幸福ヲ期スルニ存スルコト  
之ナリ  
故ニ軍縮協定ニ當リテハ戰爭、脅威ヲ除去

Def Doc # 1904-21

シ各國ニ齊シク國防、安全ヲ賦與スルコトヲ主  
眼トシ又之が協定、方法ニ付テモ各國家間ニ差別  
アリト、謬想ヲ誘致スルガ如キコトヲ案ヲ採用  
シ尚軍縮協定ニ最モ實際的ナルヲ要スルト認め  
ルニ付此點ニ付テモ最モ考慮ヲ拂ヒテ即チ日本  
案ニ公平ニシテ無理ナク且實際的ナル柔軟性ニ  
富タルモノト認めルヲ以テ各國ニ於テ篤ト研究シ  
同情ヲ以テ検討セラルルニ於テハ必ずヤ右案が軍  
縮協定、基礎トシテ妥當ナルモノナルコトヲ容易  
ニ發見シ得ルベシト信ズルモノナリ

茲ニ日本案、審議ニ當リ更ニ各國全權ニ於テ  
既存事實又ハ從來、經濟等ニ拘泥スルコトナク  
新ニ最善、方策ヲ案出セントスルノ大決心、下ニ  
最モ同情ナル態度ヲ以テ日本案、精神、存ス  
ル所ヲ了解シテ審議ヲ進サレシコトヲ切望スルモノ  
ナリ

## 第二

一 某國が世界各方面ニ於ケル同時需要ヲ生  
ズルコトアルベキヲ豫想シテ多量兵力ヲ要求ス  
ルコトアリトセバ見様ニ依リテハ二國以上ニ對應  
スル兵力ヲ要求スルノ結果トモナリ一國對一國  
ノ關係ヲ基礎トシテ論スベキ軍縮協定ヲ  
不可能ナラシムルモノト謂フベシ

二 二國が平等、立場ニ在リテ互ニ其、安全ヲ期



ddef doc #1904-21

10.4

シ得ル爲、海軍兵力ヲ協定ニトセバ均等兵  
力主義ニ依ルヲ最も合理的トシテ此非ニ公正  
ナル方違ハシ

大洋ヲ以テ相隔テ相互、國防カ專ラ海軍  
力ニ依存スル國家同ニ於ケル海軍協定ニ  
於テハ特ニ然リ

三他面ニ於テ海軍兵力、移動性並ニ海上戰爭  
、特質ヨリ論ズルモ國防、均衡ヲ得ル爲  
ニハ兵力ハ均等ナルヲ要ス艦隊兵力、骨幹  
トナルモノニ於テ特ニ然リ

此、見地ヨリ帝國提案ハ甲巡以上ヲ艦種  
別ニ各國均等トセリ

然レドモ專ラ防禦ニ使用スベキ艦種ハ各國  
、特殊、事情等ニ應ジ適當ナル調節ヲ  
行フコト可然

此、見地ヨリ帝國提案ハ乙巡以下ヲ一括共  
通、總噸數ニテ制限セリ海軍兵力ハ隨時  
隨處ニ集散離合スルコト極メテ容易ニシテ

且右、特性ハ將來益々大ナル、傾向ヲ有  
スルハ論ヲ俟タズ而シテ數個、海面ニ分散  
セル兵力ヲ用兵上、必要ニ應ジ之ヲ所要、  
時所要、地ニ集中スルハ兵術上、原則ニシ  
テ莫ク實行可能ナルコト特ニ莫ク集中ガ一國  
、致命的地點ニ對シテ行ヒ得ルコトハ過去

Def Doc # 1904-21

No. 5

現在ヲ通シ幾多ノ事實實ヲ以テ證明ニ得ル所  
アリ故ニ三國ノ海軍兵力ヲ論ズルニハ苟クモ海上  
戦闘ニ参加シ得ル凡テノ艦艇ヲ一括シテ之ヲ  
比較スルガ最も合理的ナルモノニシテ此ノ比較ニ於  
テ一國ガ他國ニ比シ其ノ兵力量ニ於テ優勢ナ  
ル場合ニハ當然、歸結シテ其ノ方勢海軍國ノ  
國防ノ不安ヲ感シ優勢海軍國ノ自國ノ國  
防ノ安全ヲ超ヘテ他國ヲ侵略シ得ルノ可能性  
ヲ生ズ

四 尚帝國ノ不脅威不侵略ヲ最も徹底的ニシ  
ルニ爲攻撃的兵力ヲ全廢若ハ大縮減ニ防禦  
的兵力ハ之ヲ國情ニ應ジ整備シ得ル如ク爲  
スントスルモノナリ

即チ帝國ノ航空母艦ヲ全廢シ主力艦、甲  
級巡洋艦、大縮減ヲ主張スルモノニシテ尚王  
力艦ニ付テハ一般の同意ニ條件トシテ各國  
ト共ニ之ヲ全廢スルノ用意ヲ有ス

右ガ實現スルバ海軍兵力、他國ヲ脅威スル  
性質ハ殆ド除去セラルベシ攻撃的兵力、全  
廢若ハ大縮減ニ之ニ依リ直接ニ一大軍縮ヲ  
實現シ得ルノミナラズ之ニ由未スル安全感、  
増大ハ各國海軍ヲ縮減セシムルノ傾向ヲ必然  
的ニ生ゼシムベキヲ以テ實ニ直接的ト同時ニ  
間接的ニ其軍備ヲ縮減スルノ效果ヲ有ス



Def doc # 1904-21

No. 6

### 第三

日本案ニ付各國全權、記憶ヲ新ニスル爲茲ニ更ニ其、方式、骨子ヲ示ス左、如クナルベシ

(イ) 關係各國、海軍軍備、其、孰モ超エベカラザル最大總噸數ヲ定ム

此、最大總噸數、實際的ニ適當ノモノニシテ而モ軍縮、精神ニ則リ出未得ル限リ低下スルベキハ勿論ナリ

(ロ) 石ト同時ニ攻撃的性質ヲ多分ニ有スル一般ニ認メラルル主力艦、航空母艦(全廢、協定スル場合)甲級巡洋艦、各艦種ニ更ニ共通、最大保有隻數及噸數ヲ定ム

Def. Doc. 1904-21

No. 7

(一) 防禦的性能ヲ有スト認めらるる乙級巡洋艦以下ハ  
括シ各國共通、合計噸數ヲ定ルニ止メ各國ヨリ  
其、需要ニ応ジ適當、艦種ヲ選ビ其、適當量ヲ  
整備セシム

(二) 特殊、國情ニ依リ特ニ必要ト認めらるる國ハ甲巡、保有  
量ヲ自ラ減スルコトニ依リ防禦性能ヲ有スト認めら  
るる艦船即チハニ記載セラルる艦船ヲ増加スルコトヲ得  
ベシ

右増減、方法ニ付テハ幾多、種類ヲ考慮シ得ベキモ  
專ラ技術的審議ニ委ヌベキモ、トス

(三) 方法ニ加フルニ更ニ本項ニ記載セラルる方法ヲ以テス  
バ各國、極メテ廣範國ニ於テ其、需要ヲ調節ス  
ルコトヲ得ベシ

(四) 右諸項ニ定ル範圍内ニ於テ各國、其、自由意思  
ニ依リ海軍軍備ヲ整備シ得ルモ、トス從テ日本案  
下ニ於テモ各國建艦案不宣言、如キ方式ヲ採用  
包含セシメ得ベキモ、トス

(五) 以上、如クスルモ尚修正、必要ヲ主張スル國ハ、各國間  
ニテ慎重ニ研究スル適當ニ修正、必要ニテ確  
認セラルるニ於テハ、修正ヲ否ムモノ非ズト雖モ元來吾  
人、主張、根本ハ屢々説明セル如ク先ヅ不脅威不  
侵略、狀態ヲ確立スルニテ以テ假令右、如キ修  
正ヲ許ストスルモ夫レハ各國、特殊ニ情ニ基テ純然  
ニ防禦用、モノニシテ決テテ折角確立セシ不脅威



Def. Doc. 1904-21

不侵略、然能て破壊スガ如キ海洋戰鬥兵力増加  
ヲ許スモノ非ザルコト、我々主張根本方針ヨリ見テ當  
然、ラトニ屬ス  
尚共通最大限、各國石限度迄建艦スベシト、謂非  
ズコト、屢次説明ニ通ニテ、各國、其國防上必要ト  
ス最小限度止ニシキ、勿論アリ、之ニ對シテ、各國、  
誠意（グッド・ウィル）ト相互信頼ヲ要求スモノ、ニテ之  
ヲ以テ、軍縮條約、如何ニ形式ニ依リテ同バ、協  
定ニ得ザルコト、本委員會モ之ヲ否定スル所ト了解  
他方ニ於テ帝國、主張ス如ク、海軍兵力、他國ヲ  
脅威ス性質ヲ陳スル、各國共ニ建艦ヲ必要  
トセス又之ヲ企圖ス、國モナキニ至ルモノ、共通最大限ヲ設  
定スル一般的海軍ヲ増大ス傾向有スト為ス杞憂  
アリト考フ

中四

帝國提案ニ對シ、各國全權ヨリ種々意見アリ、此  
際之等、意見、二三對シ、我々、基礎的觀念ニ基キ  
當方、見解ヲ簡單ニ述ベコトト為サントス、斯ルコトニ  
依リ、層次提案、趣旨ヲ明瞭トシテ得ベシト認ム  
ルヲ以テ、

No. 8

一太平洋ニ國无、故テ以テ同海面ニ於テ他國ト均勢ヲ要  
スルト、又、歐洲海面又、大西洋ニ亦然、兵力、陸軍  
要スト、趣旨、説アリタルガ此、主張、結果ニ於テ多數  
國標準、海軍ヲ要求スルモノトモ解セラレ、軍縮協定

Def. Sec. 1904-21

No. 9

基礎觀念として適當なることと思ふ

又右主張は海軍兵力の移動性たる性質より見て承認し難き  
ことハ屢次説明せし通り

ニ海外領土交通線等たる理由より沿岸警備要港灣防  
備用等洋上戦力ナキ純防禦用小艦艇ヲ他國ヨリ多ク要  
スルことトベキことヲ了解得ル同一理由より海軍兵力全般  
ノ優勢ヲ要求スルことハ他國ノ安全感ヲ動搖セシムルハ  
シ尚現在均等兵力保有國ヲ見ルモ海外領土交通線等  
ノ同一事ヲガルハ固知する事ナリ

三、一部局地防禦ニ付テ屢々論ぜラルル處斯ル局地ノ防備  
為ニ優勢兵力ノ保有ヲ主張ス其ノ結果他國ノ本土中  
杞ニ脅威ヲ與フルニ至ルことハ安當ナリト認め難シ

海外領地植民地及海上交通線ノ保護ハ一ニ懸クテ海ヲ制  
スルヤ否ニルことハ自明ノ理ナリ

四、他國ニ於テ海外領地植民地ヲ有スル國々等ノ各地ニ於テ根  
據地ト補給ノ便宜ト有スル之海上交通線保護上測知  
ルベカラザル利ヲ享有スルモノナリトスル其ノ海軍兵力ヲ所要  
ノ海面ニ集中移動スルヲ更ニ容易ナラシムルノ利便アリ

假令海ニ依存スル國家タル海軍兵力ヲ必要トスルノ説ニ從  
ヘバ帝國如キ全然海ニ依存スルモノニシテ而モ國內資源田豆  
富等ヲ加フルニ人口ハ世界各國中最モ稠密ニシテ且生活及產  
業上ハ必需品ノ大部ヲ遠ク洋ヲ渡リテ他國ヨリ仰グモノナリ此ノ點  
等ヨリ其必要物資ヲ海外ニ仰グトモ其ノ大部ヲ自國領土内ニ  
求ム得ルト大ニ相違



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No. 10

より更に國內資源豊富ニテ概不自給自足を得ル  
國ニ比スル格段相異ナリ此自地ヨリ充テ帝國、如中國  
ガ更に有利ニ地位ニ他國ヨリ為兵兵力ヲ以テ其安全  
ヲ期ス難キハ明ナリ

中五

帝國、飽ミ迄海軍軍縮ノ全般の協定成立ヲ希望  
スルモ、然レモ又決テ不可能ヲ強ヒトスルモ、非ズ  
帝國、過去軍縮ノ実績ニ鑑ミ又實情照シ各般ノ方面ヨ  
リ考察、結果帝國案ニ案未ニ充分ニ、三三案案ヲ以テ二  
般海軍軍縮ノ實現程ヲ容易ナリト確信ノ有テナリ  
一度帝國根本主張採用スルハ他國提案、如キ尤適當  
修正ト上採用、途見ベキナリ帝國案、案窮展充案ニテ、  
文字上の案ニテ、案案教性ニ當ルモ、案力尤實際  
的案ナリ

帝國委員、本案提出スルニ方、各國ニ執リ等テ好郡  
合ニテ、各國満足ヲ與ヘテ、願念ニテ、而テ、世  
界一般狀況ヲ軍縮、成立案案、充テ、修、研究ニ研  
究ヲ重テ、結果提出スルニ、充テ、各國全權ニ於テ  
充テ、虚心坦懷、更ニ精密ニ帝國案ヲ檢討、世界平和  
國民、福利増進、第一層考慮、充テ、充テ、充テ、充テ、

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy No. 129

L.N.C. (35) 7

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935

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The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation together with a copy of the reply, the terms of which were agreed at the Eleventh Meeting of the First Committee held on the 16th January, 1936.

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Secretariat-General,  
Clarence House,  
16th January, 1936.

JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

15th January, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour hereby to notify Your Lordship that as it has become sufficiently clear at to-day's session of the First Committee that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support, our Delegation usefully continue our participation in the deliberation of the present Conference.



We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limitation submitted by the other Delegations.

I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been good enough to conduct the Conference; at the same time, I should like to tender our deepest thanks on behalf of our Delegation, for the hearty co-operation of all the Delegations to this Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Sd.) OSAME NAGANO.

The Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,

First Lord of the Admiralty.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (1)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) 7 (Annex 22 (1))" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> London Naval Conference, 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ ENOMOTO Jui (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Def Doc. # 1904-22(1)

文書自ラ所註に正に關する證明

不證明書に添附した英語に依り書かれた二葉からなる「L.N.C.  
51」の記号を附した文書(附屬書目ナ三三三)は私が一九  
三五年にこの海軍會議に専門委員として出席した際既  
知を受け現に私が所持する會議議事録の寫である  
ことを證明する

昭和二十二年六月三十日

於東京

榎本 重治 (印)

右署名捺印は自分の面前に於て為され

同日於同所

主會人 奥山 八郎 (印)

Def. Doc. 1904-22-41

機密

L. N. C. (三五) X

謄本番号一〇二九

一九三三年倫敦海軍會議

事務総長は御挨拶を申し上げると共に日本代表より會議議長に宛たる書翰を呈送し一九三三年一月十二日開催の第一委員会第十回會合に於て同意する回答書と傳達致候

ウエストミンスター・パレス

ロンドン・イギリス

事務局

一九三三年一月十二日

一九三三年一月十五日

倫敦海軍會議日本代表

拜啓

會は閣下に対し本日の第一委員会會議に於て海軍軍備の廢止若く制限及縮減に對する我方の提案中に含まれる基礎的原則は一般の文書を得る事能はることを明かにせられたるを以て我が代表は今や二回上本會議の討議に有效に答へるを繼續する事能はることを論議に到達せしむることを通告するの光栄を有し候

然れ共我方は我方の提案は有效なる軍備縮小を達成する最



3

自 德

海軍大臣子三郎 大に名づゝるが公園下

CONFIDENTIAL.

L.N.C. (35) 9

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935

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The Secretary-General presents his compliments and transmits herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Conference by the Japanese Delegation.

Secretariat-General  
Clarence House,  
Westminster, S.W.1.  
21st January, 1936.

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JAPANESE DELEGATION TO THE  
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

January 20th, 1936.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter of the 16th instant and to state in reply that the Japanese Government are pleased to accept the invitation of the Committee to leave Observers who will keep in touch with the work of the Conference. The Japanese Government understand that such observers are to be present at the meetings of the First Committee and other important meetings.

I further have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Government have appointed Mr. K. Fujii, Charge d'Affaires, and Captain R. Fujita, Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy, as observers at the London Naval Conference.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Signed) OSAMI NAGANO.



Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

Right Honourable Viscount Monsell of Evesham, G.B.E.,

First Lord of the Admiralty and Chairman of the First

Committee of the London Naval Conference.

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 22 (2)

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in English, consisting of 2 pages and known as "L.N.C. (35) a (Annex 22(2))" is an official document handed to me when I attended <sup>the</sup> London Naval Conference, 1935 as an expert and is in my custody at present.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ MIYAMOTO, Jiji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,  
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Def Doc. # 1904-22(2)

文書のお所並に公正に開する 證明

本證明書に添附に英語に依る書かれ二葉からなる「  
これ(35)の」の記號を附して文書(附属書第三十二)  
は私が一九三五年四月に海軍會議に専門委員として出席  
しに際し配布を受け現に私が所持してゐる會議議事  
録の寫であることと證明する

昭和三年七月三十日 於東京

榎本

重治 (榎)

在署名捺印は自らの面前に於て爲るに

同日於同所

立會人

奥山

八郎 (奥)

Def Doc # 1904-22(2)

機密

L. N. C. (三五)元

謄本番第一三三

一九三五年倫敦海軍會議

事務総長は伺挨拶を申し上げると共に茲に日本代表  
より會議議長に宛てて書翰寫を傳達致候

ウエトミズリ・S. W. /

ウエトミズ

事務局

一九三六年一月三日

一九三六年一月三日

倫敦海軍會議日本代表

拜啓

陳者本月十二日附貴輪接受、余は日本政府が會議事務と  
接觸を保つ不ブザ―を要せむべきを貴會の招請を受  
諾するものと回答するの先を有し候、日本政府は右不ブザ―  
は亦貴會の會合及他、重要なる會合にお席すべき  
ものと解致候

余は更に閣下に対し日本政府に代理大使藤井敏之助氏、  
日本大使館附海軍武官藤田利三郎大佐を倫敦海



Def Doc. #1904-22(2)

軍會議が「ア」に任命せしむる通告するの先常と  
有候

永野 修身 敬具  
(果石)

倫敦海軍會議本（本員會議長  
海軍大臣子爵 元帥 元帥 閣下

Measures to be adopted in view of the  
World Naval Power Disarmament Conference.

-Excerpt from the Report submitted (August  
15th, 1934) by the Committee to investigate  
the matters concerning the Conference for  
the Reduction of Naval Armaments, 1935.

1. If an agreement should be formed at the next naval disarmament conference it may serve as basis to create a tendency for many more powers to conclude naval agreements: It would be necessary in such a case to take steps beforehand to consolidate the agreements which are already formed.
2. It is thought proper to meet the situation with the following policies when dealing with countries who are not contracting parties.
  - (a) Take into due consideration the existent conditions of all naval powers and reduce its armament as much as possible.
  - (b) As for the possession of capital ships, aircraft carriers, A class cruisers and submarines, they shall either be greatly limited or totally abolished in accordance with the agreement among the great powers.
  - (c) As for other types of vessels and exempted ships, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the Imperial Government's policy



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adopted hitherto as well as the provisions of the agreement which may be concluded at the coming conference.

3. In the event an agreement was not concluded at the next conference and if a naval disarmament conference participated by all the navies in the world was held, perhaps at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference, it is proper that the Imperial Government adopt the following policies.

(a) Firstly, an agreement should be formed among the major naval powers and it should serve as a criterion for general naval agreements.

(b) The naval powers other than the major naval powers, shall be dealt with according to the above item.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of 2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Measures to be adopted in view of the World Naval Power Disarmament Conference" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (2nd Demobilization Section of Demobilization Bureau).

certified at Tokyo,  
on this 8th day of August, 1947

(signed) YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,  
on this same date

Witness: (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



附屬書第二十三

世界全海軍國軍縮會議ニ應ズル對策

(昭和十年海軍國軍縮會議軍備制限研究委員會  
報告(昭和九年八月十五日)拔萃)

一、次期海軍國軍縮會議ニ於テ協定セバ更ニ之ヲ基礎トシテ多數國ノ海軍協定成立ニ導カントスル氣運ヲ在ブルコトアルベシ 此ノ場合既成ノ協定ハ豫メ之ヲ確保スルノ處置ヲ爲シ置クヲ要ス

二、右ノ場合既協定國以外ニ對シテハ概ネ左記方針ヲ以テ善處スルヲ適  
當トス

(イ) 各國海軍ノ現状ヲ考察シ出來得ル限り縮少ス

(ロ) 主力艦、航空母艦、甲級巡洋艦及潛水艦ノ保有ニ關シテハ大國間ノ協定ニ應ジ極力制限又ハ全廢ス

(ハ) 其ノ他ノ艦艇及制限外艦艇ニ對シテハ概ネ從來ノ帝國ノ方針竝ニ次期會議ニ於テ協定成立シタル規定ニ準ジ取扱フコトトス

三、

次期海軍軍縮會議ニ於テ協定成立セザル場合更ニ壽府一般軍縮會議  
等ニ於テ全世界ノ海軍軍縮會議開催セラルル場合ニ於テハ帝國ハ概  
ネ左記方針ヲ以テ臨ムヲ適當トス

(イ) 先ヅ大海軍國ニ於テ協定ヲ行ヒ之ヲ一般的海軍協定ノ基準タラシ  
ム  
(ロ) 大海軍國以外ノ海軍ニ對シテハ前號ニ準ジ善處ス

(終)



同日於同所

立會人 奥山八郎

自分、吉井道敏、復興局第二復興局文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラシタル日本語ニ成ツテ書カン 二 頁ヨリ成ル 世界全海軍國軍縮會議ニ應ズル對策ト題スル書類ハ日本政府（復興局第二復興局）ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十年八月八日 於東京

吉井道敏

立書ノ出所並ニ成テニ關スル證明書

(三號)

The Report Submitted To The  
Emperor By The Plenipotentiaries Attending  
The Naval Disarmament Conference  
Held At London In 1935.

Your subjects, Osari, Matsuzo and others in compliance with Your Majesty's command to attend The Naval Disarmament Conference at London, left Your Majesty's Palace on 16 November of last year and arrived in London on 2 December.

The conference opened on 9 December with its First General Meeting. Statements were read by the plenipotentiaries of the respective nations. Following which, considerations were to be made by the First Committee which was to consist of all members of the plenipotentiaries, but as we considered it more important to exchange unreserved opinions with the delegates of respective nations concerned, we did not wait for the conference to open and negotiated with British authorities which extended the invitation, and with the French authorities. After which, during the session of the Conference we conferred with the delegates of the respective participant nations now and then, thereby endeavoured to facilitate the accomplishment of our assertions.

At the First Committee session, we asserted that the question of limitation in numerical strength should be taken up with greatest importance in order to realize a disarmament and thereby requested priority in deliberating on this problem. The respective nations



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agreed upon this move and our plan of proposal was to be the subject of discussion.

The debate on our proposal continued through five sessions of the conference. The point of argument was centered upon the establishment of a common maximum limitation. We explained in details the fundamental policy of our Imperial Government. We also earnestly explained to the effect that in order to materialize the equality of security which the Disarmament Conference should attach great importance to, was to first, establish a common maximum limitation in view of the faculties of naval strength and next, if necessary, make adequate adjustments in contents taking into consideration the special circumstances of respective nations within the scope of the above common maximum limitation. To reach an agreement in numerical strength was the best method in attaining the objectives of armament restriction. However, the British side said that a nation whose vulnerability was great in national defense and its responsibilities extensive would have to possess military strength which was greater than the nation which was not so. Therefore, if a common maximum limitation was established such a nation would not only be left in insecurity but be extremely unfair. Again, if in case a common maximum limitation was established, such limitation could not be restricted to such low standards as Japan claims, but would invite in general an expansion in armaments. And if adjustments were made in view of the special circumstances of the various nations, it would ultimately be the acknowledging of differences in military strength.

Moreover, the balance of defensive strength which served as the basis of the Washington Treaty does not appertain to equality of military strength, and to determine a common maximum limitation and equalize military strength would upset the balance of defensive strength.

The American delegates emphasized that there was no other way to secure equality in safety and balance in defensive strength than to follow the principles of the Washington Treaty. They also expressed opinions similar to those of the British delegates.

The French delegates said that there was doubt in whether the common maximum limitation would provide sufficient security even if adjustments were made and also, if other European powers demanded its application it would create a general uneasiness.

The Italian delegates said that if adjustments were made according to special circumstances, it would mean the recognize such ratios.

Thus, every nation did not express approval of our proposal.

Against which we strongly emphasized that although naval strength should be considered as a whole because it can be shifted, our proposal would remove the difference in military strength which is the greatest cause for vulnerability in national defense and abolish offensive military strength while adjust defensive military strength thereby leading to a state of non-menace and non-aggression. Consequently there would be no uneasiness in national defense, no partiality and fear of armament expansion. As for adjustment, by taking into consideration the contents of military strength held by such means as holding special type



warships which will meet the demands of the special condition, it could be done within the scope of the common maximum limitation.

As for the Washington Treaty, it was based on military strength held by respective powers at that time. However, the progress in warships and military equipments and the change in situation has made it impossible to maintain equality in security. However, they firmly adhered to their own opinions and we too strongly adhered to our assertions with a resolute attitude from beginning to end.

During this time, we further endeavored to accomplish our assertion and held two conferences with the British delegates. However, the Imperial proposal finally could not win the approval of the participant nations, and on 16 December it was decided to postpone debates to a later date.

On the next day, the 17th, the U.S. side suggested devising some expedient measure to clear a way out of the deadlock between the U.S. and Japan. However, the above was based on previously existing treaties with a few modifications added to it and could not be accepted by our side.

The British plan of proposal which was submitted for consideration at the First Committee session following the debate on the Japanese proposal, recognized the independent right of armament as well as the announcement of a shipbuilding program in a fixed number of years, from an one-sided and voluntary standpoint. It was tendered as a numerical restriction plan, its significance being the averting of ratio. However, the above proposal was, in substance, aimed at supporting existing at

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expressed disapproval to the part dealing with the announcement of shipbuilding program submitted by France and Italy on grounds that adjustments could not be made on present military strength. As for the part dealing with notification of shipbuildings we took a non-debating attitude. In view of our strong attitude, the British side asked us straightforwardly if Japan would still remain at the conference if the Japanese proposal was rejected and would like to know if Japan would send an attendant to listen at the conference if it were continued by the four nations without Japan.

We had intended to continue further efforts to gain the understanding of the nations concerned by making still more explanations on our proposal, but when the situation had come to this stage, the adoption of our proposal was considered difficult and we judged that sooner or later we would have to leave the conference. Whereupon, we summed up the situation and waited for instructions from the Government. In compliance with the instructions received, we negotiated with the British side and as a result our proposal was to be submitted again to the First Committee session on 15 January.

At the session of the First Committee we explained the significance and contents of our proposal in details and cordially and urged the reconsideration by the participant nations. But the participant powers repeated their former opinions and adhered to the attitude of opposing our proposal. Whereupon it became clear that we could not gain the support of our proposal by the participant nations, and as our Empire



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At the session of the First Committee we explained the significance and contents of our proposal in details and cordially and urged the reconsideration by the participant nations. But the participant powers repeated their former opinions and adhered to the attitude of opposing our proposal. Whereupon it became clear that we could not gain the support of our proposal by the participant nations, and as our Empire

could not acknowledge other nations plans, it lead to our secession from the conference.

Moreover, we were to send an attendant to listen at the conference held among the four nations in complinace with the request made at the conference. Looking back upon the conference, we explained in details the significance and contents of our proposal ever since we arrived in London, beginning with the First General Meeting and not to speak of every conference where our proposal was considered and later on at practically every session of the First Committee which was held several times, and also at every opportunity. While on the other hand, even outside the conference, several meetings were held with the delegates of the U.S., Britain, France and Italy, exchanging frank opinions, thereby exerting every possible effort throughout the conference session in the hope of accomplishing our important task. However, to summarize the true motives of the nations concerned, Britain saw the necessity of taking into consideration the naval powers, both in the Pacific area and the European area, and could not approve of reducing her present numerical military strength. The U.S. though adding a few modifications, definitely sought to rely upon the significance of the treaties in effect and both France and Italy did not desire the proposal of a balance of powers in view of the special conditions peculiar to Europe.

For such reasons as stated above all participant nations did not approve of our proposal. Our being unable to accomplished our task by convincing them of our assertions and seceding from the conference was



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due to our incapability for which we are really sorry. However we are convinced that we have made it clear to the nations concerned the sincerity and policy of our Imperial Government in dealing with the problem of Naval disarmament.

We submit the above report to Your Majesty.

12 March 1936

Delegates Plenipotentiary at  
The London Disarmament Conference

Admiral:	Osami Nagano
Ambassador Plenipotentiary:	Matsuzo Nagai

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Michinori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives of the 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The Report Submitted To The Emperor By The Plenipotentiaries Attending The Naval Disarmament Conference Held at London In 1935", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The 2nd Demobilization Section of the Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 30th day of July, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,  
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)



Ref Doc 1904-124

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書 (三號)

自分吉井道致ハ復員廳第二復員局文書課長ノ職ニ  
居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セラレタル日本語ヨ依ッ  
テ書カレ八頁ヨリ成ル「昭和十年倫敦ニ於ケル海  
軍々縮會議全權ノ復命書」ト題スル書類ハ日本政  
府ハ復員廳第二復員局ハ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃  
ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年七月三十日

於東京 吉 井 道 致 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同 日 於 同 所

立會人 奥 山 八 郎 (印)



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3

府ノ根本方針ヲ詳述致シ軍縮會議ノ正ニ重視スヘ  
キ安全ノ平等ヲ實現センカ爲海軍兵力ノ特質ニ鑑  
ミ先ツ共通最大限ヲ設定シ次テ尙必要アル場合ニ  
ハ右共通最大限ノ範圍内ニ於テ各口特殊ノ事情ヲ  
考慮シテ其ノ内容ニ適當ナル調節ヲ加ヘ以テ兵力  
置ヲ協定スルコトカ本會議ニ於ケル軍縮協定達成  
ノ最良ノ方法ナリトノ趣旨ヲ續々説明致シマシタ  
然ルニ英國側ハ国防ノ脆弱性大ニシテ責任ノ廣汎  
ナル口ハ然ラサル口ヨリモ大ナル兵力ヲ保有セサ  
ルヘカラサルカ故ニ共通最大限ヲ設定セハ右ノ如  
キ口ハ不安ニ陷ルノミナラス甚シク不公平トナル  
ヘク又假ニ共通最大限ヲ設クルトスルモ右限度ハ  
結局日本ノ主張スルカ如キ低キモノトハナシ得ス  
シテ却テ一般的ニ軍備擴張ヲ招来スヘク又各口ノ  
特殊事情ニ應ジ調節ヲ加フルニ於テハ結局兵力ノ  
差等ヲ認ムルコトトナルヘシ  
尙華府條約ノ基礎トナレル防禦ノ均衡ハ兵力ノ均  
等ヲ意味セス共通最大限ヲ定メ兵力ヲ均等ト爲ス  
トキハ防禦ノ均衡ヲ極スコトトナルヘシト論シ米  
口側ハ安全ノ平等、防禦ノ均衡ヲ確保センカ爲ニ  
ハ華府條約ノ原則ニ則ルノ外ナキコトヲ力説シタ





昭和十年倫敦ニ於ケル海軍々縮  
會議全權ノ復命書

臣 修身  
松 三 等

倫敦ニ於ケル海軍々縮會議ニ參列ノ大命ヲ拜シ客  
年十一月十六日閣下ヲ辭シ十二月二日倫敦ニ到着  
シマシタ

會議ハ十二月九日第一回總會ヲ以テ開會セラレ參  
加各國全權委員ノ聲明ガアリ爾後審議ハ全權ノ全  
員ヲ以テ組織セララル第一委員會ノ行フ所トナリ  
マシタガ一方臣等ハ關係各國トノ間ニ隔意無キ意  
見ノ交換ヲ遂クルコトヲ有益ト認メマシタノデ會  
議開會ヲ待タス招請國タル英國側並ニ佛國側ト折  
衝シ又爾後會議中モ機ニ應シ參加各國委員ト會談  
シ以テ我主張ノ貫徹ヲ容易ナラシメンコトニ努メ  
タ次第デ御座リマス

第一委員會ニ於テ臣等ハ軍縮實現ノ爲メ最も重要  
視スヘキハ量的制限問題ナルニ依リ之ヲ先議スヘ  
シト主張シ各國之ニ聽從シ先ツ帝國提案ヲ議題ト  
スルニ至ツタノデ御座リマス  
帝國提案ノ討議ハ前後五回ノ會議ニ亘リ専ラ共通  
最大限設定ノ點ニ集中セラレマシタ臣等ハ帝國政

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Ref Doc 1904-224

府ノ根本方針ヲ詳述致シ軍縮會議ノ正ニ重視スヘ  
キ安全ノ平等ヲ實現センカ爲海軍兵力ノ特質ニ鑑  
ミ先ヅ共通最大限ヲ設定シ次テ尙必要ナル場合ニ  
ハ右共通最大限ノ範圍内ニ於テ各國特殊ノ事情ヲ  
考慮シテ其ノ内容ニ適當ナル調節ヲ加ヘ以テ兵力  
量ヲ協定スルコトカ本會議ニ於ケル軍縮協定達成  
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ヘク又假ニ共通最大限ヲ設クルトスルモ右限度ハ  
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シテ却テ一般的ニ軍備擴張ヲ招来スヘク又各國ノ  
特殊事情ニ應ジ調節ヲ加フルニ於テハ結局兵力ノ  
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等ヲ意味セス共通最大限ヲ定メ兵力ヲ均等ト爲ス  
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ハ華府條約ノ原則ニ則ルノ外ナキコトヲ力説シタ





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ル外英國側ト大同小異ノ意見ヲ述ヘ佛國側ハ共通  
最大限ハ假令調節ヲ加フルモ充分ナル安全ヲ與ヘ  
得ルヤ疑アリ  
又歐洲ノ他國カ其ノ適用ヲ要求スルニ至ルトキハ  
一般ニ不安ヲ醸成スヘシト爲シ佛國側ハ各國ノ特  
殊事情ニ應ジ調節スルトキハ比率ヲ認ムル結果ト  
ナルヘキ處伊國ハ比率ヲ認ムルヲ待スト述ヘ何レ  
モ我榮ニ贊意ヲ表サナカツタノデ御座リマス  
之ニ對シ臣等ハ海軍兵力ハ其ノ移動性ニ鑑ミ全部  
總括シテ考慮スヘキモノナルカ我提議ハ國防ノ脆  
弱性ノ最大原因タル兵力ノ差等ヲ撤去シ且攻撃的  
兵力ヲ廢滅シ防禦的兵力ヲ整備シ以テ不脅威不侵  
略ノ狀態ヲ招致セントスルモノナルニ付國防ノ不  
安モ無ク不公平モ無ク且軍費ノ快モ無カルヘシ又  
調節ハ各國保有兵力ノ内容ヲ考慮スルカ或ハ特殊  
ノ事情ニ應スル特殊ノ艦船ヲ保有セシムルカノ方  
法ニ依リ共通最大限内ニ於テ之ヲ爲シ得ヘシ尙華  
府條約ハ當時ノ現有兵力ヲ基準トシタルモノナル  
カ其ノ後ノ艦船兵器ノ進歩及情勢ノ變化ハ到底安  
全ノ平等ヲ期シ得ルニ至ラシメタリ等ノ理由ヲ敷  
衍シテ極力説得ニ努メマシタカ彼等ハ自説ヲ固執  
シテ譲ラス臣等モ亦終始確乎タル態度ヲ以テ我主



Ref Doc 1904-24

張ヲ飽迄堅持致シタノテ御座リマス

此ノ間臣等ハ英國側ニ對シ前後二回ノ會談ニ於テ  
更ニ我主張ノ徹底ニ努メマシタガ帝國提案ハ遂ニ  
各國ノ贊同ヲ得ルニ至ラス十二月十六日一先ツ委  
員會ニ於ケル討議ヲ後日ニ譲ルコトトナツタ次第  
テ御座リマス

翌十七日米國側ハ局面打開ノ爲日米間ニ何等カノ  
便法ヲ講シ度キ旨示唆シテ參リマシタカ右ハ既存  
條約ヲ基礎トシ之ニ若干ノ修正ヲ加ヘントスルモ  
テアリマシテ我方ニ於テ到底受諾シ得ナカツタ  
テ御座リマス

帝國提案ニ次テ第一委員會ノ審議ニ附セラレマシ  
タル英國案ハ軍備自主權ヲ認ムルト共ニ一定年間  
ノ艦艇計劃ヲ一方的且自發的ニ宣言セントスルモ  
ノニシテ比率ヲ避クル趣旨ノ量的制限案ナリトテ  
提示セラレタモノデアリマスルカ右ハ實質的ニ各  
國現在ノ不平等ナル兵力關係ヲ維持セントスルモ  
ノテ御座リマシテ我根本方針ト相容レサルカ故ニ  
臣等ハ之ヲ應諾シ得サル旨ヲ言明致シマシタ他方  
同案ニハ如伊兩國モ反對致シマシタル處其ノ後佛  
伊兩國ハ夫々帝國ノ立場ヲモ考慮シタル局面打開





6

案ナリトシテ短期建艦計劃ノ宣言ニ建艦通報ヲ加  
味セル案ヲ提出シ之ト同時ニ英國ハ單ナル建艦通  
報案ヲ提示シ會議ハ右三案ヲ建艦通報ニ關スル提  
案トシテ審議スルノ情勢トナツタノデ御座リマス

(以下次頁へ續ク)

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7

臣等ハ

夙クヨリ關係國ハ量的制限問題ノ解決ヲ至難ナ  
リトシ質的制限問題及第二義的問題ノ協定ニ止  
メントスルモノナルコトヲ感知致シテ居リマシ  
タル處會議カ若シ量的制限問題ヨリ離ルルトキ  
ハ我主張貫徹ハ益々困難ヲ加フルモノト思惟シ  
同問題先議ノ必要ヲ關係國ニ了得セシムルニ努  
メタノデ御座リマス

然ルニ情勢右ノ如ク建艦計畫宣言ヨリ量的制限  
問題ト關係ナシト認メラル建艦通報ニ轉化セ  
ントスルニ際會致シマシタノデ臣等ハ早キニ追  
ンテ之ヲ阻止スルヲ要スト認メ本年一月八日第  
一委員會ノ席上通報問題ヲ後廻シトシ量的制限  
問題ヲ先議スヘキコトヲ極力主張シ尙佛伊兩案  
中建艦宣言ニ關スル部分ニ對シテハ現在ノ兵力  
關係ヲ調整シ得サルモノナルニ依リ賛同シ得サ  
ル旨ヲ述ヘ他方建艦通報ニ關スル部分ハ之ヲ論  
議セザルノ態度ヲ執ツタノデ御座リマス  
英側ハ右ノ如キ臣等ノ強固ナル態度ニ鑑ミ若  
シ日本案否決ノ場合日本ハ猶ホ會議ニ殘留スル  
ヤ日本ヲ除キ四國ニテ會議ヲ續行ストセハ日本ハ





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ハ傍聴者ヲ参加セシメ得ルヤヲ承知シ度シト端的ニ申出タノデ御座リマス

臣等ハ

我提案ニ關シ一層ノ説明ヲ爲シ關係國ノ了解ヲ得ル爲依然努力シ度キ意嚮デアリマシタカ情勢斯クナリタル上ハ帝國提案ノ採決ハ已ムヲ得サル所ニシテ我方カ會議ヲ去ルハ早晚違クヘカラサルモノト認メマシタノデ事情ヲ具シテ政府ニ訓令ヲ仰キ同訓ノ趣旨ヲ体シ英國側ト折衝致シマシタル結果帝國提案ハ一月十五日ノ第一委員會ニ再ヒ上提セララルコトトナツタノデ御座リマス同委員會ニ於テ臣等ハ更ニ詳細懇切ニ我案ノ職旨及内容ヲ説明シ各國ノ再考ヲ促シマシタルモ各國何レモ從來ノ意見ヲ繰返シ我案反對ノ態度ヲ固執致シマシタ茲ニ於キマシテ我案カ關係國ノ支持ヲ得サルコト明瞭トナリ又帝國案ヲ承認スルヲ得マセヌノデ我方ハ同日此ノ上引續キ會議ニ参加シ得サル旨ノ通告ヲ送達シ斯クテ會議ヲ去ルニ至ツタノデ御座リマス

尙我方ハ會議側ノ招請ニ應シ四國間ノ會議ニ傍事者ヲ出席セシムルコトトナツタノデ御座リマス



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願ミマスルニ臣等倫敦到着以來第一同總會ヲ初  
メトシ帝國提案ヲ審議セル會議ハ勿論其ノ後數  
同ニ亘レル第一委員會ノ殆ント總テノ會合ヲ通  
シ機會アル毎ニ我提案ノ職旨内容ヲ解説シ他方  
會議外ニ於テモ英米並ニ佛伊國委員等トノ間ニ  
數次ノ會談ヲ行ヒ率直ナル意見ノ交換ヲ爲シ終  
始一貫全力ヲ傾倒シテ大任ヲ完フセシコトヲ期  
シタル次第デ御座リマス然ルニ關係國ノ真意ヲ  
要約致シマスルニ英國側ハ太平洋及歐洲海軍國  
等ヲ同時ニ考慮スルノ要アリトシ現有兵力量ノ  
縮減ニ應セス米國側ハ若干ノ修正ヲ加フルモ飽  
迄現行條約ノ趣旨ニ依ラントシ佛伊兩國ハ夫々  
歐洲ノ特殊事情ニ依リ均勢問題ノ提起ヲ欲シナ  
カッタノデ御座リマス  
石炭ノ次第ニテ各國何レモ帝國提案ニ賛同セス  
遂ニ我主張ヲ貫徹シ得スシテ會議ヲ去ルニ至リ  
マシタコトハ臣等微力ノ致ス所デアリマシテ眞  
ニ恐懼ニ堪ヘサル所デ御座リマスルカ海軍々續  
ニ對スル帝國政府ノ誠意及方針ヲ關係各國ニ闡  
明シ得タルモノト信スル次第デ御座リマス  
右謹ミテ復命致シマス



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昭和十一年三月十二日

倫敦ニ於ケル極東會議全權委員

海軍大將 永野 修身  
特命全權大使 永井 松三

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